Deterring A Rogue- And Attempting To Stop Iran From Acquiring Nuclear Weapons
(2006)Department of Political Science
- Abstract
- Can deterrence work against a rogue state? The following analysis is done in order to test the validity of deterrence theory upon a rogue actor, and if necessary, to try and develop it further. Whereas the security strategy proved successful against the Soviet Union because of mutual assumptions of rationality, it is questionable if it works towards new challenges today. The behavior of rogue states has been branded irrational, which makes many of the traditional claims of deterrence useless. Other factors have to be found if it is to succeed. Focusing on the psychological aspects of the theory, new insights may be discovered.
However, as the rogue concept is disputable, it becomes necessary to discuss the term in itself before any... (More) - Can deterrence work against a rogue state? The following analysis is done in order to test the validity of deterrence theory upon a rogue actor, and if necessary, to try and develop it further. Whereas the security strategy proved successful against the Soviet Union because of mutual assumptions of rationality, it is questionable if it works towards new challenges today. The behavior of rogue states has been branded irrational, which makes many of the traditional claims of deterrence useless. Other factors have to be found if it is to succeed. Focusing on the psychological aspects of the theory, new insights may be discovered.
However, as the rogue concept is disputable, it becomes necessary to discuss the term in itself before any answers can be given. Exemplifying the theoretical discussion will be an empirical one on the prospects of stopping Iran, branded a rogue, from acquiring nuclear weapons. The U.S. is chosen as the deterring actor in this regard. But seeing states as the ones to deter is not the best solution. Rather, international institutions should be given this task. The conclusion will therefore be that deterrence works best from a liberal institutionalist view rather than from a state-centric one. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/1325890
- author
- Magnus, Annie Elizabeth
- supervisor
- organization
- year
- 2006
- type
- H1 - Master's Degree (One Year)
- subject
- keywords
- Deterrence, Rogue State, Iran, The U.S., Perceptions, Political and administrative sciences, Statsvetenskap, förvaltningskunskap
- language
- English
- id
- 1325890
- date added to LUP
- 2006-06-19 00:00:00
- date last changed
- 2006-06-19 00:00:00
@misc{1325890,
abstract = {{Can deterrence work against a rogue state? The following analysis is done in order to test the validity of deterrence theory upon a rogue actor, and if necessary, to try and develop it further. Whereas the security strategy proved successful against the Soviet Union because of mutual assumptions of rationality, it is questionable if it works towards new challenges today. The behavior of rogue states has been branded irrational, which makes many of the traditional claims of deterrence useless. Other factors have to be found if it is to succeed. Focusing on the psychological aspects of the theory, new insights may be discovered.
However, as the rogue concept is disputable, it becomes necessary to discuss the term in itself before any answers can be given. Exemplifying the theoretical discussion will be an empirical one on the prospects of stopping Iran, branded a rogue, from acquiring nuclear weapons. The U.S. is chosen as the deterring actor in this regard. But seeing states as the ones to deter is not the best solution. Rather, international institutions should be given this task. The conclusion will therefore be that deterrence works best from a liberal institutionalist view rather than from a state-centric one.}},
author = {{Magnus, Annie Elizabeth}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Deterring A Rogue- And Attempting To Stop Iran From Acquiring Nuclear Weapons}},
year = {{2006}},
}