Intuitionens påverkan på moralbedömningar - en primingstudie
(2003)Department of Psychology
- Abstract
- This study tests the hypothesis that participants primed with intuition make stronger and quicker moral judgements, than participants primed with rationality. 68 students (51 female and 17 male) were primed and then asked to read stories describing morally questionable actions. Strength and time of moral judgement ratings were recorded, as well as self-reported rationality, experientiality (intuition) and disgust levels. There was no effect of priming on moral judgement. However, there was a significant main effect of experientiality. Participants high in experientiality made stronger moral judgements ( p < .006). There was also a significant interaction effect between rationality and disgust level, where participants low in rationality... (More)
- This study tests the hypothesis that participants primed with intuition make stronger and quicker moral judgements, than participants primed with rationality. 68 students (51 female and 17 male) were primed and then asked to read stories describing morally questionable actions. Strength and time of moral judgement ratings were recorded, as well as self-reported rationality, experientiality (intuition) and disgust levels. There was no effect of priming on moral judgement. However, there was a significant main effect of experientiality. Participants high in experientiality made stronger moral judgements ( p < .006). There was also a significant interaction effect between rationality and disgust level, where participants low in rationality and high in disgust level made the strongest moral judgements (p < .001). Results are discussed in terms of Haidt's (2001) Social Intuitionist Model. Keywords: Moral judgement, intuition, priming, disgust. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/1356062
- author
- Andersson, Yvonne and Thilderkvist, Lis
- supervisor
- organization
- year
- 2003
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- Psychology, Psykologi
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 1356062
- date added to LUP
- 2004-11-08 00:00:00
- date last changed
- 2004-11-08 00:00:00
@misc{1356062,
abstract = {{This study tests the hypothesis that participants primed with intuition make stronger and quicker moral judgements, than participants primed with rationality. 68 students (51 female and 17 male) were primed and then asked to read stories describing morally questionable actions. Strength and time of moral judgement ratings were recorded, as well as self-reported rationality, experientiality (intuition) and disgust levels. There was no effect of priming on moral judgement. However, there was a significant main effect of experientiality. Participants high in experientiality made stronger moral judgements ( p < .006). There was also a significant interaction effect between rationality and disgust level, where participants low in rationality and high in disgust level made the strongest moral judgements (p < .001). Results are discussed in terms of Haidt's (2001) Social Intuitionist Model. Keywords: Moral judgement, intuition, priming, disgust.}},
author = {{Andersson, Yvonne and Thilderkvist, Lis}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Intuitionens påverkan på moralbedömningar - en primingstudie}},
year = {{2003}},
}