Why is the CAP resistant to reform? Applying Public Choice theory in the analysis of the Common Agricultural Policy
(2009)Department of Economics
- Abstract
- Originating in the Treaty of Rome, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the European Union’s largest and first supranational policy, well-known for its high cost, trade distorting effects and its reluctance to change. Despite being subject to three major reform attempts during 1992-2003 many of the original defects still remain. The aim of this thesis is to examine how far reaching the CAP reforms that have already been made are, and to analyse the reasons for why more fundamental changes have not been done. By applying the theory of Public Choice, i.e. economic analysis of political institutions, it becomes possible to analyse the political aspects that are forgone in pure economical studies of the policy. The main findings of the... (More)
- Originating in the Treaty of Rome, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the European Union’s largest and first supranational policy, well-known for its high cost, trade distorting effects and its reluctance to change. Despite being subject to three major reform attempts during 1992-2003 many of the original defects still remain. The aim of this thesis is to examine how far reaching the CAP reforms that have already been made are, and to analyse the reasons for why more fundamental changes have not been done. By applying the theory of Public Choice, i.e. economic analysis of political institutions, it becomes possible to analyse the political aspects that are forgone in pure economical studies of the policy. The main findings of the thesis are that it is a combination of rational and self-interested behaviour of agents involved, and the institutional set-up of the CAP that causes the policy to be resistant to reform. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/1436606
- author
- Rivelis, Marta
- supervisor
- organization
- year
- 2009
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- EU, institutions, reform, lobbying, CAP, public choice, the Commission, bureaucracy, institutional set-up, rationality, collective action, Economics, econometrics, economic theory, economic systems, economic policy, Nationalekonomi, ekonometri, ekonomisk teori, ekonomiska system, ekonomisk politik
- language
- English
- id
- 1436606
- date added to LUP
- 2009-06-04 00:00:00
- date last changed
- 2010-08-03 10:52:18
@misc{1436606,
abstract = {{Originating in the Treaty of Rome, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the European Union’s largest and first supranational policy, well-known for its high cost, trade distorting effects and its reluctance to change. Despite being subject to three major reform attempts during 1992-2003 many of the original defects still remain. The aim of this thesis is to examine how far reaching the CAP reforms that have already been made are, and to analyse the reasons for why more fundamental changes have not been done. By applying the theory of Public Choice, i.e. economic analysis of political institutions, it becomes possible to analyse the political aspects that are forgone in pure economical studies of the policy. The main findings of the thesis are that it is a combination of rational and self-interested behaviour of agents involved, and the institutional set-up of the CAP that causes the policy to be resistant to reform.}},
author = {{Rivelis, Marta}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Why is the CAP resistant to reform? Applying Public Choice theory in the analysis of the Common Agricultural Policy}},
year = {{2009}},
}