Does cheap talk matters when the U.S.A is dealing with North Korea?
(2010)Department of Economics
- Abstract
- A game theoretical analysis of international policy is of great interest from an economist’s point of view and game theory has widely been used when analysing international trade, tariffs etc. In this thesis I will use “Cheap-Talk games” to analyse if threats from the U.S. targeting North Korea are having any impact. Cheap talk games are an application of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of “dynamic games of incomplete information” . In this type of games there are always a sender and a receiver of messages. In this thesis the sender of the messages is the U.S. and the receiver is North Korea. South Korea, Japan and China are other interested parties who are closely following the communication between the sender and the receiver. A... (More)
- A game theoretical analysis of international policy is of great interest from an economist’s point of view and game theory has widely been used when analysing international trade, tariffs etc. In this thesis I will use “Cheap-Talk games” to analyse if threats from the U.S. targeting North Korea are having any impact. Cheap talk games are an application of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of “dynamic games of incomplete information” . In this type of games there are always a sender and a receiver of messages. In this thesis the sender of the messages is the U.S. and the receiver is North Korea. South Korea, Japan and China are other interested parties who are closely following the communication between the sender and the receiver. A centrepiece of the theory of Cheap-Talk games is the paper “Strategic information transmission” by Crawford and Sobel . The paper presents three conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for cheap-talk to be informative between the sender and the receiver. By analyzing these three conditions in a “North Korean – U.S.” context I’m aiming to answer the key question of this thesis: Does cheap-talk matter when the U.S. is dealing with North Korea? This thesis provide an analyse that proves that is does. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/1543743
- author
- Levin, Rickard
- supervisor
- organization
- year
- 2010
- type
- H1 - Master's Degree (One Year)
- subject
- keywords
- game theory, Korea, International relations, Economics, econometrics, economic theory, economic systems, economic policy, Nationalekonomi, ekonometri, ekonomisk teori, ekonomiska system, ekonomisk politik
- language
- English
- id
- 1543743
- date added to LUP
- 2010-02-02 00:00:00
- date last changed
- 2010-08-03 10:53:02
@misc{1543743,
abstract = {{A game theoretical analysis of international policy is of great interest from an economist’s point of view and game theory has widely been used when analysing international trade, tariffs etc. In this thesis I will use “Cheap-Talk games” to analyse if threats from the U.S. targeting North Korea are having any impact. Cheap talk games are an application of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of “dynamic games of incomplete information” . In this type of games there are always a sender and a receiver of messages. In this thesis the sender of the messages is the U.S. and the receiver is North Korea. South Korea, Japan and China are other interested parties who are closely following the communication between the sender and the receiver. A centrepiece of the theory of Cheap-Talk games is the paper “Strategic information transmission” by Crawford and Sobel . The paper presents three conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for cheap-talk to be informative between the sender and the receiver. By analyzing these three conditions in a “North Korean – U.S.” context I’m aiming to answer the key question of this thesis: Does cheap-talk matter when the U.S. is dealing with North Korea? This thesis provide an analyse that proves that is does.}},
author = {{Levin, Rickard}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Does cheap talk matters when the U.S.A is dealing with North Korea?}},
year = {{2010}},
}