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De nya takeover-reglerna - särskilt om prisskillnader mellan aktieslag med olika röstvärden

Roos, Albert LU (2010) JURM01 20101
Department of Law
Abstract
The 1 October 2009 new Takeover Rules entered into force. The most material change of the new rules was that they decreased the possibility to offer multiple voting shares a higher price than ordinary shares. This is a strengthening of the legal principle of equality as applied at the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm stock market. The intention was to ensure that minority shareholders got a greater share of the takeover premium. This paper describes the Swedish system of multiple voting rights and the advantages and disadvantages of such a system. Followed by a review of the Swedish regulation of takeover bids in respect the Takeover Act and the self-regulatory Takeover Rules. With the new Takeover Rules only allowing for price difference between... (More)
The 1 October 2009 new Takeover Rules entered into force. The most material change of the new rules was that they decreased the possibility to offer multiple voting shares a higher price than ordinary shares. This is a strengthening of the legal principle of equality as applied at the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm stock market. The intention was to ensure that minority shareholders got a greater share of the takeover premium. This paper describes the Swedish system of multiple voting rights and the advantages and disadvantages of such a system. Followed by a review of the Swedish regulation of takeover bids in respect the Takeover Act and the self-regulatory Takeover Rules. With the new Takeover Rules only allowing for price difference between multiple voting shares and ordinary shares if there is a price difference in the stock market quotations. A bidder that wishes to offer a higher price for the multiple voting shares than for the ordinary shares shall seek the authorization of the Swedish Securities Council. Exceptions to the same price for all shares will only be given if the trade volume in the multiple voting shares are sufficient to give a true and fair pricing, price difference in quotations is not merely temporary or attributable to the demand of only one or a few buyers. In practice, these rules will pose a prohibition against price difference for multiple voting shares in takeover bids. Since many stocks have little or no price difference in quotations, or low trade volumes. Although it is hard to anticipate how the Swedish Securities Council will rule on authorization for price difference. Some may say that the new Takeover Rules will cause more damage to the stock market than keeping the old rules. One of the material flaws of the old Takeover Rules in regard to price difference was not solved. When a party has a holding past 30 percent and is exempt for making a mandatory bid, the party can offer whatever premium for shares as they like. As long as the party is only buying shares and not making a takeover bid. Against this background, it would have been more appropriate to amend the rules on mandatory bids and retain the possibility of price difference between multiple voting shares and ordinary shares. (Less)
Abstract (Swedish)
Den 1 oktober 2009 trädde en de nya Takeover-reglerna i kraft. Den största
nyheten i de nya reglerna var den kraftigt minskade möjligheten att erbjuda
röststarka aktier ett högre pris än röstsvaga aktier i ett offentligt
uppköpserbjudande. Detta är en skärpning av den aktiemarknadsrättsliga
likhetsprincipen och avsikten var att tillförsäkra minoritetsägare en större
del av uppköpspremien.
Uppsatsen redogör för det svenska systemet med röstvärdesskillnader och
dess påverkan för- och nackdelar. Därefter behandlas den svenska
regleringen av offentliga uppköpserbjudanden med grund i lagen om
offentliga uppköpserbjudanden på aktiemarknaden samt Takeover-reglerna.
I och med de nya Takeover reglerna tillåts endast prisskillnad mellan
... (More)
Den 1 oktober 2009 trädde en de nya Takeover-reglerna i kraft. Den största
nyheten i de nya reglerna var den kraftigt minskade möjligheten att erbjuda
röststarka aktier ett högre pris än röstsvaga aktier i ett offentligt
uppköpserbjudande. Detta är en skärpning av den aktiemarknadsrättsliga
likhetsprincipen och avsikten var att tillförsäkra minoritetsägare en större
del av uppköpspremien.
Uppsatsen redogör för det svenska systemet med röstvärdesskillnader och
dess påverkan för- och nackdelar. Därefter behandlas den svenska
regleringen av offentliga uppköpserbjudanden med grund i lagen om
offentliga uppköpserbjudanden på aktiemarknaden samt Takeover-reglerna.
I och med de nya Takeover reglerna tillåts endast prisskillnad mellan
röststarka och röstsvaga aktier då den kan härledas från en kursskillnad
mellan två noterade aktieslag. Om en budgivare vill erbjuda ett högre pris
för de röststarka aktierna skall tillstånd sökas av AMN. Undantag från
samma pris ges endast om likviditeten i aktieslagen är tillräcklig för att ge
en rättvisande prisbild, kursskillnaden inte är endast tillfällig eller hänförlig
till endast en eller ett fåtal köpares efterfrågan. I praktiken innebär dessa
regler i princip ett förbud mot prisskillnad i offentliga uppköpserbjudanden
då det i många fall är liten kursskillnad eller låg likviditet. Det går i och för
sig inte att veta exakt hur AMN kommer att tolka förutsättningarna.
Det finns också fog för att anse att den regel ändring som genomfördes är
mer till nackdel än nytta för aktiemarknaden. En del av kritiken mot de
tidigare reglerna riktade sig inte direkt mot prisskillnad i sig utan mot fall då
andra regler möjliggjorde att budplikt kunde undvikas. Mot bakgrund av
detta hade det varit lämpligare att ändra dessa regler och behållit
möjligheten till prisskillnad vid röstvärdesskillnader. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Roos, Albert LU
supervisor
organization
course
JURM01 20101
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
Associationsrätt
language
Swedish
id
1600121
date added to LUP
2010-05-07 09:12:38
date last changed
2010-05-07 09:12:38
@misc{1600121,
  abstract     = {The 1 October 2009 new Takeover Rules entered into force. The most material change of the new rules was that they decreased the possibility to offer multiple voting shares a higher price than ordinary shares. This is a strengthening of the legal principle of equality as applied at the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm stock market. The intention was to ensure that minority shareholders got a greater share of the takeover premium. This paper describes the Swedish system of multiple voting rights and the advantages and disadvantages of such a system. Followed by a review of the Swedish regulation of takeover bids in respect the Takeover Act and the self-regulatory Takeover Rules. With the new Takeover Rules only allowing for price difference between multiple voting shares and ordinary shares if there is a price difference in the stock market quotations. A bidder that wishes to offer a higher price for the multiple voting shares than for the ordinary shares shall seek the authorization of the Swedish Securities Council. Exceptions to the same price for all shares will only be given if the trade volume in the multiple voting shares are sufficient to give a true and fair pricing, price difference in quotations is not merely temporary or attributable to the demand of only one or a few buyers. In practice, these rules will pose a prohibition against price difference for multiple voting shares in takeover bids. Since many stocks have little or no price difference in quotations, or low trade volumes. Although it is hard to anticipate how the Swedish Securities Council will rule on authorization for price difference. Some may say that the new Takeover Rules will cause more damage to the stock market than keeping the old rules. One of the material flaws of the old Takeover Rules in regard to price difference was not solved. When a party has a holding past 30 percent and is exempt for making a mandatory bid, the party can offer whatever premium for shares as they like. As long as the party is only buying shares and not making a takeover bid. Against this background, it would have been more appropriate to amend the rules on mandatory bids and retain the possibility of price difference between multiple voting shares and ordinary shares.},
  author       = {Roos, Albert},
  keyword      = {Associationsrätt},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {De nya takeover-reglerna - särskilt om prisskillnader mellan aktieslag med olika röstvärden},
  year         = {2010},
}