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Skattekonsekvenser av aktieägartillskott från fysiska personer genom omvandlingar av fordringar och villkorade aktieägartillskott

Gustafsson, Mikael LU (2010) JURM01 20101
Department of Law
Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to clarify the legal position, concerning transformations of claims to conditioned or unconditioned capital contributions as well as transformations of conditioned capital contributions to unconditioned. I will discuss the consequences, both for the company and for the giver. Further, I will discuss the reasonability in the prevailing legal position, and I will try to point out remaining questions and try to bring an answer to them. My conclusions are as follows: As for the company, the contributions are tax-free, but can affect the possibilities to use the deficits from earlier years. This is the case due to specific rules if the contribution is made shortly before a change of ownership. Furthermore the... (More)
The purpose of this thesis is to clarify the legal position, concerning transformations of claims to conditioned or unconditioned capital contributions as well as transformations of conditioned capital contributions to unconditioned. I will discuss the consequences, both for the company and for the giver. Further, I will discuss the reasonability in the prevailing legal position, and I will try to point out remaining questions and try to bring an answer to them. My conclusions are as follows: As for the company, the contributions are tax-free, but can affect the possibilities to use the deficits from earlier years. This is the case due to specific rules if the contribution is made shortly before a change of ownership. Furthermore the position of the Swedish tax authorities is that an accord can be the consequence of the transformation. The accord would have the size of the difference between the nominal value and the market value of the transformed asset at the time of transformation. One could criticise the position of the authorities, since the court practice has shown that the whole transformed asset is considered to be divested. Since an accord is not considered to lead to a divestment, it appears unlikely that an accord would arise in the case of a transformation. Hence, the most reasonable position is that an accord does not occur. As for the giver, he is considered to have made a capital contribution, equal to the market value of the transformed asset at the time of transformation. Furthermore, the whole transformed asset is considered to be divested and tax deduction for capital loss is given. Albeit the legal position is not completely clear, there is much that indicates that the above mentioned applies for all kinds of transformations. The legal position this far does at least not seem unreasonable. Concerning repayments of conditioned capital contributions it could be concluded that it is within tax law considered as an amortisation, even though the repayment exceeds the market value of the transformed asset. I find it hard to motivate why such a payment should be deemed to be repayment, since practice has stipulated that a contribution cannot have a value exceeding the market value of the transformed asset at the time of transformation. Should it not be that value that sets the limit for what is to be considered as repayment instead of dividend, at least if the payment is not made to the same person as the one who actually made a real contribution (i.e. a contribution with a market value that equals the nominal value) from the beginning? It should be noted that the anti-tax evasion clause is applicable during certain circumstances when conditioned capital contributions are used to evade the special rules in chapter 57 of the Swedish Income Tax Act, Inkomstskattelagen (1999:1229). Which circumstances these are, is still somewhat obscure. Finally, it is mainly concerning the repayments of conditioned capital contributions the legal position appears to be illogical and hence unreasonable. If this prevailing position is going to persist, the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court, Regeringsrätten, has to be more elaborate and clarifying in its motivations. (Less)
Abstract (Swedish)
Syftet med denna uppsats är att klarlägga det skatterättsliga läget beträffande omvandlingar av fordringar till villkorade eller ovillkorade aktieägartillskott samt omvandlingar av villkorade aktieägartillskott till ovillkorade. Jag behandlar både konsekvenserna för bolaget och för givaren, samt diskuterar rimligheten i det rådande rättsläget. Dessutom visar jag på oklarheter i rättsläget och diskuterar möjliga svar på dessa obesvarade frågor. Slutsatserna är följande: För bolaget är aktieägartillskottet skattefritt, men det kan påverka möjligheterna att utnyttja tidigare års underskott, dels om omvandlingen sker kort innan ett ägarbyte eftersom tillskottet då ska beaktas vid bestämmandet av beloppsspärren, dels finns det risk för att... (More)
Syftet med denna uppsats är att klarlägga det skatterättsliga läget beträffande omvandlingar av fordringar till villkorade eller ovillkorade aktieägartillskott samt omvandlingar av villkorade aktieägartillskott till ovillkorade. Jag behandlar både konsekvenserna för bolaget och för givaren, samt diskuterar rimligheten i det rådande rättsläget. Dessutom visar jag på oklarheter i rättsläget och diskuterar möjliga svar på dessa obesvarade frågor. Slutsatserna är följande: För bolaget är aktieägartillskottet skattefritt, men det kan påverka möjligheterna att utnyttja tidigare års underskott, dels om omvandlingen sker kort innan ett ägarbyte eftersom tillskottet då ska beaktas vid bestämmandet av beloppsspärren, dels finns det risk för att aktieägartillskottet kan ses som ackord motsvarande skillnaden mellan den omvandlade tillgångens nominella värde och marknadsvärde vid omvandlingstillfället. Detta är i vart fall Skatteverkets ståndpunkt. Man kan dock ifrågasätta riktigheten i den uppfattningen, eftersom det i praxis har konstaterats att en värdelös fordran som omvandlas till ett ovillkorat aktieägartillskott anses avyttrad i sin helhet. Då ackord inte brukar anses innebära avyttring är det svårt att se hur det kan vara fråga om ackord vid omvandlingar. Det förefaller vara den rimligaste ståndpunkten att ackord inte uppstår. För givaren anses ett aktieägartillskott ha skett med ett värde som motsvarar den omvandlade tillgångens marknadsvärde vid omvandlingstidpunkten. Dessutom anses den omvandlade tillgången avyttrad och avdrag för kapitalförlust medges således. Även om rättsläget inte är helt klart, finns mycket som tyder på att ovan sagda gäller alla omvandlingar. Detta förefaller åtminstone inte orimligt. Vidare kan sägas att återbetalningar av villkorade aktieägartillskott betraktas som återbetalning av lån, även när återbetalningen överstiger marknadsvärdet av den omvandlade tillgången. Jag anser att det är svårt att motivera synen på en sådan utbetalning som återbetalning, eftersom praxis konstaterar att tillskott inte kan anses ha skett med mer än den omvandlade tillgångens marknadsvärde. Borde det inte vara det värdet som utgör taket för vad som ska ses som återbetalning och inte utdelning, i vart fall när det inte är samma person som från början har tillskjutit medlen som nu emottar ”återbetalningen”? Det har framgått att skatteflyktslagen kan tillämpas under vissa förutsättningar när villkorade aktieägartillskott används för att kringgå fördelningsreglerna i 57 kap. IL. Vilka dessa förutsättningar är mer precist är oklart. Det är främst beträffande återbetalningar som rättsläget förefaller ologiskt och därmed orimligt. Ska rättsläget i fortsättningen se ut så här måste det till en utförlig och klargörande motivering från Regeringsrätten. (Less)
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author
Gustafsson, Mikael LU
supervisor
organization
course
JURM01 20101
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
Skatterätt
language
Swedish
id
1600131
date added to LUP
2010-05-07 09:35:38
date last changed
2010-05-07 09:35:38
@misc{1600131,
  abstract     = {The purpose of this thesis is to clarify the legal position, concerning transformations of claims to conditioned or unconditioned capital contributions as well as transformations of conditioned capital contributions to unconditioned. I will discuss the consequences, both for the company and for the giver. Further, I will discuss the reasonability in the prevailing legal position, and I will try to point out remaining questions and try to bring an answer to them. My conclusions are as follows: As for the company, the contributions are tax-free, but can affect the possibilities to use the deficits from earlier years. This is the case due to specific rules if the contribution is made shortly before a change of ownership. Furthermore the position of the Swedish tax authorities is that an accord can be the consequence of the transformation. The accord would have the size of the difference between the nominal value and the market value of the transformed asset at the time of transformation. One could criticise the position of the authorities, since the court practice has shown that the whole transformed asset is considered to be divested. Since an accord is not considered to lead to a divestment, it appears unlikely that an accord would arise in the case of a transformation. Hence, the most reasonable position is that an accord does not occur. As for the giver, he is considered to have made a capital contribution, equal to the market value of the transformed asset at the time of transformation. Furthermore, the whole transformed asset is considered to be divested and tax deduction for capital loss is given. Albeit the legal position is not completely clear, there is much that indicates that the above mentioned applies for all kinds of transformations. The legal position this far does at least not seem unreasonable. Concerning repayments of conditioned capital contributions it could be concluded that it is within tax law considered as an amortisation, even though the repayment exceeds the market value of the transformed asset. I find it hard to motivate why such a payment should be deemed to be repayment, since practice has stipulated that a contribution cannot have a value exceeding the market value of the transformed asset at the time of transformation. Should it not be that value that sets the limit for what is to be considered as repayment instead of dividend, at least if the payment is not made to the same person as the one who actually made a real contribution (i.e. a contribution with a market value that equals the nominal value) from the beginning? It should be noted that the anti-tax evasion clause is applicable during certain circumstances when conditioned capital contributions are used to evade the special rules in chapter 57 of the Swedish Income Tax Act, Inkomstskattelagen (1999:1229). Which circumstances these are, is still somewhat obscure. Finally, it is mainly concerning the repayments of conditioned capital contributions the legal position appears to be illogical and hence unreasonable. If this prevailing position is going to persist, the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court, Regeringsrätten, has to be more elaborate and clarifying in its motivations.},
  author       = {Gustafsson, Mikael},
  keyword      = {Skatterätt},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Skattekonsekvenser av aktieägartillskott från fysiska personer genom omvandlingar av fordringar och villkorade aktieägartillskott},
  year         = {2010},
}