Skip to main content

LUP Student Papers

LUND UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES

The Disciplinary Power of the European Court of Justice

Perez, Monica LU (2010) STVM17 20101
Department of Political Science
Abstract
Abstract

To consider judicial institutions free from any form of political capability is to ignore theories such as judicialization which have described the process and/or ability to secure political needs through judicial procedures. Judicial institutions can thus be regarded as having both judicial and political power. This power can be described through the concept of discipline, which entails the power to correct any form of unwanted behavior. Disciplinary power is therefore here understood as political power. The question becomes whether this is also true for the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which is a part of the judicial institution of the European Union. The fact of the matter is that the ECJ does not only apply law but... (More)
Abstract

To consider judicial institutions free from any form of political capability is to ignore theories such as judicialization which have described the process and/or ability to secure political needs through judicial procedures. Judicial institutions can thus be regarded as having both judicial and political power. This power can be described through the concept of discipline, which entails the power to correct any form of unwanted behavior. Disciplinary power is therefore here understood as political power. The question becomes whether this is also true for the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which is a part of the judicial institution of the European Union. The fact of the matter is that the ECJ does not only apply law but creates law through the vast variation of case-law, which in turn has plowed the way for key principles of community law. Principles such as supremacy, direct effect and state liability have been used to insure compliance and the intended effect of community law. The ECJ has, by introducing and developing these principles, corrected unwanted behavior from member states – despite their at times strong objections. EU’s political needs can therefore be insured through its judicial medium – the European Court of Justice. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Perez, Monica LU
supervisor
organization
course
STVM17 20101
year
type
H2 - Master's Degree (Two Years)
subject
keywords
European Court of Justice, Judicialization, Disciplinary Power, Principles of law, Case-law
language
English
id
1608366
date added to LUP
2010-06-29 13:16:16
date last changed
2010-06-29 13:16:16
@misc{1608366,
  abstract     = {{Abstract 

To consider judicial institutions free from any form of political capability is to ignore theories such as judicialization which have described the process and/or ability to secure political needs through judicial procedures. Judicial institutions can thus be regarded as having both judicial and political power. This power can be described through the concept of discipline, which entails the power to correct any form of unwanted behavior. Disciplinary power is therefore here understood as political power. The question becomes whether this is also true for the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which is a part of the judicial institution of the European Union. The fact of the matter is that the ECJ does not only apply law but creates law through the vast variation of case-law, which in turn has plowed the way for key principles of community law. Principles such as supremacy, direct effect and state liability have been used to insure compliance and the intended effect of community law. The ECJ has, by introducing and developing these principles, corrected unwanted behavior from member states – despite their at times strong objections. EU’s political needs can therefore be insured through its judicial medium – the European Court of Justice.}},
  author       = {{Perez, Monica}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{The Disciplinary Power of the European Court of Justice}},
  year         = {{2010}},
}