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Incitamentsprogram - En aktiebolagsrättslig studie av regleringen för aktiemarknadsbolag

Walther, Carolina LU (2010) JURM01 20101
Department of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Under de senaste åren har incitamentsprogram har blivit ett allt vanligare tillvägagångssätt för att kompensera bolagsledningar. Vanligtvis består programmen av en blandning av fasta och rörliga ersättningar som kan baseras på kontanta och aktierelaterade incitament.

Den ökade användningen av incitamentsprogram kan förklaras genom agentteorin. Enligt teorin kan principalen styra agentens handlande genom ekonomiska incitament. Att kunna kontrollera bolagsledningar på det här sättet är centralt i bolagsstyrningssammanhang, eftersom aktiebolagets juridiska konstruktion medför att bolagsformen kommer förknippas med vissa inneboende konflikter. En av dessa är motsättningen mellan aktieägares och bolagsledningens uppfattningar om hur bolaget... (More)
Under de senaste åren har incitamentsprogram har blivit ett allt vanligare tillvägagångssätt för att kompensera bolagsledningar. Vanligtvis består programmen av en blandning av fasta och rörliga ersättningar som kan baseras på kontanta och aktierelaterade incitament.

Den ökade användningen av incitamentsprogram kan förklaras genom agentteorin. Enligt teorin kan principalen styra agentens handlande genom ekonomiska incitament. Att kunna kontrollera bolagsledningar på det här sättet är centralt i bolagsstyrningssammanhang, eftersom aktiebolagets juridiska konstruktion medför att bolagsformen kommer förknippas med vissa inneboende konflikter. En av dessa är motsättningen mellan aktieägares och bolagsledningens uppfattningar om hur bolaget ska skötas. Genom att koppla aktieägarnas målsättningar till resultatkriterier i incitamentsprogram kan man reducera den här konflikten och få bolagsledningen att arbeta mot samma mål som aktieägarna.

Det har dock varit tydligt att incitamentsprogrammen under senare tid snarare fördjupat än utjämnat motsättningen mellan aktieägare och bolagsledning. Detta problem har varit särskilt påtagligt under den senaste finanskrisen, som har exponerat de förödande konsekvenser som felaktigt utformade incitamentsprogram kan orsaka. För att förhindra den negativa utvecklingen har flera lagstiftningsåtgärder genomförts. På gemenskapsrättslig nivå har EU-kommissionen utfärdat två rekommendationer som tar sikte på incitamentsprogram i börsnoterade bolag. I Sverige har rekommendationerna införlivats genom lagstadgande krav i aktiebolagslagen och årsredovisningslagen samt genom självreglering i svensk kod för bolagsstyrning. Ett genomgående drag i regleringen är att den fäster tilltro till att en aktivare ägarroll kommer att omintetgöra incitamentsprogrammens problem. Regleringen söker främja den aktiva ägarrollen dels genom att tilldela bolagsstämman en central roll i besluten om incitamentsprogram, dels genom krav på den information som ska ligga till grund för stämmans beslut.

Då regleringen är relativt ny är det svårt att bedöma om den samlade regleringen är tillräcklig för att hantera de problem incitamentsprogrammen har orsakat. Det finns tyvärr flera brister i regleringen som talar för att så inte är fallet. (Less)
Abstract
During the last decades incentive programs have become increasingly more popular in terms of rewarding top-management. Ordinarily the schemes consist of a mix of fixed and variable pay, which may be based on either monetary or stock-related incentives.

The augmented use of incentive schemes may be explained by agency theory. The theory provides that a principal may control the behavior of an agent by offering financial rewards. The ability to control and direct top-managements in this manner is a crucial factor in issues relating to corporate governance, as the legal structure of corporations is profoundly associated with several conflicts. One of these is the opposition between the ambitions of shareholders and the ambitions of... (More)
During the last decades incentive programs have become increasingly more popular in terms of rewarding top-management. Ordinarily the schemes consist of a mix of fixed and variable pay, which may be based on either monetary or stock-related incentives.

The augmented use of incentive schemes may be explained by agency theory. The theory provides that a principal may control the behavior of an agent by offering financial rewards. The ability to control and direct top-managements in this manner is a crucial factor in issues relating to corporate governance, as the legal structure of corporations is profoundly associated with several conflicts. One of these is the opposition between the ambitions of shareholders and the ambitions of managers of how the corporation should be governed. By linking the visions of the shareholders to fixed objective in incentive plans, the conflict may be reduced, as the mangers will strive to achieve the objectives of the plans and thus concurrently abide the aims of shareholders.

However, in the last years it has become evident that the incentive plans have failed their purpose. Improperly composed incentive programs have augmented, rather than reduced the conflict between shareholders and management. As a response to the downward spiral, legislators have initiated several new enactments. Two new recommendations have been issued by the European commission and both have been adopted by Swedish law. The recommendations have been enacted in the Swedish Companies Act and in the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance. These regulations emphasize a more active role of shareholders to thwart the negative trend and safe-guard the future practice of incentive plans. This is accomplished by providing the general meeting with final decision-making power in terms of the plans. The active role is also promoted by extensive requirements on the information that has to be submitted to the shareholders before they may come to a decision at the general meeting.

As the regulations are fairly young, it is difficult to predict the outcomes of the enactments. However, there are a few deficits in the enactments that indicate that these may not be sufficient to avert similar failures in the future. (Less)
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author
Walther, Carolina LU
supervisor
organization
course
JURM01 20101
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
incitamentsprogram, skatterätt
language
Swedish
id
1748919
date added to LUP
2011-04-01 11:22:39
date last changed
2011-04-01 11:22:39
@misc{1748919,
  abstract     = {During the last decades incentive programs have become increasingly more popular in terms of rewarding top-management. Ordinarily the schemes consist of a mix of fixed and variable pay, which may be based on either monetary or stock-related incentives.

The augmented use of incentive schemes may be explained by agency theory. The theory provides that a principal may control the behavior of an agent by offering financial rewards. The ability to control and direct top-managements in this manner is a crucial factor in issues relating to corporate governance, as the legal structure of corporations is profoundly associated with several conflicts. One of these is the opposition between the ambitions of shareholders and the ambitions of managers of how the corporation should be governed. By linking the visions of the shareholders to fixed objective in incentive plans, the conflict may be reduced, as the mangers will strive to achieve the objectives of the plans and thus concurrently abide the aims of shareholders. 

However, in the last years it has become evident that the incentive plans have failed their purpose. Improperly composed incentive programs have augmented, rather than reduced the conflict between shareholders and management. As a response to the downward spiral, legislators have initiated several new enactments. Two new recommendations have been issued by the European commission and both have been adopted by Swedish law. The recommendations have been enacted in the Swedish Companies Act and in the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance. These regulations emphasize a more active role of shareholders to thwart the negative trend and safe-guard the future practice of incentive plans. This is accomplished by providing the general meeting with final decision-making power in terms of the plans. The active role is also promoted by extensive requirements on the information that has to be submitted to the shareholders before they may come to a decision at the general meeting.

As the regulations are fairly young, it is difficult to predict the outcomes of the enactments. However, there are a few deficits in the enactments that indicate that these may not be sufficient to avert similar failures in the future.},
  author       = {Walther, Carolina},
  keyword      = {incitamentsprogram,skatterätt},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Incitamentsprogram - En aktiebolagsrättslig studie av regleringen för aktiemarknadsbolag},
  year         = {2010},
}