Crucial decisions in the Eurogroup
(2012) STVK01 20112Department of Political Science
- Abstract (Swedish)
- This paper is a qualitative study of interactions between domestic and EU-level politics. I’ll apply the model of Two-Level Games by Robert D. Putnam on the 2011 Euro-crisis scenario where Finland hindered the negotiations of the new bailout package because they wanted to get collateral as a condition for future loans for the problem countries like Greece. First, a brief overview of the scenario is presented. Then, using the theoretical concepts of the Two-Level Games, Win-Sets for both Finland and the Eurogroup are presented. The domestic power balance, political institutions and preferences of the Chief Negotiators determine the Win-Sets. When a better picture of the Win-Sets is constructed, I’ll apply the model of Two-Level Games on... (More)
- This paper is a qualitative study of interactions between domestic and EU-level politics. I’ll apply the model of Two-Level Games by Robert D. Putnam on the 2011 Euro-crisis scenario where Finland hindered the negotiations of the new bailout package because they wanted to get collateral as a condition for future loans for the problem countries like Greece. First, a brief overview of the scenario is presented. Then, using the theoretical concepts of the Two-Level Games, Win-Sets for both Finland and the Eurogroup are presented. The domestic power balance, political institutions and preferences of the Chief Negotiators determine the Win-Sets. When a better picture of the Win-Sets is constructed, I’ll apply the model of Two-Level Games on this specific scenario. The study shows that the collateral demand negotiations had very distinct Two-Level dynamics and the decisions were made using a rational logic since the information flow and planning was very efficient in the final phase of the negotiations. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/2275589
- author
- Grönfors, Johan LU
- supervisor
- organization
- alternative title
- The case of collateral agreement and two-level games
- course
- STVK01 20112
- year
- 2012
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- Two-Level Games, domestic policies, political bargaining, Eurogroup, Finland
- language
- English
- id
- 2275589
- date added to LUP
- 2012-02-14 20:54:44
- date last changed
- 2012-02-14 20:54:44
@misc{2275589, abstract = {{This paper is a qualitative study of interactions between domestic and EU-level politics. I’ll apply the model of Two-Level Games by Robert D. Putnam on the 2011 Euro-crisis scenario where Finland hindered the negotiations of the new bailout package because they wanted to get collateral as a condition for future loans for the problem countries like Greece. First, a brief overview of the scenario is presented. Then, using the theoretical concepts of the Two-Level Games, Win-Sets for both Finland and the Eurogroup are presented. The domestic power balance, political institutions and preferences of the Chief Negotiators determine the Win-Sets. When a better picture of the Win-Sets is constructed, I’ll apply the model of Two-Level Games on this specific scenario. The study shows that the collateral demand negotiations had very distinct Two-Level dynamics and the decisions were made using a rational logic since the information flow and planning was very efficient in the final phase of the negotiations.}}, author = {{Grönfors, Johan}}, language = {{eng}}, note = {{Student Paper}}, title = {{Crucial decisions in the Eurogroup}}, year = {{2012}}, }