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Crucial decisions in the Eurogroup

Grönfors, Johan LU (2012) STVK01 20112
Department of Political Science
Abstract (Swedish)
This paper is a qualitative study of interactions between domestic and EU-level politics. I’ll apply the model of Two-Level Games by Robert D. Putnam on the 2011 Euro-crisis scenario where Finland hindered the negotiations of the new bailout package because they wanted to get collateral as a condition for future loans for the problem countries like Greece. First, a brief overview of the scenario is presented. Then, using the theoretical concepts of the Two-Level Games, Win-Sets for both Finland and the Eurogroup are presented. The domestic power balance, political institutions and preferences of the Chief Negotiators determine the Win-Sets. When a better picture of the Win-Sets is constructed, I’ll apply the model of Two-Level Games on... (More)
This paper is a qualitative study of interactions between domestic and EU-level politics. I’ll apply the model of Two-Level Games by Robert D. Putnam on the 2011 Euro-crisis scenario where Finland hindered the negotiations of the new bailout package because they wanted to get collateral as a condition for future loans for the problem countries like Greece. First, a brief overview of the scenario is presented. Then, using the theoretical concepts of the Two-Level Games, Win-Sets for both Finland and the Eurogroup are presented. The domestic power balance, political institutions and preferences of the Chief Negotiators determine the Win-Sets. When a better picture of the Win-Sets is constructed, I’ll apply the model of Two-Level Games on this specific scenario. The study shows that the collateral demand negotiations had very distinct Two-Level dynamics and the decisions were made using a rational logic since the information flow and planning was very efficient in the final phase of the negotiations. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Grönfors, Johan LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
The case of collateral agreement and two-level games
course
STVK01 20112
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
Two-Level Games, domestic policies, political bargaining, Eurogroup, Finland
language
English
id
2275589
date added to LUP
2012-02-14 20:54:44
date last changed
2012-02-14 20:54:44
@misc{2275589,
  abstract     = {This paper is a qualitative study of interactions between domestic and EU-level politics. I’ll apply the model of Two-Level Games by Robert D. Putnam on the 2011 Euro-crisis scenario where Finland hindered the negotiations of the new bailout package because they wanted to get collateral as a condition for future loans for the problem countries like Greece. First, a brief overview of the scenario is presented. Then, using the theoretical concepts of the Two-Level Games, Win-Sets for both Finland and the Eurogroup are presented. The domestic power balance, political institutions and preferences of the Chief Negotiators determine the Win-Sets. When a better picture of the Win-Sets is constructed, I’ll apply the model of Two-Level Games on this specific scenario. The study shows that the collateral demand negotiations had very distinct Two-Level dynamics and the decisions were made using a rational logic since the information flow and planning was very efficient in the final phase of the negotiations.},
  author       = {Grönfors, Johan},
  keyword      = {Two-Level Games,domestic policies,political bargaining,Eurogroup,Finland},
  language     = {eng},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Crucial decisions in the Eurogroup},
  year         = {2012},
}