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HoT and HoTer, or Why Rosenthalian HoT Assumes the Existence of a HoT-thinker

Yamazaki, Ryo LU (2012) FTEK01 20121
Theoretical Philosophy
Abstract
In this text the idea that a higher order thought theory is a fruitful theory is brought to question. This is done by proposing a simple question, by the form “Can we know if my computer is conscious?”. The main point of this text will be that HoT fails to answer the question in a satisfying way. This is because we can see from the distinction between creature conscious theories and state conscious theories, as proposed by Bayne, that HoT needs to be a state conscious theory. The simple definition of a state h(x) is however already presupposing a conscious system and thus fails to be a state conscious theory. An alternative definition of h(x) is then needed, but through observing several potential definitions of h(x) we see that it is hard... (More)
In this text the idea that a higher order thought theory is a fruitful theory is brought to question. This is done by proposing a simple question, by the form “Can we know if my computer is conscious?”. The main point of this text will be that HoT fails to answer the question in a satisfying way. This is because we can see from the distinction between creature conscious theories and state conscious theories, as proposed by Bayne, that HoT needs to be a state conscious theory. The simple definition of a state h(x) is however already presupposing a conscious system and thus fails to be a state conscious theory. An alternative definition of h(x) is then needed, but through observing several potential definitions of h(x) we see that it is hard to find. This is because, in a cognitive scope of functions, a state of the form h(x) does not seem to have any other function than to “make x aware”. While this does not prove that h(x) necessarily fails to be defined state consciously, I think it at the very least poses some problem for the premise of the theory. (Less)
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author
Yamazaki, Ryo LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
Tänkaren i en högre ordnings tanke
course
FTEK01 20121
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
Higher order thought theory, consciousness, philosophy of mind
language
English
id
2799384
date added to LUP
2012-07-27 15:08:38
date last changed
2012-07-27 15:08:38
@misc{2799384,
  abstract     = {In this text the idea that a higher order thought theory is a fruitful theory is brought to question. This is done by proposing a simple question, by the form “Can we know if my computer is conscious?”. The main point of this text will be that HoT fails to answer the question in a satisfying way. This is because we can see from the distinction between creature conscious theories and state conscious theories, as proposed by Bayne, that HoT needs to be a state conscious theory. The simple definition of a state h(x) is however already presupposing a conscious system and thus fails to be a state conscious theory. An alternative definition of h(x) is then needed, but through observing several potential definitions of h(x) we see that it is hard to find. This is because, in a cognitive scope of functions, a state of the form h(x) does not seem to have any other function than to “make x aware”. While this does not prove that h(x) necessarily fails to be defined state consciously, I think it at the very least poses some problem for the premise of the theory.},
  author       = {Yamazaki, Ryo},
  keyword      = {Higher order thought theory,consciousness,philosophy of mind},
  language     = {eng},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {HoT and HoTer, or Why Rosenthalian HoT Assumes the Existence of a HoT-thinker},
  year         = {2012},
}