HoT and HoTer, or Why Rosenthalian HoT Assumes the Existence of a HoT-thinker
(2012) FTEK01 20121Theoretical Philosophy
- Abstract
- In this text the idea that a higher order thought theory is a fruitful theory is brought to question. This is done by proposing a simple question, by the form “Can we know if my computer is conscious?”. The main point of this text will be that HoT fails to answer the question in a satisfying way. This is because we can see from the distinction between creature conscious theories and state conscious theories, as proposed by Bayne, that HoT needs to be a state conscious theory. The simple definition of a state h(x) is however already presupposing a conscious system and thus fails to be a state conscious theory. An alternative definition of h(x) is then needed, but through observing several potential definitions of h(x) we see that it is hard... (More)
- In this text the idea that a higher order thought theory is a fruitful theory is brought to question. This is done by proposing a simple question, by the form “Can we know if my computer is conscious?”. The main point of this text will be that HoT fails to answer the question in a satisfying way. This is because we can see from the distinction between creature conscious theories and state conscious theories, as proposed by Bayne, that HoT needs to be a state conscious theory. The simple definition of a state h(x) is however already presupposing a conscious system and thus fails to be a state conscious theory. An alternative definition of h(x) is then needed, but through observing several potential definitions of h(x) we see that it is hard to find. This is because, in a cognitive scope of functions, a state of the form h(x) does not seem to have any other function than to “make x aware”. While this does not prove that h(x) necessarily fails to be defined state consciously, I think it at the very least poses some problem for the premise of the theory. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/2799384
- author
- Yamazaki, Ryo LU
- supervisor
-
- Jan Hartman LU
- organization
- alternative title
- Tänkaren i en högre ordnings tanke
- course
- FTEK01 20121
- year
- 2012
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- Higher order thought theory, consciousness, philosophy of mind
- language
- English
- id
- 2799384
- date added to LUP
- 2012-07-27 15:08:38
- date last changed
- 2012-07-27 15:08:38
@misc{2799384,
abstract = {{In this text the idea that a higher order thought theory is a fruitful theory is brought to question. This is done by proposing a simple question, by the form “Can we know if my computer is conscious?”. The main point of this text will be that HoT fails to answer the question in a satisfying way. This is because we can see from the distinction between creature conscious theories and state conscious theories, as proposed by Bayne, that HoT needs to be a state conscious theory. The simple definition of a state h(x) is however already presupposing a conscious system and thus fails to be a state conscious theory. An alternative definition of h(x) is then needed, but through observing several potential definitions of h(x) we see that it is hard to find. This is because, in a cognitive scope of functions, a state of the form h(x) does not seem to have any other function than to “make x aware”. While this does not prove that h(x) necessarily fails to be defined state consciously, I think it at the very least poses some problem for the premise of the theory.}},
author = {{Yamazaki, Ryo}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{HoT and HoTer, or Why Rosenthalian HoT Assumes the Existence of a HoT-thinker}},
year = {{2012}},
}