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Quasi-governmental organisations - who is responsible in Laval?

Hansson, Daniel LU (2012) JURM01 20112
Department of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
I Laval målet så höll Domstolen fast att fackförbund ska hållas ansvariga för överträdelser av EU-rätten i form av blockering av den fria rörelsen för tjänster. Den här uppsatsen har som mål att undersöka det juridiska ansvaret för fackförbund och andra organisationer som är skilda från staten och som kan utöva statsliknande krafter – det jag kallar semi-statliga organisationer. De utövar vid tillfällen statens krafter men har de en stats makt? Dessutom, vem borde hållas ansvarig för överträdelser av EU-rätten när de nämnde krafterna är använda?

För att finna svaren på dessa frågor så kommer två EU-rättsliga principer att förklaras, det vill säga direkt effekt och statsansvar.

Direkt effekt i EU-rätten, grundad i Van Gend en Loos,... (More)
I Laval målet så höll Domstolen fast att fackförbund ska hållas ansvariga för överträdelser av EU-rätten i form av blockering av den fria rörelsen för tjänster. Den här uppsatsen har som mål att undersöka det juridiska ansvaret för fackförbund och andra organisationer som är skilda från staten och som kan utöva statsliknande krafter – det jag kallar semi-statliga organisationer. De utövar vid tillfällen statens krafter men har de en stats makt? Dessutom, vem borde hållas ansvarig för överträdelser av EU-rätten när de nämnde krafterna är använda?

För att finna svaren på dessa frågor så kommer två EU-rättsliga principer att förklaras, det vill säga direkt effekt och statsansvar.

Direkt effekt i EU-rätten, grundad i Van Gend en Loos, etablerade doktrinen där medborgare av medlemsstater kan åberopa EU-rätten i nationella domstolar mot medlemsstaten. Till en början var direkt effekt tämligen begränsad men utvecklades i den följande rättspraxisen, vilken etablerade att direkt effekt inte bara tillämpas på de själva fördragen utan även på förordningar, beslut och direktiv. Eftersom denna uppsats huvudfokus är Laval-målet så är det direkt effekt för direktiv som är fokus häri. Doktrinen om horisontell direkt effekt gjorde det möjligt för enskilda att stämma andra enskilda inför domstol för överträdelser av EU-rätten. Dock så komplicerade Marshall saken genom att förbjuda horisontell direkt effekt för direktiv. Domstolen håller fast vid förbudet även om den har utvecklat alternativ för att inskränka inverkan av Marshall genom en breddning av statsbegreppet och genom konceptet av indirekt effekt. Även om det var introducerat i Van Colson så var det Marleasing som etablerade horisontell direkt effekt för indirekt effekt – eller skyldigheten att tolka all nationell rätt i ljuset av EU-rätten.

Principen för statsansvar för skada liden av enskilda som en följd av en överträdelse av EU-rätten hänförlig till en stat etablerades i Francovich vari Italien befanns skyldig till underlåtenhet att implementera ett direktiv som gav vissa rättigheter till enskilda och var således tvungna att betala skadestånd till de enskilda ifråga. Principen utvecklades därefter till alla tillräckligt allvarliga brott begångna av offentliga institutioner som påverkade bestämmelser som hade för avsikt att ge rättigheter till enskilda, där det kunde finnas en direkt kausalitet mellan brottet mot skyldigheten som vilar på staten och skadan liden av de skadelidande.

I diskussionen så argumenterar jag för åtminstone ett medansvar för Sverige i Laval-målet på grund av överträdelserna, och omfattningen av dem, rörande omständigheterna i målet. Hur vi alla är ansvariga för våra egna handlingar men att vi ibland inte kan hållas helt och hållet ansvariga för desamma. (Less)
Abstract
In the Laval case the Court set firm that trade unions should be held responsible for transgressions of EU law in the form of obstructing the freedom to provide services. This paper has the aim to investigate the legal responsibility of trade unions and other organisations separate from the state that can still wield state-like powers – what I call quasi-governmental organisations. They wield the state’s powers at times but do they have the power of a state? Moreover, who should be held responsible for transgressions of EU law when said powers are used?

In order to find the answers to these questions, two principles of EU law will have to be explained, namely direct effect and state liability.

Direct effect of EU law, founded in Van... (More)
In the Laval case the Court set firm that trade unions should be held responsible for transgressions of EU law in the form of obstructing the freedom to provide services. This paper has the aim to investigate the legal responsibility of trade unions and other organisations separate from the state that can still wield state-like powers – what I call quasi-governmental organisations. They wield the state’s powers at times but do they have the power of a state? Moreover, who should be held responsible for transgressions of EU law when said powers are used?

In order to find the answers to these questions, two principles of EU law will have to be explained, namely direct effect and state liability.

Direct effect of EU law, founded in Van Gend en Loos, established the doctrine where nationals of a Member State can invoke EU law in national courts against the Member State. Direct effect at the start was fairly limited but developed in the subsequent case law, which established that direct effect did not apply just to the Treaties themselves, but to regulations, decisions and directives as well. As this paper’s main focus is the Laval case, the direct effect for directives is also the focus herein. The doctrine of horizontal direct effect made it possible for individuals to bring matters against other individuals before the courts for transgressions of EU law. However, Marshall complicated matters with a prohibition of horizontal direct effect for directives. The Court holds firm the prohibition although it has developed alternatives to reduce the impact of Marshall through a broadening of the concept of the state and the concept of indirect effect. Although introduced in Van Colson, it was Marleasing that established horizontal effect for indirect effect – or the obligation of national legislation to be interpreted in the light of EU law.

The principle of state liability for harm suffered by individuals as a result of an infringement of EU law attributable to a state was established in Francovich wherein Italy was found to be guilty of failure to implement a directive that granted certain rights to individuals and therefore had to pay damages to the individuals in question. The principle was subsequently developed to all sufficiently serious breaches made by public institutions that affected a provision that had been intended to confer rights on individuals, where there could be found a direct casual link between the breach of the obligation resting on the state and the damage sustained by the injured parties.

In the discussion I argue for the, at the very least, co-responsibility for Sweden in the case of Laval due to the transgressions and the magnitude of them in the facts regarding that case. How we are all responsible for our own actions but that we sometimes cannot be held completely responsible for the same. (Less)
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author
Hansson, Daniel LU
supervisor
organization
course
JURM01 20112
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
language
English
id
2857156
date added to LUP
2012-07-13 10:49:22
date last changed
2012-07-13 10:49:22
@misc{2857156,
  abstract     = {In the Laval case the Court set firm that trade unions should be held responsible for transgressions of EU law in the form of obstructing the freedom to provide services. This paper has the aim to investigate the legal responsibility of trade unions and other organisations separate from the state that can still wield state-like powers – what I call quasi-governmental organisations. They wield the state’s powers at times but do they have the power of a state? Moreover, who should be held responsible for transgressions of EU law when said powers are used?

In order to find the answers to these questions, two principles of EU law will have to be explained, namely direct effect and state liability. 

Direct effect of EU law, founded in Van Gend en Loos, established the doctrine where nationals of a Member State can invoke EU law in national courts against the Member State. Direct effect at the start was fairly limited but developed in the subsequent case law, which established that direct effect did not apply just to the Treaties themselves, but to regulations, decisions and directives as well. As this paper’s main focus is the Laval case, the direct effect for directives is also the focus herein. The doctrine of horizontal direct effect made it possible for individuals to bring matters against other individuals before the courts for transgressions of EU law. However, Marshall complicated matters with a prohibition of horizontal direct effect for directives. The Court holds firm the prohibition although it has developed alternatives to reduce the impact of Marshall through a broadening of the concept of the state and the concept of indirect effect. Although introduced in Van Colson, it was Marleasing that established horizontal effect for indirect effect – or the obligation of national legislation to be interpreted in the light of EU law.

The principle of state liability for harm suffered by individuals as a result of an infringement of EU law attributable to a state was established in Francovich wherein Italy was found to be guilty of failure to implement a directive that granted certain rights to individuals and therefore had to pay damages to the individuals in question. The principle was subsequently developed to all sufficiently serious breaches made by public institutions that affected a provision that had been intended to confer rights on individuals, where there could be found a direct casual link between the breach of the obligation resting on the state and the damage sustained by the injured parties. 

In the discussion I argue for the, at the very least, co-responsibility for Sweden in the case of Laval due to the transgressions and the magnitude of them in the facts regarding that case. How we are all responsible for our own actions but that we sometimes cannot be held completely responsible for the same.},
  author       = {Hansson, Daniel},
  language     = {eng},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Quasi-governmental organisations - who is responsible in Laval?},
  year         = {2012},
}