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Budpliktsreglerna på den svenska aktiemarknaden

Slettengren, Ian LU (2012) JURM02 20121
Department of Law
Abstract
Mandatory bid rules were introduced in NBK´s recommendation in 1999,
and then statutory in LUA in 2005, after an implementation of the takeoverdirective.
The phenomenon with mandatory bid rules is therefore relatively
new on the Swedish stock market why its application and impact is
interesting to evaluate.
Mandatory bid rules derives from the Takeover Code, from the UK, that
emerged when the stock market during the 1960-1970´s, suffered from an
increased number of takeovers. This created a demand to protect minority
shareholders. The mandatory bid rules were designed to protect shareholders
from two-tier bids and to assure that the minority shareholders had the
opportunity to utter their shares at a change of control. There are,... (More)
Mandatory bid rules were introduced in NBK´s recommendation in 1999,
and then statutory in LUA in 2005, after an implementation of the takeoverdirective.
The phenomenon with mandatory bid rules is therefore relatively
new on the Swedish stock market why its application and impact is
interesting to evaluate.
Mandatory bid rules derives from the Takeover Code, from the UK, that
emerged when the stock market during the 1960-1970´s, suffered from an
increased number of takeovers. This created a demand to protect minority
shareholders. The mandatory bid rules were designed to protect shareholders
from two-tier bids and to assure that the minority shareholders had the
opportunity to utter their shares at a change of control. There are, however,
theories that claims that the bid rules does not really cater to minority
protection as they create a stock market that makes it less attractive for
takeovers and thus reduces the minority shareholders the opportunity to
receive a premium bid. This also implies that the rules create a market
where the established players will benefit from the rules because they are
the only ones who have the financial means to carry through a takeover. It
also creates a more concentrated ownership structure.
The revision in LUA was, however, not a startling change for the players on
the market since it was composed with similar provisions, as the exchange's
regulatory. In Sweden the mandatory bid limit is 30 percent of the votes and
is composed with a rule that makes the bid equal to all shareholders. The
Swedish related criteria is more circumstantial than that in the takeoverdirective
which means that is becomes more difficult for the market
participants through collaboration with related parties to circumvent the
mandatory bid rules. It is however possible, through LUA, to deviate from
the rules. The rules also provide and opportunity to apply for dispensation
from the mandatory bid rules, a practice some consider to be applied far to
liberally. The dispensation process, however, creates a flexible application
of the rules as a dispensation is granted through an evaluation between the
objectives of the mandatory bid rules and the market efficiency. It has also
been evaluated if the market behaviour on the Swedish stock market is such
that the transferees at takeovers aim to reach 90 percent of the shares. This
market behaviour should rather be an effect of the rules binding nature.
The conclusion is therefore that it is not entirely obvious that the effect of
the rules creates the best protection for minority shareholders. This is
because the rules create a market with fewer takeovers and a market where
only the established players have the financial ability to operate on the
market. This must, however, be balanced against the rules historical nature
designed to create a secure marketplace where minority interests are met
through a healthy takeover-regulation. (Less)
Abstract (Swedish)
Regler om budplikt infördes i NBK:s rekommendationer 1999. Efter en
komplettering av takeover-direktivet blev det lag i LUA 2005. Företeelsen
med budplikt på den svenska aktiemarknaden är således relativ ny, varför
dess tillämpning och effekt är intressant att utreda.
Budpliktsreglerna härstammar från Takeover Code i Storbritannien som
uppstod efter att aktiemarknaden, under 1960-1970-talet, blev föremål för
takeovers som skapade behov av att skydda minoritetsaktieägare vid
kontrollägarskiften. Budpliktsreglerna skapade ett regelverk så att samtliga
aktieägare erhöll lika budpremier och att minoritetsaktieägare hade
möjlighet att avyttra sina aktier vid ett kontrollägarskifte. Det finns dock de
som hävdar att budpliktsreglerna... (More)
Regler om budplikt infördes i NBK:s rekommendationer 1999. Efter en
komplettering av takeover-direktivet blev det lag i LUA 2005. Företeelsen
med budplikt på den svenska aktiemarknaden är således relativ ny, varför
dess tillämpning och effekt är intressant att utreda.
Budpliktsreglerna härstammar från Takeover Code i Storbritannien som
uppstod efter att aktiemarknaden, under 1960-1970-talet, blev föremål för
takeovers som skapade behov av att skydda minoritetsaktieägare vid
kontrollägarskiften. Budpliktsreglerna skapade ett regelverk så att samtliga
aktieägare erhöll lika budpremier och att minoritetsaktieägare hade
möjlighet att avyttra sina aktier vid ett kontrollägarskifte. Det finns dock de
som hävdar att budpliktsreglerna inte alls tillgodoser minoritetsskyddet,
eftersom de skapar en aktiemarknad som blir mindre attraktivt för takeovers
och således minskar minoritetsaktieägarnas möjlighet att erhålla
budpremier. Reglerna skapar även ett marknadsbeteende där de etablerade
aktörerna gynnas eftersom de är de som har den finansiella möjligheten att
genomföra takeovers. Det innebär att ägarstrukturen blir mer koncentrerad.
De nya reglerna i LUA innebar inte någon uppseendeväckande förändring
eftersom börsens egna regelverk till stor del bestod av liknande
bestämmelser. De svenska budpliktsreglerna har en budpliktsgräns på 30
procent av röstetalet och består av en likabudsregel som innebär att budet
ska vara lika för samtliga aktieägare. De svenska närståendekriterierna är
mer detaljerade än de i takeover-direktivet, vilket innebär att det blir svårare
för aktörer att genom samverkan med närstående kringgå budpliktsreglerna.
De svenska budpliktsreglerna ger emellertid lagstadgade möjligheter att
frångå budplikt. Reglerna ger även en möjlighet att ansöka om dispens från
budplikt. Dispensförfarandet skapar en flexibel tillämpning av reglerna,
eftersom dispens beviljas genom en avvägning av budpliktsreglernas syften
och marknadens effektivitet. Det har dessutom utretts ifall
marknadsbeteendet på den svenska aktiemarknaden är sådant att förvärvaren
vid takeovers strävar efter att nå 90 procent av aktierna. Det torde dock vara
en effekt av budpliktsreglernas tvingande karaktär.
Slutsatsen blir således att det inte är helt självklart att effekten av reglerna
skapar det bästa skyddet för minoritetsaktieägarna. Detta eftersom reglerna
skapar en marknad med färre takeovers och ett marknadsbeteende där det
endast är de etablerade aktörerna som har den finansiella möjligheten att
agera på marknaden. Detta ska dock vägas mot reglernas historiska motiv
som syftar till att skapa en trygg marknadsplats där minoritetens intressen
tillgodoses genom en sund takeover-reglering. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Slettengren, Ian LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
Mandatory bid rules in the Swedish stock market
course
JURM02 20121
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
Associationsrätt
language
Swedish
id
3046186
date added to LUP
2012-11-01 10:41:16
date last changed
2013-02-28 14:44:27
@misc{3046186,
  abstract     = {Mandatory bid rules were introduced in NBK´s recommendation in 1999,
and then statutory in LUA in 2005, after an implementation of the takeoverdirective.
The phenomenon with mandatory bid rules is therefore relatively
new on the Swedish stock market why its application and impact is
interesting to evaluate.
Mandatory bid rules derives from the Takeover Code, from the UK, that
emerged when the stock market during the 1960-1970´s, suffered from an
increased number of takeovers. This created a demand to protect minority
shareholders. The mandatory bid rules were designed to protect shareholders
from two-tier bids and to assure that the minority shareholders had the
opportunity to utter their shares at a change of control. There are, however,
theories that claims that the bid rules does not really cater to minority
protection as they create a stock market that makes it less attractive for
takeovers and thus reduces the minority shareholders the opportunity to
receive a premium bid. This also implies that the rules create a market
where the established players will benefit from the rules because they are
the only ones who have the financial means to carry through a takeover. It
also creates a more concentrated ownership structure.
The revision in LUA was, however, not a startling change for the players on
the market since it was composed with similar provisions, as the exchange's
regulatory. In Sweden the mandatory bid limit is 30 percent of the votes and
is composed with a rule that makes the bid equal to all shareholders. The
Swedish related criteria is more circumstantial than that in the takeoverdirective
which means that is becomes more difficult for the market
participants through collaboration with related parties to circumvent the
mandatory bid rules. It is however possible, through LUA, to deviate from
the rules. The rules also provide and opportunity to apply for dispensation
from the mandatory bid rules, a practice some consider to be applied far to
liberally. The dispensation process, however, creates a flexible application
of the rules as a dispensation is granted through an evaluation between the
objectives of the mandatory bid rules and the market efficiency. It has also
been evaluated if the market behaviour on the Swedish stock market is such
that the transferees at takeovers aim to reach 90 percent of the shares. This
market behaviour should rather be an effect of the rules binding nature.
The conclusion is therefore that it is not entirely obvious that the effect of
the rules creates the best protection for minority shareholders. This is
because the rules create a market with fewer takeovers and a market where
only the established players have the financial ability to operate on the
market. This must, however, be balanced against the rules historical nature
designed to create a secure marketplace where minority interests are met
through a healthy takeover-regulation.},
  author       = {Slettengren, Ian},
  keyword      = {Associationsrätt},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Budpliktsreglerna på den svenska aktiemarknaden},
  year         = {2012},
}