Informationsgivning i samband med offentliga uppköpserbjudanden. Särskilt om selektiv information i samband med due diligence och insiderfrågor.
(2012) JURM02 20122Department of Law
- Abstract (Swedish)
- Aktiemarknadsbolag i Sverige har omfattande informationsskyldigheter. För att allmänhetens förtroende för värdepappersmarknaden ska upprätthållas ska all information om ett aktiemarknadsbolag eller dess aktier som kan vara kurspåverkande offentliggöras.
I samband med offentliga uppköpserbjudanden, där en budgivare erbjuder samtliga aktieägare i målbolaget att förvärva deras aktier, tillåts emellertid så kallad selektiv informationsgivning i viss mån. Med selektiv informationsgivning avses att inte offentliggjord, kurspåverkande information lämnas ut. Vanligast torde vara att selektiv information lämnas till en budgivare vid due diligence, vars främsta praktiska funktion är att fördela information mellan parterna i transaktionen.
... (More) - Aktiemarknadsbolag i Sverige har omfattande informationsskyldigheter. För att allmänhetens förtroende för värdepappersmarknaden ska upprätthållas ska all information om ett aktiemarknadsbolag eller dess aktier som kan vara kurspåverkande offentliggöras.
I samband med offentliga uppköpserbjudanden, där en budgivare erbjuder samtliga aktieägare i målbolaget att förvärva deras aktier, tillåts emellertid så kallad selektiv informationsgivning i viss mån. Med selektiv informationsgivning avses att inte offentliggjord, kurspåverkande information lämnas ut. Vanligast torde vara att selektiv information lämnas till en budgivare vid due diligence, vars främsta praktiska funktion är att fördela information mellan parterna i transaktionen.
Förbudet mot insiderhandel är en ytterligare del i regelverket vars syfte ytterst är att upprätthålla allmänhetens förtroende för värdepappersmarknaden. Att använda ett informationsövertag för att göra förmånliga affärer anses orättvist och skadligt för allmänhetens förtroende. Vissa transaktioner har undantagits det straffbara området, eftersom de inte anses utgöra missbruk av insiderinformation. En budgivares planer på att lämna ett offentligt uppköpserbjudande utgör insiderinformation, men användandet av denna för att genomföra transaktionen anses inte utgöra insiderhandel. Information om målbolaget som en budgivare erhåller i samband med due diligence är däremot inte undantagen från det straffbara området. Trots att selektiv informationsgivning i sammanhanget är tillåtet kan således en budgivare göra sig skyldig till insiderhandel, om handel i målbolagets aktier sker eller ett bud lämnas utan att den erhållna informationen först har offentliggjorts. På grund av brist på rättspraxis är MmL:s tillämpning i samband med offentliga uppköpserbjudanden dock oklar.
MmD kan ge viss ledning när det gäller tolkning av de svenska bestämmelserna. En punkt i direktivets ingress anger att det inte är att anse som insiderhandel om en budgivare erhåller insiderinformation i samband med ett offentligt uppköpserbjudande och sedan använder denna för att genomföra uppköpet. Ett förslag till en ny förordning om marknadsmissbruk innehåller en liknande bestämmelse, vilken blir direkt tillämplig i Sverige om förordningen träder i kraft.
Jag anser att MmL inte borde lägga hinder i vägen för budgivare. Självregleringen på området är omfattande och ett handelsförbud enligt Takeover-reglerna aktualiseras på ett tidigt stadie då en budgivare har genomfört due diligence. En lagstiftning där insiderinformation en budgivare får i samband med due diligence undantas från det straffbara området skulle både resultera i ett klarare rättsläge och större överensstämmelse med det rådande direktivet på området, MmD. (Less) - Abstract
- Stock market companies in Sweden have comprehensive responsibilities regarding information disclosure. In order to maintain the confidence of the shareholders and the market, all information about a stock market company or its securities that may affect the share price shall be published.
In conjunction with a public takeover offer, where a bidder offers all shareholders of the target company to acquire their shares, disclosure of so-called selective information is permitted to some extent. Selective information refers to unpublished, price-sensitive information. Most common is that selective information is distributed to a bidder during the due diligence, since the primary practical function of a due diligence is to distribute... (More) - Stock market companies in Sweden have comprehensive responsibilities regarding information disclosure. In order to maintain the confidence of the shareholders and the market, all information about a stock market company or its securities that may affect the share price shall be published.
In conjunction with a public takeover offer, where a bidder offers all shareholders of the target company to acquire their shares, disclosure of so-called selective information is permitted to some extent. Selective information refers to unpublished, price-sensitive information. Most common is that selective information is distributed to a bidder during the due diligence, since the primary practical function of a due diligence is to distribute information between the parties in the transaction.
The prohibition against insider trading is another part of the regulatory framework, which aims to maintain public confidence in the securities market. Using an information advantage to make favourable business is generally considered unfair and damaging to public confidence. Certain transactions are exempt the criminal area, because they do not constitute an abuse of inside information. A bidder's plans to make a public offer constitutes inside information, but the use of this in order to complete the transaction is not considered as insider trading. The selective information a bidder receives during the due diligence in the target company is however not exempt from the prohibition against insider trading. Although the selective disclosure of information in this context is allowed a bidder may risk committing insider trading, if an acquisition in the target company's shares is made or a bid submitted without the inside information obtained is published first. Because of the lack of case law, the application of Law (2005:377) on Penalties for Market Abuse in Trading Financial Instruments, Market Abuse Law, in relation to public offers however is unclear.
The Directive 2003/6/EC on insider dealing and market manipulation, Market Abuse Directive, can provide some guidance as to the interpretation of the Market Abuse Law. A paragraph in the preamble of the directive suggests that inside information a bidder possesses about the target company may be used to implement a public offer. A proposal for a new Regulation on market abuse contains a similar provision, which will be directly applicable in Sweden if the regulation enters into force.
In my opinion the Market Abuse Law should not put obstacles in the way of bidders. Self-regulation in this area is vast and a bidder that has begun a due diligence may not sell or buy the target company´s shares according to the Swedish takeover rules. A law in which inside information a bidder receives during due diligence is excluded from the criminal area would both result in a higher legal certainty and consistency with the current directive in the area, Market Abuse Directive. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/3350144
- author
- Cronqvist, Anna LU
- supervisor
- organization
- alternative title
- Information disclosure in conjunction with public takeover offer. Focusing on selective information received during due diligence and insider trading.
- course
- JURM02 20122
- year
- 2012
- type
- H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
- subject
- keywords
- aktiemarknadsrätt, Associationsrätt, aktiemarknadsbolag, offentliga uppköpserbjudanden, due diligence, selektiv information, insiderinformation, insiderhandel.
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 3350144
- date added to LUP
- 2013-01-28 13:13:40
- date last changed
- 2013-01-28 13:13:40
@misc{3350144,
abstract = {{Stock market companies in Sweden have comprehensive responsibilities regarding information disclosure. In order to maintain the confidence of the shareholders and the market, all information about a stock market company or its securities that may affect the share price shall be published.
In conjunction with a public takeover offer, where a bidder offers all shareholders of the target company to acquire their shares, disclosure of so-called selective information is permitted to some extent. Selective information refers to unpublished, price-sensitive information. Most common is that selective information is distributed to a bidder during the due diligence, since the primary practical function of a due diligence is to distribute information between the parties in the transaction.
The prohibition against insider trading is another part of the regulatory framework, which aims to maintain public confidence in the securities market. Using an information advantage to make favourable business is generally considered unfair and damaging to public confidence. Certain transactions are exempt the criminal area, because they do not constitute an abuse of inside information. A bidder's plans to make a public offer constitutes inside information, but the use of this in order to complete the transaction is not considered as insider trading. The selective information a bidder receives during the due diligence in the target company is however not exempt from the prohibition against insider trading. Although the selective disclosure of information in this context is allowed a bidder may risk committing insider trading, if an acquisition in the target company's shares is made or a bid submitted without the inside information obtained is published first. Because of the lack of case law, the application of Law (2005:377) on Penalties for Market Abuse in Trading Financial Instruments, Market Abuse Law, in relation to public offers however is unclear.
The Directive 2003/6/EC on insider dealing and market manipulation, Market Abuse Directive, can provide some guidance as to the interpretation of the Market Abuse Law. A paragraph in the preamble of the directive suggests that inside information a bidder possesses about the target company may be used to implement a public offer. A proposal for a new Regulation on market abuse contains a similar provision, which will be directly applicable in Sweden if the regulation enters into force.
In my opinion the Market Abuse Law should not put obstacles in the way of bidders. Self-regulation in this area is vast and a bidder that has begun a due diligence may not sell or buy the target company´s shares according to the Swedish takeover rules. A law in which inside information a bidder receives during due diligence is excluded from the criminal area would both result in a higher legal certainty and consistency with the current directive in the area, Market Abuse Directive.}},
author = {{Cronqvist, Anna}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Informationsgivning i samband med offentliga uppköpserbjudanden. Särskilt om selektiv information i samband med due diligence och insiderfrågor.}},
year = {{2012}},
}