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LUP Student Papers

LUND UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES

Styrelsens dolda förpliktelser

Källkvist, Aleksander LU (2013) LAGF03 20131
Department of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Sammanfattning
Det enda som behövs för att investera i ett publikt aktiebolag är kapital. En investering i ett privat aktiebolag kräver, utöver erforderligt kapital, att en befintlig aktieägare vill avyttra sina aktier. En aktieägare behöver sedan inte vara delaktig i aktiebolagets förvaltning utan intar istället en passiv ägarroll. Investering i ett aktiebolag medför att man som delägare delegerar makt till en ledning som ska ta snabba och förhoppningsvis, ekonomiskt gynnsamma beslut som ska komma aktieägarna till nytta genom utdelningar och allmän värdestegring av bolaget. Delegering av makt från delägarna till bolagets ledning innebär samtidigt en överhängande risk att bolagsledningen missbrukar sin omfattande kompetens.... (More)
Sammanfattning
Det enda som behövs för att investera i ett publikt aktiebolag är kapital. En investering i ett privat aktiebolag kräver, utöver erforderligt kapital, att en befintlig aktieägare vill avyttra sina aktier. En aktieägare behöver sedan inte vara delaktig i aktiebolagets förvaltning utan intar istället en passiv ägarroll. Investering i ett aktiebolag medför att man som delägare delegerar makt till en ledning som ska ta snabba och förhoppningsvis, ekonomiskt gynnsamma beslut som ska komma aktieägarna till nytta genom utdelningar och allmän värdestegring av bolaget. Delegering av makt från delägarna till bolagets ledning innebär samtidigt en överhängande risk att bolagsledningen missbrukar sin omfattande kompetens. Aktiebolagslagen (2005:551) (ABL) innehåller en rad olika spärrar och rättsprinciper för att säkerställa att bolagsledningen inte missköter sin uppgift. Lojalitetsplikten är en sådan spärr. I doktrin och förarbeten råder samstämmighet om att en aktiebolagsrättslig lojalitetsplikt existerar men dess innehåll är omdebatterat och inga prejudicerande fall existerar i dagsläget.

Jävsbestämmelsen och generalklausulen är de två bestämmelser som anses åskådliggöra styrelsens lojalitetsplikt inom ABL. Därutöver finns övriga icke-kodifierade förpliktelser som doktrin anser ryms under lojalitetsplikten, några av dessa plikter presenteras och analyseras. Uppsatsen granskar lojalitetsplikten utifrån bolagets möjlighet att föra en skadeståndstalan mot styrelsen genom 29 kap. ABL, detta för att undersöka om lojalitetsplikten kan utgöra en reell ansvarsgrund eller inte. I dagsläget talar det mesta för att en lojalitetsplikt utöver generalklausulen och jävsbestämmelsen snarare är önskemål än rättsprinciper.
Att det rättsliga efterspelet efter HQ-kraschen år 2010 börjar närma sig var en stark faktor vid val av uppsatsämne. Någon närmare undersökning av tvisten görs ej men det är tacksamt både för läsare och författare att det finns ett fall att relatera till. (Less)
Abstract
Summary
The only thing necessary to make an investment in a public limited company is capital. A shareholder does not have to contribute in any other way. The shareholders delegates power to the company management, which manages the daily operations. The company management is hopefully able to make successful decisions that will benefit the company and in the end the shareholders by dividends and capital gains, as the value of the stock rises. Transferring power to the company management means at the same time an increasing risk of misuse. The Swedish Company Act (2005:551) contains several barriers to ensure that the board of directors do not exploit their obligations. The duty of loyalty is one of them.

The Swedish doctrine and the... (More)
Summary
The only thing necessary to make an investment in a public limited company is capital. A shareholder does not have to contribute in any other way. The shareholders delegates power to the company management, which manages the daily operations. The company management is hopefully able to make successful decisions that will benefit the company and in the end the shareholders by dividends and capital gains, as the value of the stock rises. Transferring power to the company management means at the same time an increasing risk of misuse. The Swedish Company Act (2005:551) contains several barriers to ensure that the board of directors do not exploit their obligations. The duty of loyalty is one of them.

The Swedish doctrine and the legislative history recognizes the existence of the duty of loyalty. However, the content of the principle is not clear and no precedent case exists. The Swedish doctrine refers to general principles of law and explicit clauses in order to justify the existence of the duty of loyalty. Despite the effort to justify the duty, there are still big ambiguities about its interpretation in Swedish Company law. There are considerable differences of doctrine view of the duty of loyalty and how it can actually be applied in real life. There is no doubt that doctrine has failed to consider the duty of loyalty in a wider context.

This thesis shows that the duty of loyalty is tied to the current shareholders and not the company as a legal entity. This means that the duty of loyalty exists side by side with other principles such as the principle of all shareholders consent, which is significant for its application. The legal aftermath after the scandal in HQ Bank is approaching. This had a huge impact on the choice of subject. A closer examination of the dispute is not made but it is a reminder how important it is that Swedish legislation contains devices to ensure that the members of board act responsible. (Less)
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author
Källkvist, Aleksander LU
supervisor
organization
course
LAGF03 20131
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
Associationsrätt
language
Swedish
id
3800708
date added to LUP
2013-10-18 12:55:55
date last changed
2013-10-18 12:55:55
@misc{3800708,
  abstract     = {Summary
The only thing necessary to make an investment in a public limited company is capital. A shareholder does not have to contribute in any other way. The shareholders delegates power to the company management, which manages the daily operations. The company management is hopefully able to make successful decisions that will benefit the company and in the end the shareholders by dividends and capital gains, as the value of the stock rises. Transferring power to the company management means at the same time an increasing risk of misuse. The Swedish Company Act (2005:551) contains several barriers to ensure that the board of directors do not exploit their obligations. The duty of loyalty is one of them.

The Swedish doctrine and the legislative history recognizes the existence of the duty of loyalty. However, the content of the principle is not clear and no precedent case exists. The Swedish doctrine refers to general principles of law and explicit clauses in order to justify the existence of the duty of loyalty. Despite the effort to justify the duty, there are still big ambiguities about its interpretation in Swedish Company law. There are considerable differences of doctrine view of the duty of loyalty and how it can actually be applied in real life. There is no doubt that doctrine has failed to consider the duty of loyalty in a wider context. 

This thesis shows that the duty of loyalty is tied to the current shareholders and not the company as a legal entity. This means that the duty of loyalty exists side by side with other principles such as the principle of all shareholders consent, which is significant for its application. The legal aftermath after the scandal in HQ Bank is approaching. This had a huge impact on the choice of subject. A closer examination of the dispute is not made but it is a reminder how important it is that Swedish legislation contains devices to ensure that the members of board act responsible.},
  author       = {Källkvist, Aleksander},
  keyword      = {Associationsrätt},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Styrelsens dolda förpliktelser},
  year         = {2013},
}