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LUND UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES

Straffrättsligt ansvar för psykiskt störda lagöverträdare

Pettersson, Sara LU (2013) LAGF03 20131
Department of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Hur psykisk störning ska beaktas inom straffrätten utgör idag ett av de mest omdebatterade och svårlösta ämnena i svensk strafflagstiftning. I vår nuvarande lagstiftning kan alla, även psykiskt störda och barn, teoretiskt sett begå brott. Någon åtskillnad görs inte för de psykiskt störda lagöverträdarna i ansvarsledet utan särregleringen ligger uteslutande i påföljdsledet. Så har dock inte alltid varit fallet. Innan Brottsbalkens ikraftträdande 1965 hade vi i Sverige ett krav på tillräknelighet som ett rekvisit för personligt ansvar. I 1864 års strafflag stadgades att de som var berövade förståndets bruk skulle räknas som otillräkneliga och därför vara fria från straff. Denna straffrihet motiverades av att man på den tiden betonade begrepp... (More)
Hur psykisk störning ska beaktas inom straffrätten utgör idag ett av de mest omdebatterade och svårlösta ämnena i svensk strafflagstiftning. I vår nuvarande lagstiftning kan alla, även psykiskt störda och barn, teoretiskt sett begå brott. Någon åtskillnad görs inte för de psykiskt störda lagöverträdarna i ansvarsledet utan särregleringen ligger uteslutande i påföljdsledet. Så har dock inte alltid varit fallet. Innan Brottsbalkens ikraftträdande 1965 hade vi i Sverige ett krav på tillräknelighet som ett rekvisit för personligt ansvar. I 1864 års strafflag stadgades att de som var berövade förståndets bruk skulle räknas som otillräkneliga och därför vara fria från straff. Denna straffrihet motiverades av att man på den tiden betonade begrepp som fri vilja, skuld och klander som grunder för straffrättsligt ansvar. Vid Brottsbalkens införande upphävdes denna tillräknelighetslära. Denna omvändning grundade sig i att man vid den tiden inte ansåg att filosofiska och moraliska begrepp hade någon plats inom straffrätten. Man hävdade att straffrättens främsta syfte var att hämma brottsligheten och straffrättens viktigaste redskap skulle därför vara behandling och vård. Att moraliskt kunna motivera straffansvaret var inte relevant i det sammanhanget. Dessa resonemang är således bakgrunden till varför vi idag inte har ett krav på tillräknelighet i vår lagstiftning. Mycket har dock förändrats inom straffrätten sedan sextiotalet. Idag har återigen begrepp som skuld och klander fått inta centrala roller för att motivera straffrättsligt ansvar och konformitets- och skuldprincipen utgör idag ledande normer inom svensk straffrätt. Konformitetsprincipen stadgar att en person inte bör anses ansvarig för ett brott om han inte hade förmåga eller tillfälle att rätta sig efter lagen. Skuldprincipen säger vidare att endast den som kan åläggas skuld bör drabbas av straffrättsligt ansvar. Mot bakgrund av dessa principers ställning förefaller det märkligt att vi idag inte uppställer ett krav på tillräknelighet för straffansvar. Ännu märkligare framstår det när i princip alla andra länder världen över har ett sådant system i någon form. Syftet med denna uppsats är att klarlägga varför svensk ansvarsreglering ser ut som den gör samt att utreda om ett återinförande av tillräknelighetsläran borde ske. För att begripa varför vår nuvarande reglering ser ut som den gör är det nödvändigt att förstå vilka olika argument som historiskt sett har motiverat de psykiskt stördas ställning. Därför utgår arbetet från ett rättsutvecklingsperspektiv. Vad gäller ett eventuellt återinförande av tillräknelighetsläran har min utredning visat att en sådan förändring borde vara på sin plats. Detta förespråkas även av lagstiftaren och företrädare inom doktrinen. Att vår nuvarande ansvarsreglering bygger på teorier som i princip står i strid med vår nuvarande straffrättspolitik skapar en kontroversiell och motsägelsefull straffrätt. En förändring är därför nödvändig. (Less)
Abstract
How mental disorder should be considered in the criminal justice system is one of the most debated and intractable subjects in Swedish criminal law. Everyone, including mentally disturbed and children, is theoretically capable of committing a crime in our current legislation. No exceptions are made for the mentally disturbed offenders in questions of responsibility. Special regulation lies exclusively in the choice of sanction. However, this has not always been the case. Before the Penal code entered into force in 1965, we had a requirement of accountability for personal liability. The 1864 Penal Code stipulated that those who were deprived of reasonable sense should be considered as unaccountable and thus be free from punishment. This... (More)
How mental disorder should be considered in the criminal justice system is one of the most debated and intractable subjects in Swedish criminal law. Everyone, including mentally disturbed and children, is theoretically capable of committing a crime in our current legislation. No exceptions are made for the mentally disturbed offenders in questions of responsibility. Special regulation lies exclusively in the choice of sanction. However, this has not always been the case. Before the Penal code entered into force in 1965, we had a requirement of accountability for personal liability. The 1864 Penal Code stipulated that those who were deprived of reasonable sense should be considered as unaccountable and thus be free from punishment. This impunity was motivated by the, at the time, emphasized notion of free will, guilt and blame as grounds for criminal liability. But the new Penal Code abolished these exceptions. Philosophical and moral concepts were not believed to have any place in criminal law. It was argued that the criminal law's primary purpose was to suppress crime and the major tool for this purpose would therefore be correctional treatment. To morally justify liability was not relevant in that context. Such reasoning is thus the background to why we do not currently have a requirement for accountability in our legislation. However, much has changed in criminal law since the sixties. Today concepts of guilt and blame are again considered as key roles to justify liability and the principles of conformity and guilt are now two of the leading criterions in Swedish criminal law. The principle of conformity states that a person should not be held responsible for a crime if he did not have the ability or opportunity to comply with the law. The principle of guilt says that only a person who has guilt should face criminal liability. In light of these principles, today’s positioning seems odd. It seems even stranger when almost every other country in the world has a requirement of accountability in some form. The purpose of this paper is to clarify why the Swedish rules of liability look like they do and to investigate whether a reinstatement of the requirement of accountability is necessary. To understand why our current regulatory looks like it does, it is necessary to understand the various arguments that historically has justified the positioning of the mentally disordered. This paper is therefore based on a legal development perspective. As for the possible reintroduction of the requirement of accountability my investigation has proved that such a change should be in order. The legislature and representatives of academic writers also advocate this. That our current legislation on liability is based on theories that basically run counter to our current criminal justice policy creates a controversial and contradictory criminal law. A change is therefore necessary. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Pettersson, Sara LU
supervisor
organization
course
LAGF03 20131
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
tillräknelighet, straffansvar, psykiskt störda lagöverträdare, straffrätt, criminal law, otillräknelig, straffrättsligt ansvar, skuld
language
Swedish
id
3800767
date added to LUP
2013-10-18 13:01:28
date last changed
2013-10-18 13:01:28
@misc{3800767,
  abstract     = {How mental disorder should be considered in the criminal justice system is one of the most debated and intractable subjects in Swedish criminal law. Everyone, including mentally disturbed and children, is theoretically capable of committing a crime in our current legislation. No exceptions are made for the mentally disturbed offenders in questions of responsibility. Special regulation lies exclusively in the choice of sanction. However, this has not always been the case. Before the Penal code entered into force in 1965, we had a requirement of accountability for personal liability. The 1864 Penal Code stipulated that those who were deprived of reasonable sense should be considered as unaccountable and thus be free from punishment. This impunity was motivated by the, at the time, emphasized notion of free will, guilt and blame as grounds for criminal liability. But the new Penal Code abolished these exceptions. Philosophical and moral concepts were not believed to have any place in criminal law. It was argued that the criminal law's primary purpose was to suppress crime and the major tool for this purpose would therefore be correctional treatment. To morally justify liability was not relevant in that context. Such reasoning is thus the background to why we do not currently have a requirement for accountability in our legislation. However, much has changed in criminal law since the sixties. Today concepts of guilt and blame are again considered as key roles to justify liability and the principles of conformity and guilt are now two of the leading criterions in Swedish criminal law. The principle of conformity states that a person should not be held responsible for a crime if he did not have the ability or opportunity to comply with the law. The principle of guilt says that only a person who has guilt should face criminal liability. In light of these principles, today’s positioning seems odd. It seems even stranger when almost every other country in the world has a requirement of accountability in some form. The purpose of this paper is to clarify why the Swedish rules of liability look like they do and to investigate whether a reinstatement of the requirement of accountability is necessary. To understand why our current regulatory looks like it does, it is necessary to understand the various arguments that historically has justified the positioning of the mentally disordered. This paper is therefore based on a legal development perspective. As for the possible reintroduction of the requirement of accountability my investigation has proved that such a change should be in order. The legislature and representatives of academic writers also advocate this. That our current legislation on liability is based on theories that basically run counter to our current criminal justice policy creates a controversial and contradictory criminal law. A change is therefore necessary.},
  author       = {Pettersson, Sara},
  keyword      = {tillräknelighet,straffansvar,psykiskt störda lagöverträdare,straffrätt,criminal law,otillräknelig,straffrättsligt ansvar,skuld},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Straffrättsligt ansvar för psykiskt störda lagöverträdare},
  year         = {2013},
}