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Självförvållad berusning och skuldprincipen - En jämförelse mellan svensk och tysk rätt

Axelsson, Cecilia LU (2013) LAGF03 20132
Faculty of Law
Department of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Syftet med denna uppsats är att redogöra för regleringen av självförvållad berusning i svensk och tysk straffrätt, och dess förhållande till grundläggande straffrättsliga principer. Utmärkande för problematiken kring självförvållad berusning är stridigheterna mellan kriminalpolitiska effektivitetsskäl å ena sidan, och den grundläggande straffrättsliga skuldprincipen å andra sidan. I svensk rätt regleras självförvållad berusning i 1 kap. 2 § 2 st. BrB. Denna bestämmelse tolkades länge som att kravet på uppsåt kunde efterges vid självförvållad berusning. Det fanns dock många oklarheter kring hur långtgående denna möjlighet var. Möjligheten till uppsåtseftergift kritiserades också på grund av dess oförenlighet med skuldprincipen. År 2011... (More)
Syftet med denna uppsats är att redogöra för regleringen av självförvållad berusning i svensk och tysk straffrätt, och dess förhållande till grundläggande straffrättsliga principer. Utmärkande för problematiken kring självförvållad berusning är stridigheterna mellan kriminalpolitiska effektivitetsskäl å ena sidan, och den grundläggande straffrättsliga skuldprincipen å andra sidan. I svensk rätt regleras självförvållad berusning i 1 kap. 2 § 2 st. BrB. Denna bestämmelse tolkades länge som att kravet på uppsåt kunde efterges vid självförvållad berusning. Det fanns dock många oklarheter kring hur långtgående denna möjlighet var. Möjligheten till uppsåtseftergift kritiserades också på grund av dess oförenlighet med skuldprincipen. År 2011 ändrade HD tolkningen av 1 kap 2 § 2 st. BrB, som numera anses innebära att uppsåt inte får efterges vid självförvållad berusning, utan att självförvållat berusade gärningsmän tvärtom ska behandlas precis som nyktra gärningsmän. Rättsfallen har i doktrinen mottagits positivt av vissa författare, som menar att det är fundamentalt för en rättsstat att grundläggande straffrättsliga principer som skuldprincipen efterlevs, medan andra har kritiserat den nya tolkningen med argumentet att den innebär en möjlighet för åtalade att åberopa berusning som en ursäkt (med friande verkan). I tysk rätt finns det två regleringar av självförvållat rus: actio libera in causa och § 323a StGB. Den förstnämnda är en icke lagstadgad rättsfigur som innebär att gärningsmannen straffas för att uppsåtligen ha för-satt sig i ett tillstånd av otillräknelighet (Schuldunfähigkeit) för att i detta tillstånd begå ett specifikt brott. Rättsfiguren har kritiserats både på grund av att den inte finns uttryckligen lagreglerad, vilket strider mot legalitetsprincipen, och för att den innebär att gärningsmannen straffas trots att han egentligen var otillräknelig, vilket strider mot skuldprincipen. I § 323a StGB regleras det så kallade rusbrottet. Rusbrottet blir aktuellt att tillämpa först sedan det konstaterats att gärnings-mannen inte kan dömas på grund av det brott han begick under berusningen på grund av att han var otillräknelig (schuldunfähig). Istället döms han då för det särskilda rusbrottet. § 323a StGB är mycket omdiskuterad i tysk doktrin, särskilt gällande problematiken kring hur straffmätningen ska utföras och gällande förhållandet till skuldprincipen. Slutsatsen av min undersökning är att de regleringar i svensk och tyskrätt som ämnar/har ämnat att särbehandla självförvållat berusade gärningsmän i förhållande till nyktra gärningsmän alla är/har varit oförenliga med skuldprincipen, oavsett om de har knutits till uppsåts- eller (o)tillräknelighetsbedömningen. Huruvida ett undan-tag från skuldprincipen bör accepteras är i slutänden upp till lagstiftaren att avgöra, men enligt min mening är de lösningar som redovisats här förenade med sådana nackdelar att det bästa alternativet är att inte behandla självförvållat berusade gärningsmän annorlunda än nyktra gärningsmän. (Less)
Abstract
The aim of this essay is to investigate the regulation of self-induced intoxication in Swedish and German criminal law and its relation with fundamental rule of law-principles. Characteristic for this problematic area is the incompatibility between the legislator’s criminal policy on the one hand, and fundamental rule of law principles as the principle of culpability on the other hand. In Swedish law, self-induced intoxication is regulated in 1 kap. 2 § 2 st. BrB. For many years, this regulation was interpreted as making it possible to waive the demand for intent. There were however many issues regarding how far this possibility reached, and it was criticised for its incompatibility with the principle of culpability. Through two cases, the... (More)
The aim of this essay is to investigate the regulation of self-induced intoxication in Swedish and German criminal law and its relation with fundamental rule of law-principles. Characteristic for this problematic area is the incompatibility between the legislator’s criminal policy on the one hand, and fundamental rule of law principles as the principle of culpability on the other hand. In Swedish law, self-induced intoxication is regulated in 1 kap. 2 § 2 st. BrB. For many years, this regulation was interpreted as making it possible to waive the demand for intent. There were however many issues regarding how far this possibility reached, and it was criticised for its incompatibility with the principle of culpability. Through two cases, the Swedish Supreme Court changed the interpretation of the paragraph during 2011, and now it is found to mean that the demand for intent can’t be waived in cases of self-induced intoxication. The cases have been welcomed by some writers of the legal doctrine, who mean that it’s fundamental for a rule of law-state to observe criminal principles as the principle of culpability, while other writers have criticised the decisions of the Supreme Court for making it possible for perpetrators to invoke their self-induced intoxication as an excuse for their criminal behaviour. In German criminal law, there are two regulations of voluntary intoxication: actio libera in causa and § 323a StGB. The first-named is a non-statutory legal character, whose meaning is that the perpetrator is punished for intentionally putting himself in a state of insanity (Schuldunfähigkeit) in order to commit a specific crime. Actio libera in causa has been criticised both because it’s not prescribed by law, which is incompatible with the principle of legality, and for punishing the perpetrator when he actually was incapable of carrying criminal responsibility. § 323a StGB regulates the crime of total intoxication, which is possible to apply only when the offender can’t be convicted for a crime he committed during intoxication since he was insane (schuldunfähig). Then he can be convicted for total intoxication instead. The paragraph is disputed in German legal doctrine, especially because of the difficulties regarding how the sentencing should be carried out, but also because of its complicated relation to the principle of culpability. My conclusion is that the regulations in Swedish and German criminal law that intend to/have intended to treat voluntarily intoxicated perpetrators differently than sober offenders all are/have been incompatible with the principle of culpability. Whether an exception from the principle of culpability should be accepted or not, is an issue that should be handled by the legislator, but according to my meaning, those regulations that have been presented in this essay are all associated with such disadvantages that the best option is to not treat voluntarily intoxicated perpetrators differently than sober offenders. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Axelsson, Cecilia LU
supervisor
organization
course
LAGF03 20132
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
Straffrätt, Criminal law, Komparativ rätt, Comparative law
language
Swedish
id
4228154
date added to LUP
2014-01-28 17:44:24
date last changed
2014-01-28 17:44:24
@misc{4228154,
  abstract     = {The aim of this essay is to investigate the regulation of self-induced intoxication in Swedish and German criminal law and its relation with fundamental rule of law-principles. Characteristic for this problematic area is the incompatibility between the legislator’s criminal policy on the one hand, and fundamental rule of law principles as the principle of culpability on the other hand. In Swedish law, self-induced intoxication is regulated in 1 kap. 2 § 2 st. BrB. For many years, this regulation was interpreted as making it possible to waive the demand for intent. There were however many issues regarding how far this possibility reached, and it was criticised for its incompatibility with the principle of culpability. Through two cases, the Swedish Supreme Court changed the interpretation of the paragraph during 2011, and now it is found to mean that the demand for intent can’t be waived in cases of self-induced intoxication. The cases have been welcomed by some writers of the legal doctrine, who mean that it’s fundamental for a rule of law-state to observe criminal principles as the principle of culpability, while other writers have criticised the decisions of the Supreme Court for making it possible for perpetrators to invoke their self-induced intoxication as an excuse for their criminal behaviour. In German criminal law, there are two regulations of voluntary intoxication: actio libera in causa and § 323a StGB. The first-named is a non-statutory legal character, whose meaning is that the perpetrator is punished for intentionally putting himself in a state of insanity (Schuldunfähigkeit) in order to commit a specific crime. Actio libera in causa has been criticised both because it’s not prescribed by law, which is incompatible with the principle of legality, and for punishing the perpetrator when he actually was incapable of carrying criminal responsibility. § 323a StGB regulates the crime of total intoxication, which is possible to apply only when the offender can’t be convicted for a crime he committed during intoxication since he was insane (schuldunfähig). Then he can be convicted for total intoxication instead. The paragraph is disputed in German legal doctrine, especially because of the difficulties regarding how the sentencing should be carried out, but also because of its complicated relation to the principle of culpability. My conclusion is that the regulations in Swedish and German criminal law that intend to/have intended to treat voluntarily intoxicated perpetrators differently than sober offenders all are/have been incompatible with the principle of culpability. Whether an exception from the principle of culpability should be accepted or not, is an issue that should be handled by the legislator, but according to my meaning, those regulations that have been presented in this essay are all associated with such disadvantages that the best option is to not treat voluntarily intoxicated perpetrators differently than sober offenders.},
  author       = {Axelsson, Cecilia},
  keyword      = {Straffrätt,Criminal law,Komparativ rätt,Comparative law},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Självförvållad berusning och skuldprincipen - En jämförelse mellan svensk och tysk rätt},
  year         = {2013},
}