Resemblance Between Universals
(2014) FTEK01 20131Theoretical Philosophy
 Abstract
 In this paper I evaluate a problem with the partial identity theory and solutions as suggested by Eddon and Morganti. Resemblances exist not only between objects, but between universals. Hence, the mass universal of a 1kg object resembles the mass universal of a 3 kg object and the mass universal of a 100kg object. Resemblances between such universals, referred to as quantitative universals, are particularly difficult to analyze within a universal realist framework. The Partial Identity Theory, as put forward by David Armstrong, is an attempt to provide a universal realist analysis of these resemblances. It has been argued, by Eddon, that the Partial Identity Theory cannot adequately account for how far, different, but still resembling,... (More)
 In this paper I evaluate a problem with the partial identity theory and solutions as suggested by Eddon and Morganti. Resemblances exist not only between objects, but between universals. Hence, the mass universal of a 1kg object resembles the mass universal of a 3 kg object and the mass universal of a 100kg object. Resemblances between such universals, referred to as quantitative universals, are particularly difficult to analyze within a universal realist framework. The Partial Identity Theory, as put forward by David Armstrong, is an attempt to provide a universal realist analysis of these resemblances. It has been argued, by Eddon, that the Partial Identity Theory cannot adequately account for how far, different, but still resembling, quantitative universals are from being completely identical. This cannot be done because a comparison of quantitative universals cannot be based on a count of their respective number of constituents (their parts). Eddon argues that the problem cannot be solved unless we incorporate a mathematical metric, which however weakens the partial identity theory. I suggest that one reason why we must discard such a solution is that it makes the partial identity theory inconsistent. Morganti attempts to resolve the mathematical metric issue by arguing that it is unnecessary to make an exact count of all the constituents in order to account for the distance between quantitative universals. His solution, however, seems to assume a selfcontradictory nature of the world and is therefore inadequate, I suggest. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/studentpapers/record/4357656
 author
 Lanken Verma, Robin ^{LU}
 supervisor

 Johannes Persson ^{LU}
 organization
 alternative title
 Investigating a problematic aspect of the Partial Identity Theory
 course
 FTEK01 20131
 year
 2014
 type
 M2  Bachelor Degree
 subject
 keywords
 Armstrong, universals, resemblance, partial identity, partial identity theory, Eddon, Morganti, metaphysics, universal realism, scientific universal realism, philosophy, theoretical philosophy
 language
 English
 id
 4357656
 date added to LUP
 20140311 09:38:39
 date last changed
 20160322 16:37:24
@misc{4357656, abstract = {In this paper I evaluate a problem with the partial identity theory and solutions as suggested by Eddon and Morganti. Resemblances exist not only between objects, but between universals. Hence, the mass universal of a 1kg object resembles the mass universal of a 3 kg object and the mass universal of a 100kg object. Resemblances between such universals, referred to as quantitative universals, are particularly difficult to analyze within a universal realist framework. The Partial Identity Theory, as put forward by David Armstrong, is an attempt to provide a universal realist analysis of these resemblances. It has been argued, by Eddon, that the Partial Identity Theory cannot adequately account for how far, different, but still resembling, quantitative universals are from being completely identical. This cannot be done because a comparison of quantitative universals cannot be based on a count of their respective number of constituents (their parts). Eddon argues that the problem cannot be solved unless we incorporate a mathematical metric, which however weakens the partial identity theory. I suggest that one reason why we must discard such a solution is that it makes the partial identity theory inconsistent. Morganti attempts to resolve the mathematical metric issue by arguing that it is unnecessary to make an exact count of all the constituents in order to account for the distance between quantitative universals. His solution, however, seems to assume a selfcontradictory nature of the world and is therefore inadequate, I suggest.}, author = {Lanken Verma, Robin}, keyword = {Armstrong,universals,resemblance,partial identity,partial identity theory,Eddon,Morganti,metaphysics,universal realism,scientific universal realism,philosophy,theoretical philosophy}, language = {eng}, note = {Student Paper}, title = {Resemblance Between Universals}, year = {2014}, }