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Resemblance Between Universals

Lanken Verma, Robin LU (2014) FTEK01 20131
Theoretical Philosophy
Abstract
In this paper I evaluate a problem with the partial identity theory and solutions as suggested by Eddon and Morganti. Resemblances exist not only between objects, but between universals. Hence, the mass universal of a 1kg object resembles the mass universal of a 3 kg object and the mass universal of a 100kg object. Resemblances between such universals, referred to as quantitative universals, are particularly difficult to analyze within a universal realist framework. The Partial Identity Theory, as put forward by David Armstrong, is an attempt to provide a universal realist analysis of these resemblances. It has been argued, by Eddon, that the Partial Identity Theory cannot adequately account for how far, different, but still resembling,... (More)
In this paper I evaluate a problem with the partial identity theory and solutions as suggested by Eddon and Morganti. Resemblances exist not only between objects, but between universals. Hence, the mass universal of a 1kg object resembles the mass universal of a 3 kg object and the mass universal of a 100kg object. Resemblances between such universals, referred to as quantitative universals, are particularly difficult to analyze within a universal realist framework. The Partial Identity Theory, as put forward by David Armstrong, is an attempt to provide a universal realist analysis of these resemblances. It has been argued, by Eddon, that the Partial Identity Theory cannot adequately account for how far, different, but still resembling, quantitative universals are from being completely identical. This cannot be done because a comparison of quantitative universals cannot be based on a count of their respective number of constituents (their parts). Eddon argues that the problem cannot be solved unless we incorporate a mathematical metric, which however weakens the partial identity theory. I suggest that one reason why we must discard such a solution is that it makes the partial identity theory inconsistent. Morganti attempts to resolve the mathematical metric issue by arguing that it is unnecessary to make an exact count of all the constituents in order to account for the distance between quantitative universals. His solution, however, seems to assume a self-contradictory nature of the world and is therefore inadequate, I suggest. (Less)
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author
Lanken Verma, Robin LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
Investigating a problematic aspect of the Partial Identity Theory
course
FTEK01 20131
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
Armstrong, universals, resemblance, partial identity, partial identity theory, Eddon, Morganti, metaphysics, universal realism, scientific universal realism, philosophy, theoretical philosophy
language
English
id
4357656
date added to LUP
2014-03-11 09:38:39
date last changed
2016-03-22 16:37:24
@misc{4357656,
  abstract     = {In this paper I evaluate a problem with the partial identity theory and solutions as suggested by Eddon and Morganti. Resemblances exist not only between objects, but between universals. Hence, the mass universal of a 1kg object resembles the mass universal of a 3 kg object and the mass universal of a 100kg object. Resemblances between such universals, referred to as quantitative universals, are particularly difficult to analyze within a universal realist framework. The Partial Identity Theory, as put forward by David Armstrong, is an attempt to provide a universal realist analysis of these resemblances. It has been argued, by Eddon, that the Partial Identity Theory cannot adequately account for how far, different, but still resembling, quantitative universals are from being completely identical. This cannot be done because a comparison of quantitative universals cannot be based on a count of their respective number of constituents (their parts). Eddon argues that the problem cannot be solved unless we incorporate a mathematical metric, which however weakens the partial identity theory. I suggest that one reason why we must discard such a solution is that it makes the partial identity theory inconsistent. Morganti attempts to resolve the mathematical metric issue by arguing that it is unnecessary to make an exact count of all the constituents in order to account for the distance between quantitative universals. His solution, however, seems to assume a self-contradictory nature of the world and is therefore inadequate, I suggest.},
  author       = {Lanken Verma, Robin},
  keyword      = {Armstrong,universals,resemblance,partial identity,partial identity theory,Eddon,Morganti,metaphysics,universal realism,scientific universal realism,philosophy,theoretical philosophy},
  language     = {eng},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Resemblance Between Universals},
  year         = {2014},
}