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Aktiemarknadsaktörers avvikelser från avsiktsförklaringar

Cronqvist, Cecilia LU (2014) JURM02 20141
Department of Law
Abstract
During the course of a public takeover offer, the need for a stock market actor to make statements towards the market regarding their intentions occasionally arises. For various reasons, the stock market actor may at a later stage deem it necessary to diverge from this previously made statement of intention and the question of under what circumstances such a deviation is acceptable emerges. Therefore, the objective of this thesis is to examine the current Swedish regulation regarding stock market actors’ deviations from statements of intentions, from both a de lege lata- and a de lege ferenda-perspective.

This thesis reports on the review of the takeover rules that were carried out during 2011, which resulted in some minor adjustments... (More)
During the course of a public takeover offer, the need for a stock market actor to make statements towards the market regarding their intentions occasionally arises. For various reasons, the stock market actor may at a later stage deem it necessary to diverge from this previously made statement of intention and the question of under what circumstances such a deviation is acceptable emerges. Therefore, the objective of this thesis is to examine the current Swedish regulation regarding stock market actors’ deviations from statements of intentions, from both a de lege lata- and a de lege ferenda-perspective.

This thesis reports on the review of the takeover rules that were carried out during 2011, which resulted in some minor adjustments regarding the regulation of stock market actors’ deviations from statements of intention. The regulation in the takeover rules remained however very brief and is currently subsumed under two specific paragraphs, I.2 and II.7. The issue has been addressed by the Swedish Securities Council (the Council, sw: Aktiemarknadsnämnden) on several occasions, which has declared it a general principle in the stock market regulation that actors are not permitted to simply diverge from statements of intentions. The Council has also emphasized that it is regarded as essential for the maintenance of the public’s reliance in the stock market that statements of intentions are complied with.

Stock market actors’ responsibilities for statements made towards the market are regulated to a much greater extent in the UK. Since the Swedish takeover regulation originated from the takeover code, the question arises of why this particular problem exhibits such large differences in the degree of regulation. Furthermore, this thesis examines the possible consequences of the European Commission's proposal for a new regulation on market abuse. The proposal is primarily interesting because of a paragraph in its preamble that could be interpreted to imply that stock market actors’ deviations from statements of intentions under certain conditions might be considered as market manipulation.

Finally, this thesis provides an analysis of the current Swedish regulation and also offers opinions on how the framework could be developed in the future. My conclusion is that a precautionary standard is indicated in the Council’s practice and provided this is met at the time of the statement there is room to allow subsequent deviations. However, the Council’s practice shows deficiencies in its explanations which negatively impacts the predictability in its assessments. In my view, further regulation of the issue is therefore necessary, especially regarding situations where a bidder has announced that the price of the offer will not be raised and discrepancies in connection therewith. (Less)
Abstract (Swedish)
I samband med offentliga uppköpserbjudanden uppstår emellanåt ett behov för aktiemarknadsaktörer att göra uttalanden gentemot aktiemarknaden avseende sina avsikter. När aktiemarknadsaktören senare av olika anledningar kan behöva avvika från denna tidigare gjorda avsiktsförklaring uppstår frågan om under vilka förutsättningar en sådan avvikelse kan godtas. Uppsatsens grundläggande syfte är således att utreda gällande rätt avseende aktiemarknadsaktörers avvikelser från avsiktsförklaringar, ur både ett de lege lata- och ett de lege ferenda-perspektiv.

Presentationen redogör för den översyn av takeover-reglerna som genomfördes under 2011, som resulterade i att vissa marginella förändringar av relevans för frågan inkorporerades i... (More)
I samband med offentliga uppköpserbjudanden uppstår emellanåt ett behov för aktiemarknadsaktörer att göra uttalanden gentemot aktiemarknaden avseende sina avsikter. När aktiemarknadsaktören senare av olika anledningar kan behöva avvika från denna tidigare gjorda avsiktsförklaring uppstår frågan om under vilka förutsättningar en sådan avvikelse kan godtas. Uppsatsens grundläggande syfte är således att utreda gällande rätt avseende aktiemarknadsaktörers avvikelser från avsiktsförklaringar, ur både ett de lege lata- och ett de lege ferenda-perspektiv.

Presentationen redogör för den översyn av takeover-reglerna som genomfördes under 2011, som resulterade i att vissa marginella förändringar av relevans för frågan inkorporerades i regelverket. Aktiemarknadsaktörers avvikelser från avsiktsförklaringar regleras dock i dagsläget fortfarande högst kortfattat, inom ramen för punkterna I.2 och II.7 i takeover-reglerna. Frågan har däremot varit uppe till bedömning hos AMN vid ett flertal tillfällen och i nämndens praxis har en allmän aktiemarknadsrättslig princip etablerats, innebärande att aktörer inte utan vidare får avvika från avsiktsförklaringar som getts till känna för marknaden. Nämnden har även återkommande gånger framhållit att det är väsentligt för upprätthållandet av förtroendet för aktiemarknaden att avsiktsförklaringar efterlevs.

Av uppsatsens deskriptiva del framgår vidare att aktiemarknadsaktörers ansvar för uttalanden som görs gentemot marknaden är reglerat i en betydligt större utsträckning och med en avsevärt högre detaljgrad i den brittiska självregleringen. Då den brittiska takeover-koden sedan begynnelsen har utgjort förebild för de svenska takeover-reglerna, väcks frågan om varför just detta problemområde uppvisar så stora olikheter i graden av reglering. Därutöver undersöks de eventuella konsekvenser som kommissionens förslag till ny förordning om marknadsmissbruk kan komma att innebära för problematiken. Förslaget är främst intressant på grund av ett skäl i dess ingress, som kan tolkas som att aktiemarknadsaktörers avvikelser från avsiktsförklaringar under vissa förutsättningar betraktas som otillbörlig marknadspåverkan.

Uppsatsen avslutas med en analys varvid frågeställningarna besvaras. Ur AMN:s betydelsefulla praxis anser jag att en försiktighetsstandard kan utläsas och förutsatt att denna uppfylls vid tidpunkten för avsiktsförklaringen finns utrymme att tillåta senare avvikelser. Nämndens högst kortfattade motiveringar innebär emellertid att dess praxis leder till bristande förutsebarhet och därför menar jag att ytterligare reglering av frågan är nödvändig. Detta gäller i synnerhet de situationer då budgivaren har tillkännagett att priset i budet inte kommer att höjas och avvikelser i samband därmed. Vid dessa tillfällen måste nämligen aktieägarna anses ha ett särskilt skyddsvärt intresse av att kunna förlita sig på budgivarens uttalanden. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Cronqvist, Cecilia LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
Stock market actors' deviations from statements of intention
course
JURM02 20141
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
Associationsrätt, Aktiemarknadsrätt, Offentliga uppköpserbjudanden, Aktiemarknadsnämnden, Marknadsmissbruk
language
Swedish
id
4448260
date added to LUP
2014-06-12 08:34:10
date last changed
2014-06-12 08:34:10
@misc{4448260,
  abstract     = {{During the course of a public takeover offer, the need for a stock market actor to make statements towards the market regarding their intentions occasionally arises. For various reasons, the stock market actor may at a later stage deem it necessary to diverge from this previously made statement of intention and the question of under what circumstances such a deviation is acceptable emerges. Therefore, the objective of this thesis is to examine the current Swedish regulation regarding stock market actors’ deviations from statements of intentions, from both a de lege lata- and a de lege ferenda-perspective. 

This thesis reports on the review of the takeover rules that were carried out during 2011, which resulted in some minor adjustments regarding the regulation of stock market actors’ deviations from statements of intention. The regulation in the takeover rules remained however very brief and is currently subsumed under two specific paragraphs, I.2 and II.7. The issue has been addressed by the Swedish Securities Council (the Council, sw: Aktiemarknadsnämnden) on several occasions, which has declared it a general principle in the stock market regulation that actors are not permitted to simply diverge from statements of intentions. The Council has also emphasized that it is regarded as essential for the maintenance of the public’s reliance in the stock market that statements of intentions are complied with. 

Stock market actors’ responsibilities for statements made towards the market are regulated to a much greater extent in the UK. Since the Swedish takeover regulation originated from the takeover code, the question arises of why this particular problem exhibits such large differences in the degree of regulation. Furthermore, this thesis examines the possible consequences of the European Commission's proposal for a new regulation on market abuse. The proposal is primarily interesting because of a paragraph in its preamble that could be interpreted to imply that stock market actors’ deviations from statements of intentions under certain conditions might be considered as market manipulation. 

Finally, this thesis provides an analysis of the current Swedish regulation and also offers opinions on how the framework could be developed in the future. My conclusion is that a precautionary standard is indicated in the Council’s practice and provided this is met at the time of the statement there is room to allow subsequent deviations. However, the Council’s practice shows deficiencies in its explanations which negatively impacts the predictability in its assessments. In my view, further regulation of the issue is therefore necessary, especially regarding situations where a bidder has announced that the price of the offer will not be raised and discrepancies in connection therewith.}},
  author       = {{Cronqvist, Cecilia}},
  language     = {{swe}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Aktiemarknadsaktörers avvikelser från avsiktsförklaringar}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}