Saklegitimation för enskilda i svensk förvaltningsprocess
(2014) JURM02 20141Department of Law
- Abstract (Swedish)
- I svensk förvaltningsrätt har den generella rätten att överklaga sedan lång tid varit öppet formulerad i lag och lämnats till domstolarna att konkretisera. I praxis har talerätten gjorts beroende av indikationer i lag och förarbeten för att avgöra vilka intressenter som ska ha rätt att överklaga. Tre grunder för saklegitimation kan urskiljas. För det första är den som haft partsställning vid myndigheten saklegitimerad. Vidare kan saklegitimation ges den som representerar ett av rättsordningen skyddat intresse. Sist kan konstateras att enskildas påverkade rättsställning kan grunda talerätt, även om denna grund är ovanlig i praxis. På senare tid har i praxis kunnat skönjas en viss förändring i hur talerätt avgörs för enskild. I SOU 2010:29... (More)
- I svensk förvaltningsrätt har den generella rätten att överklaga sedan lång tid varit öppet formulerad i lag och lämnats till domstolarna att konkretisera. I praxis har talerätten gjorts beroende av indikationer i lag och förarbeten för att avgöra vilka intressenter som ska ha rätt att överklaga. Tre grunder för saklegitimation kan urskiljas. För det första är den som haft partsställning vid myndigheten saklegitimerad. Vidare kan saklegitimation ges den som representerar ett av rättsordningen skyddat intresse. Sist kan konstateras att enskildas påverkade rättsställning kan grunda talerätt, även om denna grund är ovanlig i praxis. På senare tid har i praxis kunnat skönjas en viss förändring i hur talerätt avgörs för enskild. I SOU 2010:29 hävdas att denna prövning genom praxis gjorts mer fristående från de formella indikationer med vilka domstol traditionellt avgjort talerättsfrågan. Uppsatsen undersöker om en sådan utveckling faktiskt skett och hur den ska förstås, och hur en klagande kan bli taleberättigad utanför de formella indikationerna genom att använda allmänna rättsprinciper. Uppsatsen undersöker även de internationella åtaganden som åvilar Sverige för att se om en klagande kan förlita sig på något av dessa. Det tycks finnas en uppfattning om att talerätten som den förstås enligt svensk rätt eventuellt inte tillfredsställer de krav som EKMR ställer på avtalsstaternas rättsordningar. Huruvida uppfattning stämmer är svårt att svara på generellt. En klagande bör dock alltid föra upp EKMR inför svensk domstol för att tvinga denna att ta ställning. Vidare undersöks vilka krav EU-rätten ställer vad gäller talerätt för enskilda inför medlemsstaternas domstolar, och hur dessa kan användas av klagande inför svensk förvaltningsdomstol. Det konstateras att EU-rättens krav på talerätt inför nationell domstol är rättighetsbaserad och snäv i jämförelse med den svenska talerätten. En utveckling tycks dock vara på väg att ske mot en fristående rätt att bli hörd inför det att myndighet tar beslut baserade på EU-rätten, vilket i sin tur skulle kunna användas av en klagande i svensk domstol utifrån grunden ”av rättsordningen skyddat intresse”. Det är dock oklart om EU-domstolen kommer att utveckla denna rätt och i vilken riktning. (Less)
- Abstract
- In Swedish administrative procedural law the right to appeal has long been regulated in a manner which has left it to the courts to decide the specifics. In practice who has the right to appeal has been determined by viewing the law in conjunction with the preparatory works established in its creation. Three different bases for standing can be identified. First and foremost the addressee of a decision has a right to appeal. Secondly, standing can be based on the appellant representing an ”interest identified by the legal order”. Lastly, standing can be on the basis that a decision has consequences directly derived from law for the legal conditions of an appellant. Lately however, case-law has suggested a shift in how standing is decided by... (More)
- In Swedish administrative procedural law the right to appeal has long been regulated in a manner which has left it to the courts to decide the specifics. In practice who has the right to appeal has been determined by viewing the law in conjunction with the preparatory works established in its creation. Three different bases for standing can be identified. First and foremost the addressee of a decision has a right to appeal. Secondly, standing can be based on the appellant representing an ”interest identified by the legal order”. Lastly, standing can be on the basis that a decision has consequences directly derived from law for the legal conditions of an appellant. Lately however, case-law has suggested a shift in how standing is decided by the courts. In SOU 2010:29 it is claimed that the method by which the courts decide who has standing has developed to be more independent from formal indications such as those found in law and preparatory works. The essay investigates if such a development actually has taken place, how it should be understood, and if an appellant can gain standing with arguments based on general principles of law when not representing an interest indicated by the legal order. The essay also explores the international law by which Sweden is bound, to clarify whether an appellant can rely on these for standing in the Swedish administrative courts. There seems to be a notion that the rules of standing, as it is understood in Swedish courts, might not always be sufficient to satisfy the obligations posed on the parties by the ECHR. Furthermore, the essay investigates in which regards the EU places obligations upon the member states with regards to standing in the national courts, and how this might be used by an appellant in a Swedish administrative court. In this regard, it is found that the obligations posed by the EU in regards to standing are rights-based and rather narrow in comparison to the Swedish understanding of standing. A certain development has been identified in regards to the right to be heard when a national authority makes decisions on the basis of EU-law. This right to be heard could be used by an appellant in a Swedish administrative court as a part of the basis ”interest identified by the legal order”. It is however yet to be seen if the Court of justice will develop this right and in which direction. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/4451287
- author
- Kronqvist, Gustav LU
- supervisor
- organization
- alternative title
- Standing för individuals in Swedish administrative procedural law
- course
- JURM02 20141
- year
- 2014
- type
- H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
- subject
- keywords
- förvaltningsrätt
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 4451287
- date added to LUP
- 2014-06-12 08:46:39
- date last changed
- 2014-06-12 08:46:39
@misc{4451287,
abstract = {{In Swedish administrative procedural law the right to appeal has long been regulated in a manner which has left it to the courts to decide the specifics. In practice who has the right to appeal has been determined by viewing the law in conjunction with the preparatory works established in its creation. Three different bases for standing can be identified. First and foremost the addressee of a decision has a right to appeal. Secondly, standing can be based on the appellant representing an ”interest identified by the legal order”. Lastly, standing can be on the basis that a decision has consequences directly derived from law for the legal conditions of an appellant. Lately however, case-law has suggested a shift in how standing is decided by the courts. In SOU 2010:29 it is claimed that the method by which the courts decide who has standing has developed to be more independent from formal indications such as those found in law and preparatory works. The essay investigates if such a development actually has taken place, how it should be understood, and if an appellant can gain standing with arguments based on general principles of law when not representing an interest indicated by the legal order. The essay also explores the international law by which Sweden is bound, to clarify whether an appellant can rely on these for standing in the Swedish administrative courts. There seems to be a notion that the rules of standing, as it is understood in Swedish courts, might not always be sufficient to satisfy the obligations posed on the parties by the ECHR. Furthermore, the essay investigates in which regards the EU places obligations upon the member states with regards to standing in the national courts, and how this might be used by an appellant in a Swedish administrative court. In this regard, it is found that the obligations posed by the EU in regards to standing are rights-based and rather narrow in comparison to the Swedish understanding of standing. A certain development has been identified in regards to the right to be heard when a national authority makes decisions on the basis of EU-law. This right to be heard could be used by an appellant in a Swedish administrative court as a part of the basis ”interest identified by the legal order”. It is however yet to be seen if the Court of justice will develop this right and in which direction.}},
author = {{Kronqvist, Gustav}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Saklegitimation för enskilda i svensk förvaltningsprocess}},
year = {{2014}},
}