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LUND UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES

Aktieägaravtalets civilrättsliga verkningar - särskilt om avtalade avståenden från rätt till tvångsinlösen och hembudsinlösen

Bjartell, Louise LU (2014) LAGM01 20142
Department of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Aktieägaravtal är vanligt förekommande i svenska aktiebolag och fungerar
som ett kompletterande styrinstrument för bolagets ägare. Genom att ingå
avtal kan aktieägare frångå reglerna i aktiebolagslagen2 och
bolagsordningen. Avgörande för om avtalet får den effekt som parterna
avser är dock vilka rättsliga verkningar gällande rätt tillmäter
aktieägaravtalet. Utgångspunkten är att aktieägaravtal inte medför
aktiebolagsrättsliga verkningar, om inte lag föreskriver annat. Detta följer av
den aktiebolagsrättsliga separationsprincipen, en princip som bygger på att
avtalsrätten och aktiebolagsrätten utgör två inbördes autonoma
rättsområden.
Aktieägaravtal kan t.ex. innehålla föreskrifter om att parterna avsäger sig sin
rätt till... (More)
Aktieägaravtal är vanligt förekommande i svenska aktiebolag och fungerar
som ett kompletterande styrinstrument för bolagets ägare. Genom att ingå
avtal kan aktieägare frångå reglerna i aktiebolagslagen2 och
bolagsordningen. Avgörande för om avtalet får den effekt som parterna
avser är dock vilka rättsliga verkningar gällande rätt tillmäter
aktieägaravtalet. Utgångspunkten är att aktieägaravtal inte medför
aktiebolagsrättsliga verkningar, om inte lag föreskriver annat. Detta följer av
den aktiebolagsrättsliga separationsprincipen, en princip som bygger på att
avtalsrätten och aktiebolagsrätten utgör två inbördes autonoma
rättsområden.
Aktieägaravtal kan t.ex. innehålla föreskrifter om att parterna avsäger sig sin
rätt till tvångsinlösen eller hembudsinlösen. Huruvida den
aktiebolagsrättsliga separationsprincipen kan tillämpas för att bedöma vilka
rättsliga verkningar sådana avtal medför är beroende av principens
tillämpningsomfång. Enligt Nerep är principen tillämplig så snart ett
aktieägaravtal tar sikte på någon regel i ABL medan Arvidsson anser att
principen enbart är tillämplig på rättsfrågor som rör bolagets inre
rättsförhållande, dvs. relationen mellan å ena sidan bolaget och å andra
sidan bolagets aktörer. I arbetet tar jag ställning för Arvidssons uppfattning
eftersom denna bygger på en rättslig analys och denna syn har flera fördelar.
Eftersom rätten till inlösen inte berör bolagets inre rättsförhållande saknar
den aktiebolagsrättsliga separationsprincipen all betydelse för frågan om
vilka verkningar avtalade avstående från rätt till inlösen har. Bedömningen
av sådana avtals rättsliga verkningar får istället ske utifrån den
avtalsrättsliga distinktionen mellan tvingande och dispositivt.
Inlösenrättigheter är obligationsrättsliga rättigheter även om rättigheterna i
fråga kommer till uttryck i ABL. NJA 2011 s. 429 visar dock att det finns
möjlighet att företa en analog tillämpning av den aktiebolagsrättsliga
separationsprincipen. Det kan dock endast ske om syftet med de
ifrågavarande reglerna motiverar det.
I arbetet finner jag att aktieägare har en begränsad möjlighet att i
aktieägaravtal avstå från rätten till tvångsinlösen. Genom NJA 2011 s. 429
har Högsta domstolen konstaterat att sådana avtal inte ska beaktas i en
tvångsinlösenprocess. Däremot tycks det råda större frihet för aktieägare att
förfoga över den rätten till inlösen som följer av ett hembudsförbehåll i
bolagsordningen. Aktieägaravtal i vilka parterna avstår från sin rätt till
hembudsinlösen torde vara obligationsrättsligt bindande och även bindande i
en aktiebolagsrättslig kontext. Förutsatt att förvärvaren är avtalspart, kan
rätten till hembudsinlösen därför elimineras helt genom aktieägaravtal.
Aktieägaravtal kan t.ex. innehålla föreskrifter om att parterna avsäger sig sin rätt till tvångsinlösen eller hembudsinlösen. Huruvida den aktiebolagsrättsliga separationsprincipen kan tillämpas för att bedöma vilka rättsliga verkningar sådana avtal medför är beroende av principens tillämpningsomfång. Enligt Nerep är principen tillämplig så snart ett aktieägaravtal tar sikte på någon regel i ABL medan Arvidsson anser att principen enbart är tillämplig på rättsfrågor som rör bolagets inre rättsförhållande, dvs. relationen mellan å ena sidan bolaget och å andra sidan bolagets aktörer. I arbetet tar jag ställning för Arvidssons uppfattning eftersom denna bygger på en rättslig analys och denna syn har flera fördelar.

Eftersom rätten till inlösen inte berör bolagets inre rättsförhållande saknar den aktiebolagsrättsliga separationsprincipen all betydelse för frågan om vilka verkningar avtalade avstående från rätt till inlösen har. Bedömningen av sådana avtals rättsliga verkningar får istället ske utifrån den avtalsrättsliga distinktionen mellan tvingande och dispositivt. Inlösenrättigheter är obligationsrättsliga rättigheter även om rättigheterna i fråga kommer till uttryck i ABL. NJA 2011 s. 429, det s.k. Mineralmålet, visar dock att det finns möjlighet att företa en analog tillämpning av den aktiebolagsrättsliga separationsprincipen. Det kan dock endast ske om syftet med de ifrågavarande reglerna motiverar det.

I arbetet finner jag att aktieägare har en begränsad möjlighet att i aktieägaravtal avstå från rätten till tvångsinlösen. Genom Mineralmålet har Högsta domstolen konstaterat att sådana avtal inte ska beaktas i en tvångsinlösenprocess. Däremot tycks det råda större frihet för aktieägare att förfoga över den rätten till inlösen som följer av ett hembudsförbehåll i bolagsordningen. Aktieägaravtal i vilka parterna avstår från sin rätt till hembudsinlösen torde vara obligationsrättsligt bindande och även bindande i en aktiebolagsrättslig kontext. Förutsatt att förvärvaren är avtalspart, kan rätten till hembudsinlösen elimineras helt. (Less)
Abstract
Shareholder agreements are often used as a governing instrument in
Swedish limited companies. By entering such agreements, the company’s
shareholders can agree on rules that deviate from the rules of the Swedish
Companies Act1 (SCA) or the Article of Association. However, whether the
agreement will have the impact that the parties desire depends on what legal
effects shareholder agreements are given under Swedish law. According to
the separation principle in company law, explicit legal support in statutory
law is necessary in order for a shareholder agreement to have company law
effects. This principle is founded upon the idea that contract law and
company law are two mutually autonomous areas of law.
Shareholders may, for... (More)
Shareholder agreements are often used as a governing instrument in
Swedish limited companies. By entering such agreements, the company’s
shareholders can agree on rules that deviate from the rules of the Swedish
Companies Act1 (SCA) or the Article of Association. However, whether the
agreement will have the impact that the parties desire depends on what legal
effects shareholder agreements are given under Swedish law. According to
the separation principle in company law, explicit legal support in statutory
law is necessary in order for a shareholder agreement to have company law
effects. This principle is founded upon the idea that contract law and
company law are two mutually autonomous areas of law.
Shareholders may, for example, agree to refrain from their rights in chapter
22 SCA or their post-transfer acquisition right. Whether the separation
principle can be adapted to assess the legal effects of such an agreement
depends on how far the principle’s appliance scope reaches. According to
Nerep, the principle applies whenever a shareholder agreement regulated a
norm or right stated in SCA, regardless of the actual characteristics of the
norm or right. Meanwhile, Arvidsson claims that the principle is only
applicable when the question at hand relates to the internal legal relations of
the company. Since the view presented by Arvidsson is based on a
thourough legal analysis and because it leads to desired results, I agree with
Arvidsson’s perception of the scope of the separations principle.
In accordance with Arvidsson’s view, the separation principle of company
law is not applicable on agreements among shareholders to refrain from
their acquisition rights. This follows from the fact that such rights are not
related to the internal legal relations of the company, i.e. between the
company in its capacity as a legal entity on the one hand and its actors and
bodies on the other. The legal effects of such shareholder agreements must
thus instead be assessed on the distinction between mandatory and optional,
since acquisition rights are contractual rights. However, it follows from the
case NJA 2011 s. 429 that the separation principle may be applied
analogically if motivated by the purpose of the rights or norms at hand.
In this paper, I find that shareholders’ power to refrain from their acquisition
rights under chapter 22 SCA is limited. The Swedish Supreme Court have
concluded that such agreements should be ignored in an acquisition
procedure. Meanwhile, shareholders have a greater liberty to refrain from
their post-transfer acquisition rights. Agreements in which shareholders
refrain from such rights are legally binding between the parties and should
be considered even in a company context. Given that the acquirer is a party
to the agreement, the post-transfer acquisition right can thus be eliminated
altogether through shareholder agreements.
Shareholders may, for example, agree to refrain from their rights in chapter 22 SCA or their post-transfer acquisition right. Whether the separation principle can be adapted to assess the legal effects of such an agreement depends on how far the principle’s appliance scope reaches. According to Nerep, the principle applies whenever a shareholder agreement deals with a norm or right that is stated in SCA, regardless of the actual characteristics of the norm or right. Meanwhile, Arvidsson claims that the principle is only applicable when the question at hand relates the internal legal relations of the company. Since the view presented by Arvidsson is based on a thourough legal analysis and because it leads to desired results, I agree with Arvidsson’s perception of the scope of the separations principle.

In accordance with Arvidsson’s view, the separation principle of company law is not applicable on agreements among shareholders to refrain from their acquisition rights. This follows from the fact that such rights are not related to the internal legal relations of the company, i.e. between the company in its capacity as a legal entity on the one hand its actors and bodies on the other. The legal effects of such shareholder agreements must thus instead be assessed on the distinction between mandatory and optional, since acquisition rights are contractual rights. However, it follows from the case NJA 2011 s. 429 that the separation principle may be applied analogically if motivated by the purpose of the rights or norms at hand.

In this paper, I find that shareholders’ power to refrain from their right to compulsory cession of shares under chapter 22 SCA is limited. The Swedish Supreme Court have concluded that such agreements should not be considered in an acquisition procedure. Meanwhile, shareholders have a greater liberty to refrain from their post-transfer acquisition rights. Agreements in which shareholders refrain from such rights are legally binding between the parties and should be considered even in a company context. Given that the acquirer is a party to the agreement, the post-transfer acquisition right can thus be eliminated altogether. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Bjartell, Louise LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
Legal effects of shareholder agreeements - about refraining from the right to compulsory cession of shares or a post-transfer acquisition right
course
LAGM01 20142
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
aktieägaravtal, förmögenhetsrätt, avtalsrätt, associationsrätt, tvångsinlösen, hembud
language
Swedish
id
4732880
date added to LUP
2014-11-24 07:29:58
date last changed
2014-11-24 07:29:58
@misc{4732880,
  abstract     = {{Shareholder agreements are often used as a governing instrument in
Swedish limited companies. By entering such agreements, the company’s
shareholders can agree on rules that deviate from the rules of the Swedish
Companies Act1 (SCA) or the Article of Association. However, whether the
agreement will have the impact that the parties desire depends on what legal
effects shareholder agreements are given under Swedish law. According to
the separation principle in company law, explicit legal support in statutory
law is necessary in order for a shareholder agreement to have company law
effects. This principle is founded upon the idea that contract law and
company law are two mutually autonomous areas of law.
Shareholders may, for example, agree to refrain from their rights in chapter
22 SCA or their post-transfer acquisition right. Whether the separation
principle can be adapted to assess the legal effects of such an agreement
depends on how far the principle’s appliance scope reaches. According to
Nerep, the principle applies whenever a shareholder agreement regulated a
norm or right stated in SCA, regardless of the actual characteristics of the
norm or right. Meanwhile, Arvidsson claims that the principle is only
applicable when the question at hand relates to the internal legal relations of
the company. Since the view presented by Arvidsson is based on a
thourough legal analysis and because it leads to desired results, I agree with
Arvidsson’s perception of the scope of the separations principle.
In accordance with Arvidsson’s view, the separation principle of company
law is not applicable on agreements among shareholders to refrain from
their acquisition rights. This follows from the fact that such rights are not
related to the internal legal relations of the company, i.e. between the
company in its capacity as a legal entity on the one hand and its actors and
bodies on the other. The legal effects of such shareholder agreements must
thus instead be assessed on the distinction between mandatory and optional,
since acquisition rights are contractual rights. However, it follows from the
case NJA 2011 s. 429 that the separation principle may be applied
analogically if motivated by the purpose of the rights or norms at hand.
In this paper, I find that shareholders’ power to refrain from their acquisition
rights under chapter 22 SCA is limited. The Swedish Supreme Court have
concluded that such agreements should be ignored in an acquisition
procedure. Meanwhile, shareholders have a greater liberty to refrain from
their post-transfer acquisition rights. Agreements in which shareholders
refrain from such rights are legally binding between the parties and should
be considered even in a company context. Given that the acquirer is a party
to the agreement, the post-transfer acquisition right can thus be eliminated
altogether through shareholder agreements.
Shareholders may, for example, agree to refrain from their rights in chapter 22 SCA or their post-transfer acquisition right. Whether the separation principle can be adapted to assess the legal effects of such an agreement depends on how far the principle’s appliance scope reaches. According to Nerep, the principle applies whenever a shareholder agreement deals with a norm or right that is stated in SCA, regardless of the actual characteristics of the norm or right. Meanwhile, Arvidsson claims that the principle is only applicable when the question at hand relates the internal legal relations of the company. Since the view presented by Arvidsson is based on a thourough legal analysis and because it leads to desired results, I agree with Arvidsson’s perception of the scope of the separations principle.

In accordance with Arvidsson’s view, the separation principle of company law is not applicable on agreements among shareholders to refrain from their acquisition rights. This follows from the fact that such rights are not related to the internal legal relations of the company, i.e. between the company in its capacity as a legal entity on the one hand its actors and bodies on the other. The legal effects of such shareholder agreements must thus instead be assessed on the distinction between mandatory and optional, since acquisition rights are contractual rights. However, it follows from the case NJA 2011 s. 429 that the separation principle may be applied analogically if motivated by the purpose of the rights or norms at hand.

In this paper, I find that shareholders’ power to refrain from their right to compulsory cession of shares under chapter 22 SCA is limited. The Swedish Supreme Court have concluded that such agreements should not be considered in an acquisition procedure. Meanwhile, shareholders have a greater liberty to refrain from their post-transfer acquisition rights. Agreements in which shareholders refrain from such rights are legally binding between the parties and should be considered even in a company context. Given that the acquirer is a party to the agreement, the post-transfer acquisition right can thus be eliminated altogether.}},
  author       = {{Bjartell, Louise}},
  language     = {{swe}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Aktieägaravtalets civilrättsliga verkningar - särskilt om avtalade avståenden från rätt till tvångsinlösen och hembudsinlösen}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}