Neurojuridik och svensk bevisrätt - naturvetenskapliga rön mot rättsliga presumtioner
(2014) JURM02 20142Department of Law
- Abstract (Swedish)
- Det har på senare tid skett framsteg inom neurovetenskaplig forskning som skapat möjligheter för ett nytt ämnesområde inom juridiken, neurojuridik. Forskningen om neurojuridik sker främst i USA och en särskilt omdebatterad fråga där är om neurovetenskapliga lögndetektorer ska få användas i straffprocessen. Det finns även två privata bolag i USA som för närvarande lanserar den neurovetenskapliga lögndetektorn som vetenskapligt bevisad och starkt tillförlitlig, vilket tyder på att neurovetenskapliga metoder har potential att skapa bevisning som påverkar straffprocessen på ett betydande sätt och att sådan bevisning troligen kan skapa en faktisk presumtion om att den tilltalade är skyldig.
Föreliggande uppsats utreder vilken påverkan... (More) - Det har på senare tid skett framsteg inom neurovetenskaplig forskning som skapat möjligheter för ett nytt ämnesområde inom juridiken, neurojuridik. Forskningen om neurojuridik sker främst i USA och en särskilt omdebatterad fråga där är om neurovetenskapliga lögndetektorer ska få användas i straffprocessen. Det finns även två privata bolag i USA som för närvarande lanserar den neurovetenskapliga lögndetektorn som vetenskapligt bevisad och starkt tillförlitlig, vilket tyder på att neurovetenskapliga metoder har potential att skapa bevisning som påverkar straffprocessen på ett betydande sätt och att sådan bevisning troligen kan skapa en faktisk presumtion om att den tilltalade är skyldig.
Föreliggande uppsats utreder vilken påverkan neurojuridiken, som handlar om att neurovetenskapliga framsteg tillvaratas i den juridiska processen, har på svenska straffprocessrättsliga regler som principen om fri bevisprövning och oskyldighetspresumtionen. Den slutliga bedömningen är att neurovetenskaplig bevisning får anföras i svensk domstol och att neurovetenskaplig bevisning troligen inte kommer att tillmätas något bevisvärde i målet, vilket beror på att den neurovetenskapliga bevisningen saknar tillförlitlighet enligt aktuell forskning. Neurovetenskaplig bevisning kan dessutom medföra svårigheter i rättens bevisvärdering eftersom bevisningen är av vetenskaplig och grafisk natur, vilket troligen medför att den övertolkas eller missförstås av rätten. Neurovetenskaplig bevisning kan även framstå som objektiv och som att subjektiva bedömningar på så sätt undviks när bevisningen används. Det framgår emellertid att neurovetenskapliga metoder och sakkunnigbevisning kan medföra ett subjektivt element till bevisningen.
Den tilltalades rätt till tystnad kan även bli tillämplig i vissa situationer när neurovetenskaplig bevisning används, främst när den tilltalade väljer att förhålla sig passiv under processen och möjligen även på ett mer generellt plan om neurovetenskaplig bevisning bedöms som osäker. Författaren förespråkar därför att Europadomstolens krav om att tystnaden inte får vara det huvudsakliga eller enda beviset för en fällande dom ska införas i svensk lagtext. Den förespråkade lagändringen innebär troligen att bevisvärderingen återges på ett mer utförligt och korrekt sätt i domskälen.
Neurovetenskaplig bevisning bedöms slutligen inte vara tillförlitlig nog i dagsläget för att skapa en faktisk presumtion om att den tilltalade är skyldig, vilket föranleder att oskyldighetspresumtionen kvarstår som en rimlig rättslig presumtion att använda i straffprocessen. Oskyldighetspresumtionen bör dessutom vidhållas även om neurovetenskaplig bevisning i framtiden blir mer tillförlitlig eftersom presumtionen är viktig för den tilltalades rättsskydd i brottmål. (Less) - Abstract
- The recent developments in neuroscience research have made it possible for a new field to emerge within law, neurolaw. Most of the research on neurolaw takes place in the United States and one intensively debated issue there is whether or not neuroscience-based lie detection should be allowed in criminal cases. There are currently two American private companies advertising the neuroscience-based lie detection tests as scientifically proven and highly reliable. This demonstrates that neuroscientific methods are able to produce evidence that can have a profound significance for the criminal procedure and that neuroscientific evidence may have the ability to create a factual presumption of the defendant being guilty.
This thesis examines... (More) - The recent developments in neuroscience research have made it possible for a new field to emerge within law, neurolaw. Most of the research on neurolaw takes place in the United States and one intensively debated issue there is whether or not neuroscience-based lie detection should be allowed in criminal cases. There are currently two American private companies advertising the neuroscience-based lie detection tests as scientifically proven and highly reliable. This demonstrates that neuroscientific methods are able to produce evidence that can have a profound significance for the criminal procedure and that neuroscientific evidence may have the ability to create a factual presumption of the defendant being guilty.
This thesis examines how neurolaw, which is about neuroscientific advances being implemented in the legal process, relates to the Swedish rules of criminal procedure, more specifically production and evaluation of evidence and the presumption of innocence. The final conclusion is that neuroscientific evidence can be presented in Swedish criminal courts and that neuroscientific evidence most likely will be evaluated to have no evidentiary value in the case. This conclusion is motivated by the fact that neuroscientific evidence lack reliability according to the research performed to date. It is furthermore apparent that neuroscientific evidence may be difficult for the court to evaluate because of its scientific and graphic nature, which may cause the court to be unduly influenced by the evidence or to misinterpret the evidence. Neuroscientific evidence can also be perceived as objective by nature and therefore as if subjective judgments are avoided when neuroscientific evidence is used. However this is not the case since both neuroscientific evidence and expert witnesses carries a subjective element to the evidence.
The defendant’s right to silence can also be addressed in certain situations when neuroscientific evidence is presented in court, mostly when the defendant decides to remain silent during the proceedings and possibly also on a more general level since neuroscientific evidence can be deemed as uncertain. The author argues that Swedish law should be changed on this issue in order to better comply with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which repeatedly has ruled that a conviction cannot be solely or mainly based on the defendant’s silence. An amendment of the Swedish law will most likely cause the judges to explain the evaluation of the evidence more extensively and correctly in the judgment.
Finally neuroscientific evidence is not presumed to be reliable enough to create a factual presumption of the defendant being guilty, which leaves the presumption of innocence as a reasonable legal presumption to use in criminal cases. The presumption of innocence ought to be persevered even if neuroscientific evidence in the future gains a greater reliability because the presumption is vital to the defendant’s legal protection in criminal cases. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/4905420
- author
- Andersson, Ida LU
- supervisor
-
- Karol Nowak LU
- organization
- alternative title
- Neurolaw and Swedish Rules of Evidence - scientific findings against legal presumptions
- course
- JURM02 20142
- year
- 2014
- type
- H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
- subject
- keywords
- straffrätt, folkrätt, straffprocessrätt, neurojuridik
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 4905420
- date added to LUP
- 2015-04-14 14:38:06
- date last changed
- 2015-04-14 14:38:06
@misc{4905420,
abstract = {{The recent developments in neuroscience research have made it possible for a new field to emerge within law, neurolaw. Most of the research on neurolaw takes place in the United States and one intensively debated issue there is whether or not neuroscience-based lie detection should be allowed in criminal cases. There are currently two American private companies advertising the neuroscience-based lie detection tests as scientifically proven and highly reliable. This demonstrates that neuroscientific methods are able to produce evidence that can have a profound significance for the criminal procedure and that neuroscientific evidence may have the ability to create a factual presumption of the defendant being guilty.
This thesis examines how neurolaw, which is about neuroscientific advances being implemented in the legal process, relates to the Swedish rules of criminal procedure, more specifically production and evaluation of evidence and the presumption of innocence. The final conclusion is that neuroscientific evidence can be presented in Swedish criminal courts and that neuroscientific evidence most likely will be evaluated to have no evidentiary value in the case. This conclusion is motivated by the fact that neuroscientific evidence lack reliability according to the research performed to date. It is furthermore apparent that neuroscientific evidence may be difficult for the court to evaluate because of its scientific and graphic nature, which may cause the court to be unduly influenced by the evidence or to misinterpret the evidence. Neuroscientific evidence can also be perceived as objective by nature and therefore as if subjective judgments are avoided when neuroscientific evidence is used. However this is not the case since both neuroscientific evidence and expert witnesses carries a subjective element to the evidence.
The defendant’s right to silence can also be addressed in certain situations when neuroscientific evidence is presented in court, mostly when the defendant decides to remain silent during the proceedings and possibly also on a more general level since neuroscientific evidence can be deemed as uncertain. The author argues that Swedish law should be changed on this issue in order to better comply with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which repeatedly has ruled that a conviction cannot be solely or mainly based on the defendant’s silence. An amendment of the Swedish law will most likely cause the judges to explain the evaluation of the evidence more extensively and correctly in the judgment.
Finally neuroscientific evidence is not presumed to be reliable enough to create a factual presumption of the defendant being guilty, which leaves the presumption of innocence as a reasonable legal presumption to use in criminal cases. The presumption of innocence ought to be persevered even if neuroscientific evidence in the future gains a greater reliability because the presumption is vital to the defendant’s legal protection in criminal cases.}},
author = {{Andersson, Ida}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Neurojuridik och svensk bevisrätt - naturvetenskapliga rön mot rättsliga presumtioner}},
year = {{2014}},
}