The price of sanctions - how far are the Western powers willing to go?
(2015) STVM23 20151Department of Political Science
- Abstract (Swedish)
- The research investigate the Visegrad countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) cohesion problem finding a joint position on the EU sanctions against Russia by answering the question: What is behind the Visegrad Groups different positions and lack of unity on the EU sanctions towards Russia?. To identify what is behind the Visegrad Groups different positions the theory spring from Putnam’s two-level game theory and will focus on Tsebelis Nested game theory. The two theory´s together enable to map out the Visegrad countries different games nested in an arena dynamics consisting of the three different arenas: the domestic arena, the supranational arena and the international arena. To be able to explain the V4 countries'... (More)
- The research investigate the Visegrad countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) cohesion problem finding a joint position on the EU sanctions against Russia by answering the question: What is behind the Visegrad Groups different positions and lack of unity on the EU sanctions towards Russia?. To identify what is behind the Visegrad Groups different positions the theory spring from Putnam’s two-level game theory and will focus on Tsebelis Nested game theory. The two theory´s together enable to map out the Visegrad countries different games nested in an arena dynamics consisting of the three different arenas: the domestic arena, the supranational arena and the international arena. To be able to explain the V4 countries' divided positions, this research will use five different hypotheses, which will function as explanatory factors trying to describe what is behind each of the V4 countries taken position on the EU sanctions against Russia. The result of the research show that the countries positions and decisions on the three arenas, from their point of view, can be explained as rational choices and strategically decisions taken in the nested game surrounding the sanction war against Russia. Due to the fact that each of the V4 countries act rational to maximize their goal achievement, a coherence problem occur, which makes it hard for the V4 countries to reach an agreement on the “level 3” sanctions. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/5425578
- author
- Wallberg, Sofia LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- STVM23 20151
- year
- 2015
- type
- H2 - Master's Degree (Two Years)
- subject
- keywords
- European Union cooperation, Sanctions policy, Ukraine crises, Visegrad countries
- language
- English
- id
- 5425578
- date added to LUP
- 2015-07-13 11:44:26
- date last changed
- 2015-07-13 11:44:26
@misc{5425578, abstract = {{The research investigate the Visegrad countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) cohesion problem finding a joint position on the EU sanctions against Russia by answering the question: What is behind the Visegrad Groups different positions and lack of unity on the EU sanctions towards Russia?. To identify what is behind the Visegrad Groups different positions the theory spring from Putnam’s two-level game theory and will focus on Tsebelis Nested game theory. The two theory´s together enable to map out the Visegrad countries different games nested in an arena dynamics consisting of the three different arenas: the domestic arena, the supranational arena and the international arena. To be able to explain the V4 countries' divided positions, this research will use five different hypotheses, which will function as explanatory factors trying to describe what is behind each of the V4 countries taken position on the EU sanctions against Russia. The result of the research show that the countries positions and decisions on the three arenas, from their point of view, can be explained as rational choices and strategically decisions taken in the nested game surrounding the sanction war against Russia. Due to the fact that each of the V4 countries act rational to maximize their goal achievement, a coherence problem occur, which makes it hard for the V4 countries to reach an agreement on the “level 3” sanctions.}}, author = {{Wallberg, Sofia}}, language = {{eng}}, note = {{Student Paper}}, title = {{The price of sanctions - how far are the Western powers willing to go?}}, year = {{2015}}, }