Advanced

The Intrinsic Motivated Salaried Physician: A Principal-Agent Model

Tholen, Jacqueline LU (2015) NEKN01 20151
Department of Economics
Abstract
Salaried physicians work in several health care systems, medical care organizations and fields of specialization. This thesis will provide an analysis of salaried physicians behavior by extending the model of the extrinsic motivated salaried physician elaborated by Blomqvist (1991) and include intrinsic motivation and negative utility associated with lying to the patient about the health condition. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the managed care organization has preferences towards more extrinsic motivated physicians when hiring, as long as the patient cannot change the supplier. Allowing for patients to get a second opinion, leads to an improvement in the patient’s expected utility in the model. Including reputation and... (More)
Salaried physicians work in several health care systems, medical care organizations and fields of specialization. This thesis will provide an analysis of salaried physicians behavior by extending the model of the extrinsic motivated salaried physician elaborated by Blomqvist (1991) and include intrinsic motivation and negative utility associated with lying to the patient about the health condition. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the managed care organization has preferences towards more extrinsic motivated physicians when hiring, as long as the patient cannot change the supplier. Allowing for patients to get a second opinion, leads to an improvement in the patient’s expected utility in the model. Including reputation and patient’s evaluation of the health care institution’s service is likely to change the managed care organizations preferences towards more intrinsic motivated physicians. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Tholen, Jacqueline LU
supervisor
organization
course
NEKN01 20151
year
type
H1 - Master's Degree (One Year)
subject
keywords
principal-agent model, intrinsic motivation, salaried physician, information asymmetry, costs of lying
language
English
id
7851623
date added to LUP
2015-09-10 15:23:54
date last changed
2015-09-10 15:23:54
@misc{7851623,
  abstract     = {Salaried physicians work in several health care systems, medical care organizations and fields of specialization. This thesis will provide an analysis of salaried physicians behavior by extending the model of the extrinsic motivated salaried physician elaborated by Blomqvist (1991) and include intrinsic motivation and negative utility associated with lying to the patient about the health condition. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the managed care organization has preferences towards more extrinsic motivated physicians when hiring, as long as the patient cannot change the supplier. Allowing for patients to get a second opinion, leads to an improvement in the patient’s expected utility in the model. Including reputation and patient’s evaluation of the health care institution’s service is likely to change the managed care organizations preferences towards more intrinsic motivated physicians.},
  author       = {Tholen, Jacqueline},
  keyword      = {principal-agent model,intrinsic motivation,salaried physician,information asymmetry,costs of lying},
  language     = {eng},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {The Intrinsic Motivated Salaried Physician: A Principal-Agent Model},
  year         = {2015},
}