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Ovillkorlig vittnesplikt – en utopi? - Om vittnesplikten och vittnens straffansvar i nöd.

Eliasson, Nils LU (2015) LAGF03 20152
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
I Sverige råder en allmän medborgerlig skyldighet att inställa sig som vittne i domstol och där avlägga vittnesmål. Denna skyldighet träffar, med några få undantag, den som av ett eller annat skäl anses inneha information av betydelse för målet. Vittnesmålen är av oerhörd betydelse för att våra domstolar ska ges möjlighet att komma till korrekta avgöranden. Problematiskt är dock hur vittnen många gånger känner rädsla inför pliktens fullgörande, och hur vittnen i vissa fall utsätts för hot. Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka hur vittnens nödsituation kan påverka vittnesplikten samt vittnens straffansvar vid mened. Uppsatsen har författats med utgångspunkt i två principer: principen om rättssäkerhet och principen om rättstrygghet. Av... (More)
I Sverige råder en allmän medborgerlig skyldighet att inställa sig som vittne i domstol och där avlägga vittnesmål. Denna skyldighet träffar, med några få undantag, den som av ett eller annat skäl anses inneha information av betydelse för målet. Vittnesmålen är av oerhörd betydelse för att våra domstolar ska ges möjlighet att komma till korrekta avgöranden. Problematiskt är dock hur vittnen många gånger känner rädsla inför pliktens fullgörande, och hur vittnen i vissa fall utsätts för hot. Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka hur vittnens nödsituation kan påverka vittnesplikten samt vittnens straffansvar vid mened. Uppsatsen har författats med utgångspunkt i två principer: principen om rättssäkerhet och principen om rättstrygghet. Av redogörelsen framgår att vittnesplikten inte är direkt påverkbar av vittnens nödsituation men att indirekt påverkan möjligen kan ske. Sådan indirekt påverkan skulle kunna undanta domstols sanktionsmöjligheter riktade mot vittnen som väl i rätten vägrar fullgöra sin vittnesplikt. Av redogörelsen framgår också hur vittnen, enbart i extrema undantagsfall, kan befrias från sitt straffrättsliga ansvar för begången mened med stöd av brottsbalkens nödrätt. Skälen därtill är att vittnens nödhandling svårligen kan anses försvarlig i mer ordinära nödsituationer.

Av uppsatsförfattaren argumenteras för att vittnesplikten bör vara möjlig att undanta i situationer av nöd. Av argumentationen framgår hur författaren påstår att en sådan ordning skulle skydda såväl principen om rättssäkerhet som vittnens rättstrygghet. (Less)
Abstract
In Sweden, there is a general civil obligation to appear in court as witness and to testify. With a few exceptions, this obligation affects anyone who is considered to possess important information to a case. Testimonies such as these form the basis for the courts  to make correct rulings. However, there is a problem related to the many witnesses who are afraid to fulfil their obligations and who in some cases even feel threatened while doing so. The aim of this essay is to investigate how the witness in a case of emergency can affect the obligation to testify and the criminal liability for perjury. This essay takes it outset in two principles: the principle of legal certainty (sw. principen om rättssäkerhet) and the principle of legal... (More)
In Sweden, there is a general civil obligation to appear in court as witness and to testify. With a few exceptions, this obligation affects anyone who is considered to possess important information to a case. Testimonies such as these form the basis for the courts  to make correct rulings. However, there is a problem related to the many witnesses who are afraid to fulfil their obligations and who in some cases even feel threatened while doing so. The aim of this essay is to investigate how the witness in a case of emergency can affect the obligation to testify and the criminal liability for perjury. This essay takes it outset in two principles: the principle of legal certainty (sw. principen om rättssäkerhet) and the principle of legal security (sw. principen om rättstrygghet). From the essay it emerges that the obligation to testify is not directly affected by the witness’ case of emergency, but that indirect influence may occur. Such indirect influence could exclude a courts possibility to use sanctions aimed at witnesses that refuse to fulfil their obligation to witness in court. From this essay it also emerges how witnesses, be it only in very exceptional cases, can be liberated from their criminal liability for committed perjury with support from the rule of necessity in the Swedish Penal Code. The reasons hereto are that the witnesses act committed out of necessity hardly can be considered as justified in more ordinary cases of emergency.

The writer argues for the possibility to exclude the obligation to testify in cases of emergency. From the argumentation it becomes clear how such an arrangement would protect both the principle of legal certainty and the principle of legal security. (Less)
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author
Eliasson, Nils LU
supervisor
organization
course
LAGF03 20152
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
processrätt, criminal procedure, straffrätt, criminal law
language
Swedish
id
8506762
date added to LUP
2016-02-23 15:20:14
date last changed
2016-02-23 15:20:14
@misc{8506762,
  abstract     = {In Sweden, there is a general civil obligation to appear in court as witness and to testify. With a few exceptions, this obligation affects anyone who is considered to possess important information to a case. Testimonies such as these form the basis for the courts  to make correct rulings. However, there is a problem related to the many witnesses who are afraid to fulfil their obligations and who in some cases even feel threatened while doing so. The aim of this essay is to investigate how the witness in a case of emergency can affect the obligation to testify and the criminal liability for perjury. This essay takes it outset in two principles: the principle of legal certainty (sw. principen om rättssäkerhet) and the principle of legal security (sw. principen om rättstrygghet). From the essay it emerges that the obligation to testify is not directly affected by the witness’ case of emergency, but that indirect influence may occur. Such indirect influence could exclude a courts possibility to use sanctions aimed at witnesses that refuse to fulfil their obligation to witness in court. From this essay it also emerges how witnesses, be it only in very exceptional cases, can be liberated from their criminal liability for committed perjury with support from the rule of necessity in the Swedish Penal Code. The reasons hereto are that the witnesses act committed out of necessity hardly can be considered as justified in more ordinary cases of emergency.

The writer argues for the possibility to exclude the obligation to testify in cases of emergency. From the argumentation it becomes clear how such an arrangement would protect both the principle of legal certainty and the principle of legal security.},
  author       = {Eliasson, Nils},
  keyword      = {processrätt,criminal procedure,straffrätt,criminal law},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Ovillkorlig vittnesplikt – en utopi? - Om vittnesplikten och vittnens straffansvar i nöd.},
  year         = {2015},
}