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Kapitalbristreglerna i ABL - Ett borgenärsskydd på glid?

Vinnerljung, Joakim LU (2016) LAGF03 20152
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Aktiebolag som kapitalassociation är en riskbegränsad bolagsform, utan något kompletterande ansvar för exempelvis aktieägarna och bolagsföreträdarna. Aktiebolagslagen uppställer dock en rad handlingsdirigerande föreskrifter då ett bolag drabbas av kritisk kapitalbrist, med i många fall snäva tidsramar, men långtgående konsekvenser. Underlåtelse att agera enligt föreskrifterna medför ett solidariskt personligt betalningsansvar för bolagets därefter uppkomna förpliktelser. Ansvaret är därtill ett presumtionsansvar, innebärande att styrelseledamoten, för att undgå ansvar, har att visa att denne inte agerat försumligt.

Kapitalbristreglerna har ur ett historiskt perspektiv främst motiverats av borgenärsskyddet, Borgenärerna som har ett... (More)
Aktiebolag som kapitalassociation är en riskbegränsad bolagsform, utan något kompletterande ansvar för exempelvis aktieägarna och bolagsföreträdarna. Aktiebolagslagen uppställer dock en rad handlingsdirigerande föreskrifter då ett bolag drabbas av kritisk kapitalbrist, med i många fall snäva tidsramar, men långtgående konsekvenser. Underlåtelse att agera enligt föreskrifterna medför ett solidariskt personligt betalningsansvar för bolagets därefter uppkomna förpliktelser. Ansvaret är därtill ett presumtionsansvar, innebärande att styrelseledamoten, för att undgå ansvar, har att visa att denne inte agerat försumligt.

Kapitalbristreglerna har ur ett historiskt perspektiv främst motiverats av borgenärsskyddet, Borgenärerna som har ett intresse av att ett bolag med kapitalbrist genomgår en sund effektiv avveckling med kapital kvar i bolaget att skiftas till fordringsägarna. Även aktieägarnas intresse, att bli varse om bolagets ekonomiska situation och beredas rådrum att besluta om kapitaltillskott eller avveckling, har inverkat på dess utformning. Dock är rådrumsintressets betydelse underordnat borgenärskyddet.

Regleringen har kritiserats i doktrin, stundtals väldigt kraftigt, och även i propositionen gällande minskningen av aktiekapitalkravet 2010 förefaller lagstiftaren nu tveka på dess borgenärsskyddande effekt. Sammantaget förmedlas bilden av en föråldrad komplicerad lagstiftning som förefaller särskilt överspelad i ljuset av att ägare till aktiebolag sedan 2010 endast behöver tillstå med ett aktiekapital om 50 000 kronor vilket därmed medför att borgenärsskyddet torde ha försvagats kraftigt. Dock hänger regleringen till stor del samman med ovan nämnda aktiekapitalkrav, och tills dess att Sverige följer andra Europeiska länder såsom Storbritannien, Frankrike och Tyskland vad gäller inget eller försvinnande litet aktiekapitalkrav för aktiebolag, torde regleringen tvingas kvarstå för att upprätthålla aktiekapitalkravet. (Less)
Abstract
It’s an important principle within the Swedish Limited Companies Act that limited companies remain a limited liability, without additional responsibilites for shareholder and company representatives. However, the Swedish Companies Act imposes a certain course of action when capital shortage arises, with tight time frames and possibly severe consequenses. Failure to act in accordance with the provisions entails a joint personal liability for the companies subsequent obligations. The responsibility arises with a presumption of guilt, meaning that the board, in order to avoid liability has to prove their lack of neglience.

These capital deficiency rules are from an historical perspective primarily justified by the protection of creditors.... (More)
It’s an important principle within the Swedish Limited Companies Act that limited companies remain a limited liability, without additional responsibilites for shareholder and company representatives. However, the Swedish Companies Act imposes a certain course of action when capital shortage arises, with tight time frames and possibly severe consequenses. Failure to act in accordance with the provisions entails a joint personal liability for the companies subsequent obligations. The responsibility arises with a presumption of guilt, meaning that the board, in order to avoid liability has to prove their lack of neglience.

These capital deficiency rules are from an historical perspective primarily justified by the protection of creditors. Creditors who should be interested in the sound settlement of a company with a capital shortage, with capital still intact to be shifted to the creditors. Also the shareholders need for awareness of the companies financial situation, and their need for a sufficent respite to decide the recapitalization or liquidation of the company has had an impact on the regulations. However, this impact is considered limited.

The regulation has been criticized in doctrine, occasionally severely. In the bill of 2010 regarding the reduction of share capital requirements it appears the legislature now holds doubts of the overall effect of the regulation in regards of creditor protection. Altogether the conveyed image of the legislation is that of an outdated complicated legislation that in the light of the 2010 reduction of share capital requirements to 50 000 SEK seem particularly outdated, which thus means that the creditor protection would have been diminished. However, the regulation is closely tied to the above mentioned share capital requirements, and untill Sweden decides to follow other European nations such as Britian, France and Germany in terms of no, or negliable capital requirements for limited liability companies, the regulation will be forced to remain to uphold thee capital requirements. (Less)
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author
Vinnerljung, Joakim LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
The capital deficiency regulations within the Swedish Companies Act - A protection of creditors past its sell-by date?
course
LAGF03 20152
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
associationsrätt, aktiebolagsrätt, commercial law, kapitalbristreglerna, aktiebolagslagen
language
Swedish
id
8511548
date added to LUP
2016-02-24 08:14:56
date last changed
2016-02-24 08:14:56
@misc{8511548,
  abstract     = {It’s an important principle within the Swedish Limited Companies Act that limited companies remain a limited liability, without additional responsibilites for shareholder and company representatives. However, the Swedish Companies Act imposes a certain course of action when capital shortage arises, with tight time frames and possibly severe consequenses. Failure to act in accordance with the provisions entails a joint personal liability for the companies subsequent obligations. The responsibility arises with a presumption of guilt, meaning that the board, in order to avoid liability has to prove their lack of neglience.

These capital deficiency rules are from an historical perspective primarily justified by the protection of creditors. Creditors who should be interested in the sound settlement of a company with a capital shortage, with capital still intact to be shifted to the creditors. Also the shareholders need for awareness of the companies financial situation, and their need for a sufficent respite to decide the recapitalization or liquidation of the company has had an impact on the regulations. However, this impact is considered limited.

The regulation has been criticized in doctrine, occasionally severely. In the bill of 2010 regarding the reduction of share capital requirements it appears the legislature now holds doubts of the overall effect of the regulation in regards of creditor protection. Altogether the conveyed image of the legislation is that of an outdated complicated legislation that in the light of the 2010 reduction of share capital requirements to 50 000 SEK seem particularly outdated, which thus means that the creditor protection would have been diminished. However, the regulation is closely tied to the above mentioned share capital requirements, and untill Sweden decides to follow other European nations such as Britian, France and Germany in terms of no, or negliable capital requirements for limited liability companies, the regulation will be forced to remain to uphold thee capital requirements.},
  author       = {Vinnerljung, Joakim},
  keyword      = {associationsrätt,aktiebolagsrätt,commercial law,kapitalbristreglerna,aktiebolagslagen},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Kapitalbristreglerna i ABL - Ett borgenärsskydd på glid?},
  year         = {2016},
}