Vållande till annans självmord - Kan en kränkande behandling utgöra vållande till annans död?
(2015) LAGF03 20152Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract (Swedish)
- Denna uppsats syftar till att utreda brottet vållande till annans död och var gränsen går för en rättssäker tolkning av dess straffbuds ordalydelse. Specifikt fokuseras på frågan om straffbudet kan ta sikte på den som medelst kränkande behandling av någon annan orsakar att vederbörande begår självmord.
Då medverkansansvar förutsätter medverkan till en otillåten gärning, utgör inte medverkan till självmord ett brott, eftersom självmord är tillåtet enligt gällande rätt. I stället är det endast när den avlidne, som rent faktiskt har tillfogat den dödande skadan, i juridisk mening inte kan anses ha tagit sitt eget liv som ett brott kan aktualiseras. En sådan slutsats förutsätter emellertid att den avlidne bedöms ha saknat fri vilja,... (More) - Denna uppsats syftar till att utreda brottet vållande till annans död och var gränsen går för en rättssäker tolkning av dess straffbuds ordalydelse. Specifikt fokuseras på frågan om straffbudet kan ta sikte på den som medelst kränkande behandling av någon annan orsakar att vederbörande begår självmord.
Då medverkansansvar förutsätter medverkan till en otillåten gärning, utgör inte medverkan till självmord ett brott, eftersom självmord är tillåtet enligt gällande rätt. I stället är det endast när den avlidne, som rent faktiskt har tillfogat den dödande skadan, i juridisk mening inte kan anses ha tagit sitt eget liv som ett brott kan aktualiseras. En sådan slutsats förutsätter emellertid att den avlidne bedöms ha saknat fri vilja, tillräcklig mognad eller tillräcklig insikt om relevanta omständigheter i förhållande till självmordsbeslutet. Härmed ska den avlidne dessutom i princip ha utgjort ett styrbart redskap i någon annans händer. Med stor säkerhet vore det väldigt sällan, och enbart i ytterst särpräglade situationer, som en person kan anses försättas i en sådan sits till följd av att ha utsatts för kränkande behandling.
För att vållande till annans död ska aktualiseras krävs dessutom att den kränkande personens agerande faller in under gärningsbeskrivningen i 3 kap. 7 § BrB. Sålunda krävs att vederbörande kan anses ha orsakat den avlidnes död av oaktsamhet, vilket i sin tur förutsätter att kravet på gärningsculpa och gärningstäckande personlig culpa uppfylls. En gärningsculpabedömning torde endast i väldigt sällsynta fall betrakta en kränkning som ett otillåtet risktagande avseende självmord, och än mer sällan som ett relevant orsakande av självmordet. I så fall bör rimligtvis krävas att gärningspersonen haft anledning att förmoda att kränkningen skulle föranleda den utsattes självmord. Eftersom bedömningen av gärningstäckande personlig culpa är så pass beroende av bevisningen i varje enskilt fall, låter sig dock en teoretisk förhandsbedömning svårligen göras. Sammanfattningsvis konstateras att det ofta skulle bryta mot legalitetsprincipens analogiförbud att betrakta kränkande behandling som ett vållande till annans död. (Less) - Abstract
- The purpose of this essay is to investigate the crime of involuntary manslaughter in Swedish law and the boundaries for a lawful interpretation of the provision. Specifically, it focuses on whether the provision may take aim at someone whose degrading treatment causes someone else’s suicide.
Since responsibility for complicity requires complicity to an illegal act, complicity to suicide is not a crime, as suicide is allowed by law. Instead, it is only when the deceased, who in fact inflicted the lethal damage, in legal terms cannot be considered to have committed suicide, that a crime can be actualized. Such conclusion, however, requires that the deceased is deemed to have lacked free will, sufficient maturity or sufficient... (More) - The purpose of this essay is to investigate the crime of involuntary manslaughter in Swedish law and the boundaries for a lawful interpretation of the provision. Specifically, it focuses on whether the provision may take aim at someone whose degrading treatment causes someone else’s suicide.
Since responsibility for complicity requires complicity to an illegal act, complicity to suicide is not a crime, as suicide is allowed by law. Instead, it is only when the deceased, who in fact inflicted the lethal damage, in legal terms cannot be considered to have committed suicide, that a crime can be actualized. Such conclusion, however, requires that the deceased is deemed to have lacked free will, sufficient maturity or sufficient understanding of the relevant circumstances in relation to the suicide decision. Hereby, the deceased should basically have constituted a steerable tool in the hands of someone else. With great certainty, it would be very rare, and only in very peculiar situations that a person can be considered to be placed in such a position, after being subjected to degrading treatment.
For involuntary manslaughter to be actualized, the abusive person’s action must further on fall under section 7 of chapter 3 of the Swedish Penal Code. Thus, the person must be considered to have caused the deceased’s death by negligence, which in turn presupposes that the requirement of “gärningsculpa” and culpability is fulfilled. An assessment of gärningsculpa should only in unique circumstances recognize degrading treatment as an unacceptable risk taking regarding suicide, and more seldom as a relevant cause of suicide. If so, it should reasonably require that the perpetrator is considered to have had reason to believe that the treatment would cause the degraded person’s suicide. Since the assessment of culpability is very dependent on the evidence in every particular case, such ex-ante evaluation can hardly be done in theory. Conclusively, the analogy prohibition in the principle of legality would often be violated, if degrading treatment was to be considered as involuntary manslaughter. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/8511736
- author
- Kjellstrand, Simon LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- LAGF03 20152
- year
- 2015
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- Straffrätt, Criminal law, Vållande till annans död, Självmord, Analogiförbudet, Legalitetsprincipen
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 8511736
- date added to LUP
- 2016-02-23 15:11:39
- date last changed
- 2016-02-23 15:11:39
@misc{8511736,
abstract = {{The purpose of this essay is to investigate the crime of involuntary manslaughter in Swedish law and the boundaries for a lawful interpretation of the provision. Specifically, it focuses on whether the provision may take aim at someone whose degrading treatment causes someone else’s suicide.
Since responsibility for complicity requires complicity to an illegal act, complicity to suicide is not a crime, as suicide is allowed by law. Instead, it is only when the deceased, who in fact inflicted the lethal damage, in legal terms cannot be considered to have committed suicide, that a crime can be actualized. Such conclusion, however, requires that the deceased is deemed to have lacked free will, sufficient maturity or sufficient understanding of the relevant circumstances in relation to the suicide decision. Hereby, the deceased should basically have constituted a steerable tool in the hands of someone else. With great certainty, it would be very rare, and only in very peculiar situations that a person can be considered to be placed in such a position, after being subjected to degrading treatment.
For involuntary manslaughter to be actualized, the abusive person’s action must further on fall under section 7 of chapter 3 of the Swedish Penal Code. Thus, the person must be considered to have caused the deceased’s death by negligence, which in turn presupposes that the requirement of “gärningsculpa” and culpability is fulfilled. An assessment of gärningsculpa should only in unique circumstances recognize degrading treatment as an unacceptable risk taking regarding suicide, and more seldom as a relevant cause of suicide. If so, it should reasonably require that the perpetrator is considered to have had reason to believe that the treatment would cause the degraded person’s suicide. Since the assessment of culpability is very dependent on the evidence in every particular case, such ex-ante evaluation can hardly be done in theory. Conclusively, the analogy prohibition in the principle of legality would often be violated, if degrading treatment was to be considered as involuntary manslaughter.}},
author = {{Kjellstrand, Simon}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Vållande till annans självmord - Kan en kränkande behandling utgöra vållande till annans död?}},
year = {{2015}},
}