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Hur långt får vi gå? – En studie av hur de brottsbekämpande myndigheterna får använda sig av hemliga tvångsmedel och överskottsinformation för att utreda brott

Hörberg, Isabelle LU (2015) LAGM01 20152
Department of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Organiserad brottslighet är ett svårutrett fenomen och ett fortsatt växande problem i både Sverige och resten av världen. För att på ett effektivt sätt kunna utreda och bekämpa allvarlig och grov organiserad brottslighet har de brottsbekämpande myndigheterna möjlighet att använda sig av hemliga tvångsmedel mot en enskild. Några exempel på hemliga tvångsmedel är hemlig avlyssning av elektronisk kommunikation (HAK) och hemlig rumsavlyssning (HRA). Vid beslut om och tillämpningen av hemliga tvångsmedel måste legalitets-, ändamåls-, behovs- och proportionalitetsprincipen alltid beaktas. Utöver de allmänna principerna måste även intresset av en effektiv brottsbekämpning ställas mot intresset av skyddet för den personliga integriteten. Denna... (More)
Organiserad brottslighet är ett svårutrett fenomen och ett fortsatt växande problem i både Sverige och resten av världen. För att på ett effektivt sätt kunna utreda och bekämpa allvarlig och grov organiserad brottslighet har de brottsbekämpande myndigheterna möjlighet att använda sig av hemliga tvångsmedel mot en enskild. Några exempel på hemliga tvångsmedel är hemlig avlyssning av elektronisk kommunikation (HAK) och hemlig rumsavlyssning (HRA). Vid beslut om och tillämpningen av hemliga tvångsmedel måste legalitets-, ändamåls-, behovs- och proportionalitetsprincipen alltid beaktas. Utöver de allmänna principerna måste även intresset av en effektiv brottsbekämpning ställas mot intresset av skyddet för den personliga integriteten. Denna intresseavvägning är grundproblematiken vid ett användande av hemliga tvångsmedel.

Denna uppsats syftar till att granska hur de brottsbekämpande myndigheterna får använda sig av hemliga tvångsmedel och överskottsinformation från hemliga tvångsmedel för att utreda allvarlig och grov organiserad brottslighet. Detta görs utifrån en teoretisk utgångspunkt med bakgrund i den kritik som framförts i den kriminalpolitiska debatten.

De brottsbekämpande myndigheternas möjligheter att använda sig av hemliga tvångsmedel och tillkommen överskottsinformation fastställs med gällande rätt. Gällande rätt problematiseras ur ett de lege-ferenda perspektiv och frågan hur rätten bör vara utformad analyseras utifrån de teoretiska utgångspunkterna integritet och effektivitet. Dessa begrepp används således som mätinstrument i framställningen för att komma fram till om regleringen avseende HAK och HRA samt överskottsinformation är tillfredställande eller bör ändras.

På senare tid har politiker och representanter för de brottsbekämpande myndigheterna framfört att brotten övergrepp i rättssak och mened är några av de brott som ofta kopplas till den grova organiserade brottsligheten men som inte kan utredas med hemliga tvångsmedel. Brottens gemensamma nämnare är att de har ett straffminimum som understiger två års fängelse och därmed inte kan utredas med t.ex. HAK. Jag anser att det bör finnas en möjlighet att utreda brotten övergrepp i rättssak och mened. Detta bör dock inte ske genom en sänkning av straffminimum för HAK. Att sänka straffminimum hade gått emot syftet med tvångsmedlet då det enbart ska användas till att utreda mindre antal brott. Ur ett effektivitetsperspektiv hade en sådan lösning öppnat upp för möjligheten att utreda fler mindre allvarliga brott men de allmänna principerna hade troligtvis satt stopp för en sådan användning. Ur ett integritetsperspektiv hade en sådan lösning varit alldeles för inskränkande. Min slutsats är att dagens straffminimum på två års fängelse är legitimt och att detta varken bör sänkas eller höjas. Ett annat sätt att angripa det föreliggande problemet är att ändra straffminium för de specifika brotten övergrepp i rättssak och mened.
Polisens har enligt 9 § polislagen (PL) en lagstadgad skyldighet att rapportera brott som faller in under allmänt åtal. Genom bestämmelsen om överskottsinformation i 27 kap. 23 a § RB får polisen både en möjlighet att använda och en indirekt skyldighet att bortse från information om brott. Om polisen på grund av den föreliggande konflikten använder överskottsinformation i strid med gällande regler får den ändå användas som bevisning i domstol enligt den fria bevisföringens princip. Detta anförde HD i NJA 2003 s. 323. Min slutsats är därmed att det i rent bevishänseende inte spelar någon roll om polisen följer lagen avseende användandet av överskottsinformation eller inte. Dock bör ett sådant felaktigt agerande leda till konsekvenser för den enskilde polisen eller åklagaren.

I SOU 2012:44 lades det fram ett förslag om att det inte borde föreligga några skillnader mellan hur överskottsinformation får användas beroende av vilket hemligt tvångsmedel som har använts. Detta ställningstagande motsatte sig regeringen i prop. 2013/14:237 och hänvisade b.la. till tvångsmedlen olika natur och att HRA är betydligt mer integritetskränkande. De brottsbekämpande myndigheterna fick dock genom en ändring av straffminimum i 27 kap. 23 a § RB, utökade möjligheter att använda överskottsinformation från HRA. Regeringen ansåg att den dåvarande regleringen var oskälig eftersom att överskottsinformation inte fick användas till att utreda t.ex. grov misshandel, våldtäkt, människohandel och vapenbrott. Förslaget kritiserades av ett antal olika remissinstanser. Eftersom att det redan har gjorts en prövning angående integritetsintrånget vid tvångsmedelsbeslutet och det ansetts vara legitimt att använda, anser jag att den enskilde personen måste tåla mer vid beslut om överskottsinformation. Utifrån ett effektivitetsperspektiv är det positivt att kunna utreda flera allvarliga brott när HRA väl används eftersom att det är resurskrävande. Utifrån ett integritetsperspektiv är det dock, både för den misstänkte och tredje man, positivt med två skilda integritetsbedömningar och högre krav. Min slutsats är att den nya regleringen skapar en bättre balans mellan integritet och effektivitet. Med tanke på att den nya bestämmelsen tillkom 2015 anser jag att den nuvarande regleringen inte bör ändras. Dock bör frågan återigen väckas när bestämmelsen hunnit utvärderas. Det vore att föredra att i en sådan utredning återigen inspireras av de förslag som framlades av SOU 2012:44 och utöver detta även låta andra variabler inkluderas. (Less)
Abstract
Organised crime is a phenomenon, which is hard to investigate, and a continuing growing problem in both Sweden and the rest of the world. To effectively investigate and fight major and serious organised crime, the law enforcement authorities have the power to use secret coercive measures against an individual. Some examples of secret coercive measures are secret interception of electronic communications (SEC) and bugging. When deciding on and implementing secret coercive measures, the principles of legality, purpose, need and proportionality must be taken into account. In addition to the general principles, the interest of effective law enforcement must be set up against the interest of the protection of personal integrity. This balancing... (More)
Organised crime is a phenomenon, which is hard to investigate, and a continuing growing problem in both Sweden and the rest of the world. To effectively investigate and fight major and serious organised crime, the law enforcement authorities have the power to use secret coercive measures against an individual. Some examples of secret coercive measures are secret interception of electronic communications (SEC) and bugging. When deciding on and implementing secret coercive measures, the principles of legality, purpose, need and proportionality must be taken into account. In addition to the general principles, the interest of effective law enforcement must be set up against the interest of the protection of personal integrity. This balancing of interests is the fundamental problem when using secret coercive measures.

This essay seeks to examine how the law enforcement authorities can use secret coercive measures and excess information from secret coercive measures to investigate major and serious organised crime. This is done from a theoretical point of view with the support of the criticism, which has been submitted in the debate on crime policy.

Applicable law determines how the law enforcement authorities may use secret coercive measures and excess information. Applicable law is problematized from a de lege ferenda-perspective and the question of how the law ought to be designed are analysed from a theoretical basis, which includes integrity and efficiency. These concepts are used, as measuring instruments to see if the regulation concerning SEC and bugging and the excess information are satisfying or ought to be amended.

Lately, politicians and representatives of the law enforcement authorities have submitted that obstructing the course of justice and perjury, are crimes which are often linked to serious organised crime but which can not be investigated with secret coercive measures. The common denominator of both crimes is that they have a minimum penalty of less than two years' imprisonment and therefore cannot be investigated with, for example, SEC. I believe that there should be an opportunity to investigate the crimes obstructing the course of justice and perjury. However, this should not be achieved through a reduction of the minimum penalty for SEC. To lower the minimum penalty would go against the purpose of the coercive measure when it’s supposed to be used exclusively to investigate a small number of crimes. From a perspective of efficiency, such a solution would have opened up the possibility to investigate more minor offenses but the general principles would probably put an end to such use. From a perspective of integrity a solution like this would have been too circumscribed. My conclusion is that the current minimum penalty of two years' imprisonment is legitimate and that this should neither be raised or lowered. Another way to address the problem is to increase the minimum penalties for the specific crimes obstructing the course of justice and perjury.

The police has a statutory duty to report crimes that fall under public prosecution. Through the provision of excess information in Chapter 27 paragraph 23a RB, the police has both an opportunity to use and an indirect obligation to disregard information about crimes. If the police, because of the present conflict use excess information, which is not allowed according to applicable regulations, it may still be used as evidence in court under the principle of freedom of evidence. The Supreme Court stated this in NJA 2003 p. 323. My conclusion is therefore, in pure respect of the evidence, that it does not matter if the police follow the law regarding the use of excess information or not. However, such wrong actions should lead to consequences for the individual police or prosecutor.

In SOU 2012:44 a proposal was presented that there should not be any differences in how excess information may be used depending on which secret coercive measures that has been used. The government opposed to this position in prop. 2013/14:237 and referred to the different nature of the coercive measures and that bugging violates the integrity far more than SEC. The law enforcement authorities received extended opportunities to use excess information from bugging by changing the minimum penalty in Chapter 27 paragraph 23a RB. The Government considered the former regulations to be unreasonable because the excess information could not be used to investigate for example aggravated assault, rape, human trafficking and weapon offenses. The proposal was criticized by a number of different consultation bodies. Since it has already been an examination of the intrusion in integrity when the decision of the coercive measure was made, and this was considered to be legitimate to use, I believe that the individual person has to withstand more when deciding on using excess information. From a perspective of efficiency, it is positive to be able to investigate more serious crimes when actually using bugging, because of its heavy requirement. From a perspective of integrity it’s positive with two separate integrity assessments and higher requirements, for both the suspect and the third party. My conclusion is that the new regulation creates a better balance between integrity and efficiency. Given that the new provision was added in 2015, I consider that the present regulation should not be changed. However, the question should be brought up again when the provision has had time to be evaluated. It would be preferable if such an investigation was inspired by the proposals that were presented in SOU 2012:44 and also allowed other variables to be included. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Hörberg, Isabelle LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
How far can we go? – A study of the law enforcement authorities' ability to use secret coercive measures and excess information to investigate crimes
course
LAGM01 20152
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
Straffrätt, Straffprocessrätt, Straffprocessuella tvångsmedel, Hemliga tvångsmedel, Överskottsinformation, Rättighetsskydd, Personlig integritet, Effektivitet
language
Swedish
id
8514048
date added to LUP
2016-02-04 11:55:57
date last changed
2016-02-04 11:55:57
@misc{8514048,
  abstract     = {Organised crime is a phenomenon, which is hard to investigate, and a continuing growing problem in both Sweden and the rest of the world. To effectively investigate and fight major and serious organised crime, the law enforcement authorities have the power to use secret coercive measures against an individual. Some examples of secret coercive measures are secret interception of electronic communications (SEC) and bugging. When deciding on and implementing secret coercive measures, the principles of legality, purpose, need and proportionality must be taken into account. In addition to the general principles, the interest of effective law enforcement must be set up against the interest of the protection of personal integrity. This balancing of interests is the fundamental problem when using secret coercive measures.

This essay seeks to examine how the law enforcement authorities can use secret coercive measures and excess information from secret coercive measures to investigate major and serious organised crime. This is done from a theoretical point of view with the support of the criticism, which has been submitted in the debate on crime policy. 

Applicable law determines how the law enforcement authorities may use secret coercive measures and excess information. Applicable law is problematized from a de lege ferenda-perspective and the question of how the law ought to be designed are analysed from a theoretical basis, which includes integrity and efficiency. These concepts are used, as measuring instruments to see if the regulation concerning SEC and bugging and the excess information are satisfying or ought to be amended. 

Lately, politicians and representatives of the law enforcement authorities have submitted that obstructing the course of justice and perjury, are crimes which are often linked to serious organised crime but which can not be investigated with secret coercive measures. The common denominator of both crimes is that they have a minimum penalty of less than two years' imprisonment and therefore cannot be investigated with, for example, SEC. I believe that there should be an opportunity to investigate the crimes obstructing the course of justice and perjury. However, this should not be achieved through a reduction of the minimum penalty for SEC. To lower the minimum penalty would go against the purpose of the coercive measure when it’s supposed to be used exclusively to investigate a small number of crimes. From a perspective of efficiency, such a solution would have opened up the possibility to investigate more minor offenses but the general principles would probably put an end to such use. From a perspective of integrity a solution like this would have been too circumscribed. My conclusion is that the current minimum penalty of two years' imprisonment is legitimate and that this should neither be raised or lowered. Another way to address the problem is to increase the minimum penalties for the specific crimes obstructing the course of justice and perjury.

The police has a statutory duty to report crimes that fall under public prosecution. Through the provision of excess information in Chapter 27 paragraph 23a RB, the police has both an opportunity to use and an indirect obligation to disregard information about crimes. If the police, because of the present conflict use excess information, which is not allowed according to applicable regulations, it may still be used as evidence in court under the principle of freedom of evidence. The Supreme Court stated this in NJA 2003 p. 323. My conclusion is therefore, in pure respect of the evidence, that it does not matter if the police follow the law regarding the use of excess information or not. However, such wrong actions should lead to consequences for the individual police or prosecutor.

In SOU 2012:44 a proposal was presented that there should not be any differences in how excess information may be used depending on which secret coercive measures that has been used. The government opposed to this position in prop. 2013/14:237 and referred to the different nature of the coercive measures and that bugging violates the integrity far more than SEC. The law enforcement authorities received extended opportunities to use excess information from bugging by changing the minimum penalty in Chapter 27 paragraph 23a RB. The Government considered the former regulations to be unreasonable because the excess information could not be used to investigate for example aggravated assault, rape, human trafficking and weapon offenses. The proposal was criticized by a number of different consultation bodies. Since it has already been an examination of the intrusion in integrity when the decision of the coercive measure was made, and this was considered to be legitimate to use, I believe that the individual person has to withstand more when deciding on using excess information. From a perspective of efficiency, it is positive to be able to investigate more serious crimes when actually using bugging, because of its heavy requirement. From a perspective of integrity it’s positive with two separate integrity assessments and higher requirements, for both the suspect and the third party. My conclusion is that the new regulation creates a better balance between integrity and efficiency. Given that the new provision was added in 2015, I consider that the present regulation should not be changed. However, the question should be brought up again when the provision has had time to be evaluated. It would be preferable if such an investigation was inspired by the proposals that were presented in SOU 2012:44 and also allowed other variables to be included.},
  author       = {Hörberg, Isabelle},
  keyword      = {Straffrätt,Straffprocessrätt,Straffprocessuella tvångsmedel,Hemliga tvångsmedel,Överskottsinformation,Rättighetsskydd,Personlig integritet,Effektivitet},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Hur långt får vi gå? – En studie av hur de brottsbekämpande myndigheterna får använda sig av hemliga tvångsmedel och överskottsinformation för att utreda brott},
  year         = {2015},
}