Advanced

The Compromise Algorithm in the Swedish PhD Admissions Problem

Miao, Dingquan LU (2016) NEKP01 20152
Department of Economics
Abstract
What mechanism should be designed to allocate PhD applicants to universities in Sweden? We introduce the Swedish PhD admissions problem, and it is influenced by the college admissions problem (Gale and Shapley 1962) and the student placement problem (Balinski and Sönmez 1999). In order to “solve” this problem, we design a novel mechanism, namely the compromise algorithm. We propose three theorems from this algorithm, i.e. equivalence theorems. The equivalence theorems specify the equivalence relations among stability, worse and responsiveness. Additionally, we find a positive result that the number of fields determines the strategy-proofness of the algorithm; meanwhile, the student optimal stable matching and the university optimal stable... (More)
What mechanism should be designed to allocate PhD applicants to universities in Sweden? We introduce the Swedish PhD admissions problem, and it is influenced by the college admissions problem (Gale and Shapley 1962) and the student placement problem (Balinski and Sönmez 1999). In order to “solve” this problem, we design a novel mechanism, namely the compromise algorithm. We propose three theorems from this algorithm, i.e. equivalence theorems. The equivalence theorems specify the equivalence relations among stability, worse and responsiveness. Additionally, we find a positive result that the number of fields determines the strategy-proofness of the algorithm; meanwhile, the student optimal stable matching and the university optimal stable matching can be treated as special cases of our model when we restrict the number of fields. Generally, the compromise algorithm generates a stable matching that falls in between the student optimal stable matching and the university optimal stable matching. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Miao, Dingquan LU
supervisor
organization
course
NEKP01 20152
year
type
H2 - Master's Degree (Two Years)
subject
keywords
Matching, Swedish PhD Admissions Problem, Stability, Compromise Algorithm
language
English
id
8593763
date added to LUP
2016-02-17 15:00:27
date last changed
2016-02-17 15:00:28
@misc{8593763,
  abstract     = {What mechanism should be designed to allocate PhD applicants to universities in Sweden? We introduce the Swedish PhD admissions problem, and it is influenced by the college admissions problem (Gale and Shapley 1962) and the student placement problem (Balinski and Sönmez 1999). In order to “solve” this problem, we design a novel mechanism, namely the compromise algorithm. We propose three theorems from this algorithm, i.e. equivalence theorems. The equivalence theorems specify the equivalence relations among stability, worse and responsiveness. Additionally, we find a positive result that the number of fields determines the strategy-proofness of the algorithm; meanwhile, the student optimal stable matching and the university optimal stable matching can be treated as special cases of our model when we restrict the number of fields. Generally, the compromise algorithm generates a stable matching that falls in between the student optimal stable matching and the university optimal stable matching.},
  author       = {Miao, Dingquan},
  keyword      = {Matching,Swedish PhD Admissions Problem,Stability,Compromise Algorithm},
  language     = {eng},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {The Compromise Algorithm in the Swedish PhD Admissions Problem},
  year         = {2016},
}