Advanced

The Fiscal Consequences of Peace: Taxation and veto power in post-conflict countries

Frizell, Jakob LU (2016) STVM25 20161
Department of Political Science
Abstract
Effective and fair taxation is imperative for development and thus sustainable peace in post-conflict countries; yet there is a glaring paucity of generalizable research on the subject. Drawing on theories from Political Economy and Comparative Politics this thesis investigates how political veto powers affect these states’ ability to mobilize domestic resources. An integrated model of delayed policy adjustment is presented and applied to the economic structure and political institutions of post-conflict countries. It is predicted that the number of veto players and the existence of power-sharing agreements inhibits fiscal policy reform resulting in forgone tax revenues. Utilizing a mixed-methods research design, a statistical analysis is... (More)
Effective and fair taxation is imperative for development and thus sustainable peace in post-conflict countries; yet there is a glaring paucity of generalizable research on the subject. Drawing on theories from Political Economy and Comparative Politics this thesis investigates how political veto powers affect these states’ ability to mobilize domestic resources. An integrated model of delayed policy adjustment is presented and applied to the economic structure and political institutions of post-conflict countries. It is predicted that the number of veto players and the existence of power-sharing agreements inhibits fiscal policy reform resulting in forgone tax revenues. Utilizing a mixed-methods research design, a statistical analysis is conducted using data from 34 post-conflict recovery periods. These results in turn guide the selection of two cases (Uganda and Lebanon) for in-depth investigation, geared towards evaluating the proposed causal process.
The combined results show that veto power does matter for post-conflict revenue mobilisation, in so being that power-sharing agreements inhibits swift and comprehensive fiscal reform, resulting in lower levels of tax revenue. While the results for veto players were less conclusive, the case study analysis confirmed the existence of serious validity problems, indicating the need for better data on political institutions in developing countries. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Frizell, Jakob LU
supervisor
organization
course
STVM25 20161
year
type
H2 - Master's Degree (Two Years)
subject
keywords
post-conflict recovery, veto players, power-sharing, fiscal policy, tax revenue
language
English
additional info
Warm thanks must be given to my supervisor Roxanna Sjöstedt for continual encouragement and engagement in my work from idea to finished thesis. I am also greatly thankful to Carlo Knotz at Lund University, and Samir Makdisi at the American University of Beirut for providing direction regarding statistics and the case study on Lebanon, respectively. Nonetheless, possible mistakes in these areas are fully my own.

Most importantly, the moral and intellectual support from friends in Stockholm, Malmö/Lund, and not the least Copenhagen, was essential for being able to eventually crawl over the hurdles which the topic of this thesis kept throwing at me. Thank you!
id
8873280
date added to LUP
2016-06-17 12:30:55
date last changed
2016-06-17 12:30:55
@misc{8873280,
  abstract     = {Effective and fair taxation is imperative for development and thus sustainable peace in post-conflict countries; yet there is a glaring paucity of generalizable research on the subject. Drawing on theories from Political Economy and Comparative Politics this thesis investigates how political veto powers affect these states’ ability to mobilize domestic resources. An integrated model of delayed policy adjustment is presented and applied to the economic structure and political institutions of post-conflict countries. It is predicted that the number of veto players and the existence of power-sharing agreements inhibits fiscal policy reform resulting in forgone tax revenues. Utilizing a mixed-methods research design, a statistical analysis is conducted using data from 34 post-conflict recovery periods. These results in turn guide the selection of two cases (Uganda and Lebanon) for in-depth investigation, geared towards evaluating the proposed causal process.
The combined results show that veto power does matter for post-conflict revenue mobilisation, in so being that power-sharing agreements inhibits swift and comprehensive fiscal reform, resulting in lower levels of tax revenue. While the results for veto players were less conclusive, the case study analysis confirmed the existence of serious validity problems, indicating the need for better data on political institutions in developing countries.},
  author       = {Frizell, Jakob},
  keyword      = {post-conflict recovery,veto players,power-sharing,fiscal policy,tax revenue},
  language     = {eng},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {The Fiscal Consequences of Peace: Taxation and veto power in post-conflict countries},
  year         = {2016},
}