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En rättsvetenskaplig studie om konkurrenslagens eftergiftsprogram - Särskilt om det så kallade kölappssystemet, 3 kap. 14 a § konkurrenslagen -

Engström, Hanna LU (2016) LAGF03 20161
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract
The competition rules of today exist on both a national and European level, and aim to promote effective competition. In order to maintain that, rules have been set out to control the formation of cartels, which are prohibited according to the main rule in 2 chapter 1 § in the Swedish competitin act. If a company despite the ban would enter into an illegal, anticompetitive collaboration with other companies, there are some opportunities to escape punishment entirely or partly.
These opportunities are collectively referred to as the Swedish leniency program. Central in this is the provision in 3 Chapter § 12 Competition Act, which stipulates that the company in a cartel which first states the unlawful cooperation, and it is first by using... (More)
The competition rules of today exist on both a national and European level, and aim to promote effective competition. In order to maintain that, rules have been set out to control the formation of cartels, which are prohibited according to the main rule in 2 chapter 1 § in the Swedish competitin act. If a company despite the ban would enter into an illegal, anticompetitive collaboration with other companies, there are some opportunities to escape punishment entirely or partly.
These opportunities are collectively referred to as the Swedish leniency program. Central in this is the provision in 3 Chapter § 12 Competition Act, which stipulates that the company in a cartel which first states the unlawful cooperation, and it is first by using that information the Competition Authority is able to act, becomes free from fines. After 3 chapter 14 a § Competition Act was introduced, the threshold for the information that a company initially had to submit to a concession was lowered.
Through the introduction of the article, known as the ticket system, another possible way for companies to act in order to qualify for the concession has been created. By leaving a small amount of information to the Competition Authority concerning infringement, the company gets a queue ticket. The company will then receive a limited amount of time to submit sufficient information to reach the concession requirement, and a successful company that manages to provide the Competition Authority with sufficient information within the time limit, will be seen as to have provided the Competition Authority with the sufficient amount of information on the first day when it took the ticket.
Today there are no public cases where the ticket system has been used. It need not be interpreted as the introduction of the system has been ineffective, the biggest impact is probably the contraceptive one. A well constructed concession system destabilize cartels, and the ticket system reduces the incentive even more since it has become much easier to file a complaint. (Less)
Abstract (Swedish)
Dagens konkurrensrättsregler finns på både nationell och europeisk nivå, och syftar till att främja en effektiv konkurrens. För att det ska vara möjligt att upprätthålla, har bestämmelser utarbetats för att bland annat kontrollera bildandet av karteller, som enligt huvudregeln i 2 kap. 1 § konkurrenslagen är förbjudna. Om ett företag trots förbudet skulle ingå ett otillåtet, konkurrensbegränsande samarbete med andra företag finns det vissa möjligheter att undgå bestraffning helt eller delvis.
Dessa möjligheter betecknas gemensamt som det svenska eftergiftsprogrammet. Centralt inom det är bestämmelsen i 3 kap. 12 § konkurrenslagen som stadgar att det företag i en kartell som först anger det otillåtna samarbetet, och det är först genom den... (More)
Dagens konkurrensrättsregler finns på både nationell och europeisk nivå, och syftar till att främja en effektiv konkurrens. För att det ska vara möjligt att upprätthålla, har bestämmelser utarbetats för att bland annat kontrollera bildandet av karteller, som enligt huvudregeln i 2 kap. 1 § konkurrenslagen är förbjudna. Om ett företag trots förbudet skulle ingå ett otillåtet, konkurrensbegränsande samarbete med andra företag finns det vissa möjligheter att undgå bestraffning helt eller delvis.
Dessa möjligheter betecknas gemensamt som det svenska eftergiftsprogrammet. Centralt inom det är bestämmelsen i 3 kap. 12 § konkurrenslagen som stadgar att det företag i en kartell som först anger det otillåtna samarbetet, och det är först genom den informationen det blir möjligt för Konkurrensverket att agera, går fri från konkurrensskadeavgift. När 3 kap. 14 a § konkurrenslagen infördes sänktes tröskeln för den information som ett företag initialt är tvunget att lämna för att eftergift skulle aktualiseras.
Genom införandet av den bestämmelsen, det så kallade kölappssystemet, skapades ytterligare ett möjligt sätt för företag att agera för att kunna kvalificera sig för eftergift. Genom att lämna en liten mängd information till Konkurrensverket avseende en överträdelse, får företaget en kölapp. Företaget får sedan en begränsad tid på sig att inkomma med tillräcklig information för att nå upp till eftergiftskravet, och lyckas aktören med det så anses företaget ha inkommit med tillräcklig information för att beviljas eftergift redan samma dag som kölappen togs.
Idag finns inga offentliga beslut där kölappssystemet har använts. Det behöver dock inte tolkas som att införandet av systemet har varit verkningslöst, då den största effekten antagligen är den preventiva. Genom ett välbyggt eftergiftssystem destabiliseras karteller, och genom kölappssystemet minskar incitamentet än mer då det blivit mycket lättare att göra en anmälan. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Engström, Hanna LU
supervisor
organization
course
LAGF03 20161
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
konkurrensrätt
language
Swedish
id
8874673
date added to LUP
2016-12-14 10:01:13
date last changed
2016-12-14 10:01:13
@misc{8874673,
  abstract     = {The competition rules of today exist on both a national and European level, and aim to promote effective competition. In order to maintain that, rules have been set out to control the formation of cartels, which are prohibited according to the main rule in 2 chapter 1 § in the Swedish competitin act. If a company despite the ban would enter into an illegal, anticompetitive collaboration with other companies, there are some opportunities to escape punishment entirely or partly.
These opportunities are collectively referred to as the Swedish leniency program. Central in this is the provision in 3 Chapter § 12 Competition Act, which stipulates that the company in a cartel which first states the unlawful cooperation, and it is first by using that information the Competition Authority is able to act, becomes free from fines. After 3 chapter 14 a § Competition Act was introduced, the threshold for the information that a company initially had to submit to a concession was lowered.
Through the introduction of the article, known as the ticket system, another possible way for companies to act in order to qualify for the concession has been created. By leaving a small amount of information to the Competition Authority concerning infringement, the company gets a queue ticket. The company will then receive a limited amount of time to submit sufficient information to reach the concession requirement, and a successful company that manages to provide the Competition Authority with sufficient information within the time limit, will be seen as to have provided the Competition Authority with the sufficient amount of information on the first day when it took the ticket. 
Today there are no public cases where the ticket system has been used. It need not be interpreted as the introduction of the system has been ineffective, the biggest impact is probably the contraceptive one. A well constructed concession system destabilize cartels, and the ticket system reduces the incentive even more since it has become much easier to file a complaint.},
  author       = {Engström, Hanna},
  keyword      = {konkurrensrätt},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {En rättsvetenskaplig studie om konkurrenslagens eftergiftsprogram - Särskilt om det så kallade kölappssystemet, 3 kap. 14 a § konkurrenslagen -},
  year         = {2016},
}