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Socialtjänstens ansvar för omedelbara omhändertaganden av barn till utsatta EU-medborgare

Arvidsson, Nina LU (2016) JURM02 20162
Department of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Den här uppsatsen syftar till att utreda socialtjänstens ansvar för omedelbara omhändertaganden av barn till utsatta EU-medborgare. Socialtjänsten ansvarar för omedelbara omhändertaganden av barn med stöd av 6 § lag med särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga (LVU). I ett nyligen avgjort rättsfall från Kammarrätten i Stockholm förefaller detta ansvar inte längre omfatta omedelbara omhändertaganden av utsatta EU-medborgares barn. I domen framgår att svensk domstol enligt EU:s Bryssel II-förordning, som reglerar domsrätt i vårdnadsmål, inte har behörighet att avgöra denna typ av mål. I Bryssel II-förordningen framgår att det är domstolen i den stat där barnet har hemvist som är behörig domstol. Utsatta EU-medborgare bedöms i regel inte ha så... (More)
Den här uppsatsen syftar till att utreda socialtjänstens ansvar för omedelbara omhändertaganden av barn till utsatta EU-medborgare. Socialtjänsten ansvarar för omedelbara omhändertaganden av barn med stöd av 6 § lag med särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga (LVU). I ett nyligen avgjort rättsfall från Kammarrätten i Stockholm förefaller detta ansvar inte längre omfatta omedelbara omhändertaganden av utsatta EU-medborgares barn. I domen framgår att svensk domstol enligt EU:s Bryssel II-förordning, som reglerar domsrätt i vårdnadsmål, inte har behörighet att avgöra denna typ av mål. I Bryssel II-förordningen framgår att det är domstolen i den stat där barnet har hemvist som är behörig domstol. Utsatta EU-medborgare bedöms i regel inte ha så stark anknytning till Sverige att de kan anses ha hemvist i landet.

I uppsatsen utreds denna situation utifrån tre principer som socialtjänsten är skyldig att beakta. Dessa är principen om socialtjänstens yttersta ansvar för barn, principen om barnets bästa samt principen om myndigheternas skyldighet enligt Europeiska konventionen om de mänskliga rättigheterna (EKMR) att agera när ett barn riskerar att fara illa. Dessa tre principer samspelar för att belysa de olika delarna av socialtjänstens ansvar vid situationer när ett barn far illa och behöver omhändertas.

Principen om socialtjänstens yttersta ansvar för barn har sin grund i bestämmelser i socialtjänstlagen (SoL) och LVU. I SoL regleras socialtjänstens yttersta ansvar för de som vistas i kommunen. Det framgår att socialtjänsten i vistelsekommunen alltid har ett ansvar för akuta situationer som kan uppkomma. I de fall ett barn far illa i hemmet kan socialtjänsten behöva ingripa med tvångsåtgärder med stöd av LVU. Principen om barnets bästa kommer ursprungligen från FN:s konvention om barnets rättigheter (barnkonventionen) som Sverige har ratificerat. Anslutningen till barnkonventionen har lett till ändringar i såväl SoL som LVU. I de båda lagarna framgår numera att barnets bästa ska vara avgörande vid alla åtgärder som rör barn. Principen om myndigheternas skyldighet att agera när barn far illa har sin grund i EKMR och innebär att socialtjänsten kan ha en skyldighet att agera om den känner till missförhållanden i hemmet för barn. Sverige är skyldiga att följa EKMR som gäller som svensk lag. Artikel 2 EKMR stadgar att allas rätt till liv ska skyddas genom lag och artikel 3 EKMR stadgar att ingen får utsättas för tortyr eller förnedrande behandling eller bestraffning.

Under de senaste åren har allt fler utsatta EU-medborgare kommit till Sverige. Utsatta EU-medborgare är personer som vistas i Sverige utan att ha uppehållsrätt i landet. Detta har lett till nya utmaningar för de svenska kommunerna eftersom utsatta EU-medborgare endast har en begränsad rätt till välfärd i Sverige och i regel enbart har rätt till hjälp vid akuta situationer. I begreppet akuta situationer innefattas omedelbara omhändertagande av barn som far illa.

Till följd av dels den kammarrättsdom som meddelades i april 2016, dels ett av regeringen utfärdat betänkande, SOU 2015:71, anser jag att socialtjänstens ansvar för omhändertaganden av barn kraftigt har begränsats. Domen, som hänvisar till betänkandet, slår fast att svensk domstol inte är behörig att besluta om vård enligt LVU för barn som har hemvist i en annan medlemsstat. Frågan ska istället prövas i hemviststaten. Enligt domen föreligger alltså inte förutsättningar för att besluta om ett omedelbart omhändertagande för ett barn som inte har hemvist i Sverige.

Det ingår i socialtjänstens ansvar att verka utifrån de tre principer som har beskrivits ovan. I de fall kammarrättens avgörande efterföljs riskerar socialtjänsten att inte kunna leva upp till sitt ansvar utifrån dessa tre principer. I betänkandet SOU 2015:71 har det lämnats som förslag att LVU ska ändras för att möjliggöra omedelbara omhändertaganden av utsatta EU-medborgares barn som inte strider mot Bryssel II-förordningen. Utredningens förslag har ännu inte lett till någon lagändring. Det är enligt mig av största vikt att en sådan lagändring sker så snart som möjligt för att undvika att barn far illa, och i värsta fall dör, till följd av svensk domstols bristande domsrätt. (Less)
Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the social services’ responsibility for emergency care orders for children of vulnerable EU-citizens. According to 6 § LVU, the social services are responsible for emergency care orders of children. However, in a recently decided case from the Administrative Court of Appeal in Stockholm, this responsibility appears to no longer include emergency care orders of the children of vulnerable EU-citizens. In the judgement it was held that Swedish courts, according to the Brussels II regulation and its rules of jurisdiction, are not competent to decide in these matters. It is stated in the Brussels II regulation that the courts of a Member State shall have jurisdiction over a child who is habitually... (More)
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the social services’ responsibility for emergency care orders for children of vulnerable EU-citizens. According to 6 § LVU, the social services are responsible for emergency care orders of children. However, in a recently decided case from the Administrative Court of Appeal in Stockholm, this responsibility appears to no longer include emergency care orders of the children of vulnerable EU-citizens. In the judgement it was held that Swedish courts, according to the Brussels II regulation and its rules of jurisdiction, are not competent to decide in these matters. It is stated in the Brussels II regulation that the courts of a Member State shall have jurisdiction over a child who is habitually resident in that Member State. Vulnerable EU-citizens are not in general considered to have habitual residence in Sweden.

This situation is investigated from three principles that the social services are obliged to follow. These are the principle of the social services’ outermost responsibility for children, the principle of the best interest of the child and the principle of the authority’s responsibility according to ECHR to act when a child is in danger. These three responsibilities interact to illustrate the different parts of the social services’ duties during situations where a child is in danger and needs to be removed from his or her parents' custody.

The principle of the social services’ outermost responsibility for children has its ground in regulations in SoL and LVU. The social services’ outermost responsibility for the people who reside in the municipality is regulated in SoL. It is clear from the regulations in SoL that the social services in the municipality of residence have a responsibility for emergency situations that may occur. In the case of a child being mistreated at home, the social services may have a responsibility to act with forced measures. The principle of the best interest of the child stems from The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child which Sweden has ratified. The ratification of the convention has led to changes in SoL and LVU. In both SoL and LVU it is now clear that in measures involving children, the best interest of the child is decisive. The principle of the authority’s responsibility according to ECHR to act when children are at risk of harm means that social services may have a responsibility to act when they are aware of mistreatment in homes where children lives. Sweden is part of ECHR and the convention is Swedish law. Article 2 of ECHR states that everyone’s life shall be protected by law and Article 3 of ECHR states that no one shall be subjected to torture or to in-human or degrading treatment or punishment.

During the last couple of years Sweden has had a raise in the population of vulnerable EU-citizens. Vulnerable EU-citizens are people who live in Sweden but do not have a right to reside in the country according to the citizenship directive. This has led to new challenges for the Swedish municipalities since vulnerable EU-citizens have a limited right to social welfare and only have a right to support from the social services in emergency situations. Emergency care orders of children are contained in the concept of emergency situations.

I am of the opinion that a limitation of the social services’ responsibility for emergency care orders for children has occurred due to the judgement from the Administrative Court of Appeal in Stockholm from April 2016 and the Swedish Governments Official Report 2015:71. The judgement, which refers to the report, states that Swedish courts are not competent to make a decision about emergency care orders for children who have residence in another Member State. The question should be tried in the state of resi-dence. The conditions to issue an emergency care order for a child who does not have residence in Sweden are not fulfilled according to the judgement.

It is part of the social services’ responsibility to work according to the three principles that have been described above. In the case that the judgement from the Administrative Court of Appeal is followed, the social services are at risk to not be able to live up to the role that they have according to these three principles. In the report it has been suggested that LVU should be changed to make it possible to issue emergency care orders for children of vulnerable EU-citizens without infringing the Brussels II regulation. The suggestion from the report has still not led to any changes in the law. It is in my opinion important that such a change will occur as soon as possible to avoid mistreatment or even death of children due to the fact that the Swedish courts lack jurisdiction. (Less)
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author
Arvidsson, Nina LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
The social services' responsibility for emergency care orders of children of vulnerable EU-citizens
course
JURM02 20162
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
Förvaltningsrätt, Internationell Privaträtt, Socialrätt
language
Swedish
id
8897877
date added to LUP
2017-01-18 12:44:02
date last changed
2017-01-18 12:44:02
@misc{8897877,
  abstract     = {The aim of this thesis is to investigate the social services’ responsibility for emergency care orders for children of vulnerable EU-citizens. According to 6 § LVU, the social services are responsible for emergency care orders of children. However, in a recently decided case from the Administrative Court of Appeal in Stockholm, this responsibility appears to no longer include emergency care orders of the children of vulnerable EU-citizens. In the judgement it was held that Swedish courts, according to the Brussels II regulation and its rules of jurisdiction, are not competent to decide in these matters. It is stated in the Brussels II regulation that the courts of a Member State shall have jurisdiction over a child who is habitually resident in that Member State. Vulnerable EU-citizens are not in general considered to have habitual residence in Sweden. 

This situation is investigated from three principles that the social services are obliged to follow. These are the principle of the social services’ outermost responsibility for children, the principle of the best interest of the child and the principle of the authority’s responsibility according to ECHR to act when a child is in danger. These three responsibilities interact to illustrate the different parts of the social services’ duties during situations where a child is in danger and needs to be removed from his or her parents' custody.

The principle of the social services’ outermost responsibility for children has its ground in regulations in SoL and LVU. The social services’ outermost responsibility for the people who reside in the municipality is regulated in SoL. It is clear from the regulations in SoL that the social services in the municipality of residence have a responsibility for emergency situations that may occur. In the case of a child being mistreated at home, the social services may have a responsibility to act with forced measures. The principle of the best interest of the child stems from The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child which Sweden has ratified. The ratification of the convention has led to changes in SoL and LVU. In both SoL and LVU it is now clear that in measures involving children, the best interest of the child is decisive. The principle of the authority’s responsibility according to ECHR to act when children are at risk of harm means that social services may have a responsibility to act when they are aware of mistreatment in homes where children lives. Sweden is part of ECHR and the convention is Swedish law. Article 2 of ECHR states that everyone’s life shall be protected by law and Article 3 of ECHR states that no one shall be subjected to torture or to in-human or degrading treatment or punishment.

During the last couple of years Sweden has had a raise in the population of vulnerable EU-citizens. Vulnerable EU-citizens are people who live in Sweden but do not have a right to reside in the country according to the citizenship directive. This has led to new challenges for the Swedish municipalities since vulnerable EU-citizens have a limited right to social welfare and only have a right to support from the social services in emergency situations. Emergency care orders of children are contained in the concept of emergency situations. 

I am of the opinion that a limitation of the social services’ responsibility for emergency care orders for children has occurred due to the judgement from the Administrative Court of Appeal in Stockholm from April 2016 and the Swedish Governments Official Report 2015:71. The judgement, which refers to the report, states that Swedish courts are not competent to make a decision about emergency care orders for children who have residence in another Member State. The question should be tried in the state of resi-dence. The conditions to issue an emergency care order for a child who does not have residence in Sweden are not fulfilled according to the judgement. 

It is part of the social services’ responsibility to work according to the three principles that have been described above. In the case that the judgement from the Administrative Court of Appeal is followed, the social services are at risk to not be able to live up to the role that they have according to these three principles. In the report it has been suggested that LVU should be changed to make it possible to issue emergency care orders for children of vulnerable EU-citizens without infringing the Brussels II regulation. The suggestion from the report has still not led to any changes in the law. It is in my opinion important that such a change will occur as soon as possible to avoid mistreatment or even death of children due to the fact that the Swedish courts lack jurisdiction.},
  author       = {Arvidsson, Nina},
  keyword      = {Förvaltningsrätt,Internationell Privaträtt,Socialrätt},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Socialtjänstens ansvar för omedelbara omhändertaganden av barn till utsatta EU-medborgare},
  year         = {2016},
}