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En väl fungerande lönebildning

Svensson, Emil LU (2017) HARH16 20162
Department of Business Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Sammanfattning
Uppsatsens frågeställning berör lönebildningen och systemet för lönebildning. Sedan 1997 har den svenska lönebildningen utgått från det märke som industrins parter kommer överens om. Parterna inom industrin är lönebildande på den svenska arbetsmarknaden. Övriga parter förhåller sig sedan till denna lönenorm, eller märke. När andra branscher sedan förhandlar och behöver medling från statliga medlingsinstitutet, har medlingsinstitutet en praxis att inte föreslå avtal som lägger sig över industrins märke. Staten sanktionerar därmed nuvarande lönebildningssystem. Frågorna som behandlas i uppsatsen är dels vad som särskiljer industriavtalet från tidigare system för lönebildning och dels om industriavtalet är en konsekvens av... (More)
Sammanfattning
Uppsatsens frågeställning berör lönebildningen och systemet för lönebildning. Sedan 1997 har den svenska lönebildningen utgått från det märke som industrins parter kommer överens om. Parterna inom industrin är lönebildande på den svenska arbetsmarknaden. Övriga parter förhåller sig sedan till denna lönenorm, eller märke. När andra branscher sedan förhandlar och behöver medling från statliga medlingsinstitutet, har medlingsinstitutet en praxis att inte föreslå avtal som lägger sig över industrins märke. Staten sanktionerar därmed nuvarande lönebildningssystem. Frågorna som behandlas i uppsatsen är dels vad som särskiljer industriavtalet från tidigare system för lönebildning och dels om industriavtalet är en konsekvens av nuvarande ekonomiskt/politiskt paradigm. Är således staten en tydligare aktör än vad bilden om parternas autonomi ger utryck för? Genom att jämföra industriavtalssystemet med den tidigare modellen solidarisk lönepolitik kan skillnader i statens agerande utrönas. Lagstiftarens intentioner med lönebildningen belyses genom en grundlig genomgång av förarbetena inför instiftandet av medlingsinstitutet. I mitt arbete kommer jag fram till slutsatsen att staten i högsta grad är en mycket aktiv part när det kommer till lönebildningen på den svenska arbetsmarknaden. Lagstiftaren har inte bara isolerat parterna till en viss typ av lönebildning utan spelar en mycket aktiv del i densamma. Denna slutsats gäller både den solidariska lönepolitikens period och i nuvarande system. (Less)
Abstract
Abstract
This essay addresses wage formation in general and, more specifically, the Swedish system of wage formation.
Since 1997, Swedish wage formation has been based on the so-called "mark" agreed on by trade unions and employers’ organizations representing the industrial sector of the labor market. Parties in the industrial sector lead wage formation in the Swedish labor market. Other sectors of the labor market then adopt this "mark", as it's often referred to, as a wage norm.
When other branches negotiate and require mediation assistance from The National Mediation Office, the Office’s practice is to not put forward a proposal for agreements higher than the "mark" set by the industrial sector. In this way, the Swedish government... (More)
Abstract
This essay addresses wage formation in general and, more specifically, the Swedish system of wage formation.
Since 1997, Swedish wage formation has been based on the so-called "mark" agreed on by trade unions and employers’ organizations representing the industrial sector of the labor market. Parties in the industrial sector lead wage formation in the Swedish labor market. Other sectors of the labor market then adopt this "mark", as it's often referred to, as a wage norm.
When other branches negotiate and require mediation assistance from The National Mediation Office, the Office’s practice is to not put forward a proposal for agreements higher than the "mark" set by the industrial sector. In this way, the Swedish government sanctions the current system of wage formation.
This essay discusses how industrial agreement is distinct from previous systems of wage formation and whether industrial agreement is a consequence of the current economic/political paradigm. Is the state a more active player in wage formation than the picture of an autonomous labor market suggests?
By comparing the current system of wage formation based on industrial agreement with the previous model based on a policy of wage solidarity among the different branches, the so-called "Rehn–Meidner model", this essay reveals disparities in the way the government operates.
The government’s intentions for wage formation are discussed in an in-depth analysis of the legislative history prior to the founding of the National Mediation Office.
This essay concludes that the government, to a large extent, is an active part of wage formation in the Swedish labor market. The government has not only limited the parties in the labor market to a certain system of wage formation but also plays an active role within the same system. This conclusion applies to both the previous model based on wage solidarity and the current system of wage formation. (Less)
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author
Svensson, Emil LU
supervisor
organization
course
HARH16 20162
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
Arbetsrätt, Lönebildning, Industriavtalet, Medlingsinstitutet
language
Swedish
id
8899991
date added to LUP
2017-01-19 12:02:15
date last changed
2017-01-19 12:02:15
@misc{8899991,
  abstract     = {Abstract
This essay addresses wage formation in general and, more specifically, the Swedish system of wage formation. 
Since 1997, Swedish wage formation has been based on the so-called "mark" agreed on by trade unions and employers’ organizations representing the industrial sector of the labor market. Parties in the industrial sector lead wage formation in the Swedish labor market. Other sectors of the labor market then adopt this "mark", as it's often referred to, as a wage norm. 
When other branches negotiate and require mediation assistance from The National Mediation Office, the Office’s practice is to not put forward a proposal for agreements higher than the "mark" set by the industrial sector. In this way, the Swedish government sanctions the current system of wage formation. 
This essay discusses how industrial agreement is distinct from previous systems of wage formation and whether industrial agreement is a consequence of the current economic/political paradigm. Is the state a more active player in wage formation than the picture of an autonomous labor market suggests?
By comparing the current system of wage formation based on industrial agreement with the previous model based on a policy of wage solidarity among the different branches, the so-called "Rehn–Meidner model", this essay reveals disparities in the way the government operates. 
The government’s intentions for wage formation are discussed in an in-depth analysis of the legislative history prior to the founding of the National Mediation Office. 
This essay concludes that the government, to a large extent, is an active part of wage formation in the Swedish labor market. The government has not only limited the parties in the labor market to a certain system of wage formation but also plays an active role within the same system. This conclusion applies to both the previous model based on wage solidarity and the current system of wage formation.},
  author       = {Svensson, Emil},
  keyword      = {Arbetsrätt,Lönebildning,Industriavtalet,Medlingsinstitutet},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {En väl fungerande lönebildning},
  year         = {2017},
}