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Fastighetssäljarens upplysningsplikt - rättsläget före och efter NJA 2007 s. 86

Viberud, Fredrik LU (2017) LAGF03 20171
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Jordabalkens felregler har genomgått lagändringar och utvecklats genom rättspraxis. I ett HD-avgörande, NJA 2007 s. 86, ansågs en säljare av fast egendom under vissa kriterier ha en upplysningsplikt för fel som omfattas av köparens undersökningsplikt, men som säljaren har vetskap om. Mot bakgrund av det tidigare rättsläget och HD:s argumentation i det enskilda fallet har domens prejudikatvärde ifrågasatts av auktoriteter på området.

Uppsatsens syfte var att utreda hur HD-avgörandet har förändrat säljarens upplysningsplikt. Rekvisiten som före och efter HD-avgörandet aktualiserar en upplysningsplikt, vad den omfattar samt prejudikatvärdet har undersökts. En rättshistorisk och rättsdogmatisk metod har använts.

Säljare av fast egendom... (More)
Jordabalkens felregler har genomgått lagändringar och utvecklats genom rättspraxis. I ett HD-avgörande, NJA 2007 s. 86, ansågs en säljare av fast egendom under vissa kriterier ha en upplysningsplikt för fel som omfattas av köparens undersökningsplikt, men som säljaren har vetskap om. Mot bakgrund av det tidigare rättsläget och HD:s argumentation i det enskilda fallet har domens prejudikatvärde ifrågasatts av auktoriteter på området.

Uppsatsens syfte var att utreda hur HD-avgörandet har förändrat säljarens upplysningsplikt. Rekvisiten som före och efter HD-avgörandet aktualiserar en upplysningsplikt, vad den omfattar samt prejudikatvärdet har undersökts. En rättshistorisk och rättsdogmatisk metod har använts.

Säljare av fast egendom har i förarbeten, doktrin och rättspraxis traditionellt ansetts ha en upplysningsplikt vid generella påföljdsfriskrivningar för dolda fel. Likaså har säljaren blivit ansvarig för upptäckbara fel på grund av förtigande eller missvisande upplysningar enligt avtalslagen 30, 33 § § om svek och förfaranden i strid mot tro och heder. Då har säljaren inte tillåtits åberopa att köparen eftersatt sin undersökningsplikt.

HD-avgörandet innebär att utgångspunkten för felansvaret fortfarande är köparens undersökningsplikt, men att säljaren oberoende av den, har en upplysningsplikt för upptäckbara fel som köparen är i villfarelse om, och som säljaren dessutom försökt att åtgärda och därtill har insett eller bort inse vara av väsentlig betydelse för köparens beslut att köpa fastigheten. Det som förändras i och med HD-avgörandet är alltså inte att säljaren på grund av sin upplysningsplikt kan bli ansvarig för upptäckbara fel. Förändringen är att säljaren under dessa kriterier, utan att de dessutom innebär svek eller förfarande i strid mot tro och heder i det enskilda fallet, har en upplysningsplikt. Upplysningsplikten gäller alltså under dessa kriterier oberoende av köparens undersökningsplikt. Det följer även av att HD utgår ifrån att felet inte berörts mellan parterna överhuvudtaget.

HD menar att tidigare rättspraxis lämnat ett utrymme för upplysningsplikten och anför att NJA 1981 s. 894 kan läsas som att det var en vilseledande uppgift som medförde felansvaret, men att det lika gärna kan vara ett utnyttjande av säljarens villfarelse, oberoende av om felet diskuterats överhuvudtaget mellan parterna. HD menar även att fastigheter säljs huvudsakligen i befintligt skick och att säljaren därför, i likhet med en säljare av lös egendom i befintligt skick enligt köplagen 19 § första stycket andra punkten, har en upplysningsplikt.

Grauers har kritiserat HD-avgörandet på flera punkter och Håstad har bemött kritiken. Grauers lägger stor vikt vid HD:s argumentation och sin egen slutsats att HD-avgörandet innebär en generell upplysningsplikt. Håstad har invänt att upplysningsplikten inte är generell utan gäller i ”jämförbara fall”.

Tingsrätten har tillämpat HD-avgörandet utan ändring genom att konstatera att dess innebörd är att säljaren har en upplysningsplikt i ”mer svekliknande fall”. HD-avgörandet har alltså fått praktisk betydelse och kritiken mot det är på ett teoretiskt plan. Dessa omständigheter talar för att HD-avgörandet har ett normalt prejudikatvärde. Däremot begränsas tillämpningsområdet av Håstads uttalande om ”jämförbara fall”. (Less)
Abstract
The regulations in property law (JB 1970:994) regarding defects in real estate have undergone changes and developed through case law. In a ruling by the supreme court, NJA 2007 s. 86, a seller was considered, under certain criteria, to have a duty to disclose regarding a defect that he was aware of, although it was detectable and therefore subject to the buyer´s obligation to inspect. Because of the previous legal position and the argumentation by the supreme court in the individual case, the precedent value has been questioned by authorities in the field.

The purpose of the essay has been to examine what precedent value the ruling has and how it changes seller´s duty to disclose. Therefore, what constitutes seller´s duty to disclose... (More)
The regulations in property law (JB 1970:994) regarding defects in real estate have undergone changes and developed through case law. In a ruling by the supreme court, NJA 2007 s. 86, a seller was considered, under certain criteria, to have a duty to disclose regarding a defect that he was aware of, although it was detectable and therefore subject to the buyer´s obligation to inspect. Because of the previous legal position and the argumentation by the supreme court in the individual case, the precedent value has been questioned by authorities in the field.

The purpose of the essay has been to examine what precedent value the ruling has and how it changes seller´s duty to disclose. Therefore, what constitutes seller´s duty to disclose and its extent, before and after the ruling, have been examined. This has been done by the use of a legal historical and a legal dogmatic method.

Traditionally, sellers of real estate have, in the preparatory works, doctrine and case law, been considered to have a duty to disclose when general disclaimers for hidden defects are used. Also, sellers have been responsible for detectable defects, because of their silence about them or having provided misleading information according to the Swedish Contracts Act (AvtL 1915:218) 30, 33 § § about betrayal and procedure in violation of faith and honor. In these cases, sellers have not been allowed to claim that the buyer did not fulfill his obligation to inspect.

The ruling by the supreme court means that the starting point for the responsibility regarding defects in real estate still is the buyer´s obligation to inspect. However, sellers independently have a duty to disclose detectable defects, that the buyer has a delusion about and that the seller has tried to fix, and that the seller in addition to this, has or should have realized that the defects were crucial to the buyer’s decision to buy the property. What is changed due to the ruling, is thus not that sellers can be responsible for detectable errors. The change is that a seller, under these criteria, without them forming betrayal or procedure in violation of faith and honor in the individual case, has a duty to disclose. This means that the duty to disclose applies regardless of the buyer´s obligation to inspect. This also follows from that the supreme court assumes that the defect, in the individual case, has not at all been discussed by the parties.

The supreme court argues that earlier case law has left an opening for this duty to disclose, due to that another case (NJA 1981 s. 894), can be interpreted as if it were because the seller left misleading information to the buyer, that the seller was held responsible for the defect, but that it might as well be because the seller exploited the buyers’ delusion about the defect, regardless of whether it was discussed between the parties or not. The supreme court also argues that real estate mainly is sold in “existing condition” and that sellers therefore, like sellers of chattels in existing condition, according to the Swedish Sale of Goods Act (KöpL 1990:931) 19 § first part second point, have a duty to disclose.

Grauers has criticized the ruling on several points and Håstad has responded to this criticism. He attaches great importance to how the supreme court argued and to his own conclusion that the ruling means that sellers have a general duty to disclose. Håstad has objected that the duty to disclose arising from the ruling is not general but applies in “comparable cases”.

The district court has applied the ruling without change by stating that its meaning is that sellers have a duty to disclose in “more betrayal like cases”. The ruling by the supreme court has thus gained practical significance and the criticism towards it is on a theoretical level. These circumstances indicate that it has a normal precedent value. However, the scope is limited by the statement of Håstad about “comparable cases”. (Less)
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author
Viberud, Fredrik LU
supervisor
organization
course
LAGF03 20171
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
fastighetsrätt, upplysningsplikt
language
Swedish
id
8907946
date added to LUP
2017-06-29 10:47:09
date last changed
2017-06-29 10:47:09
@misc{8907946,
  abstract     = {The regulations in property law (JB 1970:994) regarding defects in real estate have undergone changes and developed through case law. In a ruling by the supreme court, NJA 2007 s. 86, a seller was considered, under certain criteria, to have a duty to disclose regarding a defect that he was aware of, although it was detectable and therefore subject to the buyer´s obligation to inspect. Because of the previous legal position and the argumentation by the supreme court in the individual case, the precedent value has been questioned by authorities in the field.

The purpose of the essay has been to examine what precedent value the ruling has and how it changes seller´s duty to disclose. Therefore, what constitutes seller´s duty to disclose and its extent, before and after the ruling, have been examined. This has been done by the use of a legal historical and a legal dogmatic method.

Traditionally, sellers of real estate have, in the preparatory works, doctrine and case law, been considered to have a duty to disclose when general disclaimers for hidden defects are used. Also, sellers have been responsible for detectable defects, because of their silence about them or having provided misleading information according to the Swedish Contracts Act (AvtL 1915:218) 30, 33 § § about betrayal and procedure in violation of faith and honor. In these cases, sellers have not been allowed to claim that the buyer did not fulfill his obligation to inspect. 

The ruling by the supreme court means that the starting point for the responsibility regarding defects in real estate still is the buyer´s obligation to inspect. However, sellers independently have a duty to disclose detectable defects, that the buyer has a delusion about and that the seller has tried to fix, and that the seller in addition to this, has or should have realized that the defects were crucial to the buyer’s decision to buy the property. What is changed due to the ruling, is thus not that sellers can be responsible for detectable errors. The change is that a seller, under these criteria, without them forming betrayal or procedure in violation of faith and honor in the individual case, has a duty to disclose. This means that the duty to disclose applies regardless of the buyer´s obligation to inspect. This also follows from that the supreme court assumes that the defect, in the individual case, has not at all been discussed by the parties.

The supreme court argues that earlier case law has left an opening for this duty to disclose, due to that another case (NJA 1981 s. 894), can be interpreted as if it were because the seller left misleading information to the buyer, that the seller was held responsible for the defect, but that it might as well be because the seller exploited the buyers’ delusion about the defect, regardless of whether it was discussed between the parties or not. The supreme court also argues that real estate mainly is sold in “existing condition” and that sellers therefore, like sellers of chattels in existing condition, according to the Swedish Sale of Goods Act (KöpL 1990:931) 19 § first part second point, have a duty to disclose.

Grauers has criticized the ruling on several points and Håstad has responded to this criticism. He attaches great importance to how the supreme court argued and to his own conclusion that the ruling means that sellers have a general duty to disclose. Håstad has objected that the duty to disclose arising from the ruling is not general but applies in “comparable cases”. 

The district court has applied the ruling without change by stating that its meaning is that sellers have a duty to disclose in “more betrayal like cases”. The ruling by the supreme court has thus gained practical significance and the criticism towards it is on a theoretical level. These circumstances indicate that it has a normal precedent value. However, the scope is limited by the statement of Håstad about “comparable cases”.},
  author       = {Viberud, Fredrik},
  keyword      = {fastighetsrätt,upplysningsplikt},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Fastighetssäljarens upplysningsplikt - rättsläget före och efter NJA 2007 s. 86},
  year         = {2017},
}