Advanced

Hämnden är bitterljuv - Möjligheten att vidta vedergällning i WTO:s tvistlösningssystem sett ur utvecklingsländernas perspektiv

Berglund, Anna LU (2017) JURM02 20171
Department of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Världshandelsorganisationen WTO bildades 1995 och har sedan dess arbetat för att öka handeln mellan stater genom att minska handelshinder. För att upprätthålla WTO-avtalen finns WTO:s egna tvistlösningssystem. Tvistlösningssystemet ger i teorin industriländer och utvecklingsländer samma möjlighet att utmana nationella regleringar. I praktiken finns det dock stora skillnader mellan industri- och utvecklingsländer i utnyttjandet av tvistlösningssystemet. Denna uppsats syftar till att undersöka hur systemet med vedergällning fungerar och hur det påverkar utvecklingsländernas användning av tvistlösningssystemet.

WTO:s tvistlösningssystem saknar egentliga sanktioner när en stat befinns bryta mot WTO-avtalen. Den enda och slutliga sanktionen... (More)
Världshandelsorganisationen WTO bildades 1995 och har sedan dess arbetat för att öka handeln mellan stater genom att minska handelshinder. För att upprätthålla WTO-avtalen finns WTO:s egna tvistlösningssystem. Tvistlösningssystemet ger i teorin industriländer och utvecklingsländer samma möjlighet att utmana nationella regleringar. I praktiken finns det dock stora skillnader mellan industri- och utvecklingsländer i utnyttjandet av tvistlösningssystemet. Denna uppsats syftar till att undersöka hur systemet med vedergällning fungerar och hur det påverkar utvecklingsländernas användning av tvistlösningssystemet.

WTO:s tvistlösningssystem saknar egentliga sanktioner när en stat befinns bryta mot WTO-avtalen. Den enda och slutliga sanktionen är implementering av panelernas och AB:s rekommendationer. För en stat som skadas av den otillåtna regleringen finns dock möjlighet att utöva påtryckning genom att vidta vedergällning i enlighet med artikel 22 i DSU. Vedergällning innebär att en klagande stat som drabbats av en annan stats regelstridiga agerade får lov att hämnas på den svarande staten genom att exempelvis höja tullarna för den svarande statens exportvaror.

Vedergällningssystemet har fått utstå mycket kritik, i synnerhet från utvecklingsländerna. Det har framkommit att systemet med vedergällning är ett ineffektivt påtryckningsmedel för utvecklingsländerna. I tvister där ett utvecklingsland med begränsade resurser ställs mot ett stort industriland kan den ekonomiska kostnaden för vedergällning ibland bli större än vinningen av densamma. I de tvister som initierats i WTO och som presenteras i uppsatsen är det sällan som ett utvecklingsland aktualiserat vedergällning.

Eftersom vedergällningssystemet anses ge olika förutsättningar för utvecklingsländer och industriländer att utöva påtryckning mot en svarande stat, har flera förslag till att förändra vedergällningssystemet lagts fram. De huvudsakliga förslagen lyfts fram och diskuteras i den här uppsatsen, nämligen korsvedergällning, kollektiv vedergällning, vedergällning utöver faktisk skada samt obligatorisk kompensation. Samtidigt som utvecklingsländerna vill reformera vedergällningssystemet för att öka förtroendet för WTO:s tvistlösningssystem riskerar den pågående Doharundan att öka staters skepticism mot multilaterala system.

Jag anser att trots vedergällningssystemets brister är det ett system att bygga vidare på. En del av de förslag som presenteras i uppsatsen är enligt min åsikt värda att vidareutveckla. (Less)
Abstract
The World Trade Organization was formed in 1995 and has since been working to increase trade between states by reducing trade barriers. In order to enforce the WTO law, the WTO has its own dispute settlement system. The dispute settlement system is in theory providing developing countries and developed countries the same opportunity to challenge national regulations. However, there are in practice major differences between developing and developed countries in the use of the dispute settlement system. This paper aims to investigate how the retaliation system works and how it affects developing countries’ use of the dispute settlement system.

WTO’s dispute settlement system lacks real sanctions when a state is found to violate WTO... (More)
The World Trade Organization was formed in 1995 and has since been working to increase trade between states by reducing trade barriers. In order to enforce the WTO law, the WTO has its own dispute settlement system. The dispute settlement system is in theory providing developing countries and developed countries the same opportunity to challenge national regulations. However, there are in practice major differences between developing and developed countries in the use of the dispute settlement system. This paper aims to investigate how the retaliation system works and how it affects developing countries’ use of the dispute settlement system.

WTO’s dispute settlement system lacks real sanctions when a state is found to violate WTO agreements. The only and final sanction is the implementation of the panels’ and AB’s recommendations. However, for a state injured by the unauthorized regulation there is the possibility of exerting pressure by retaliating in accordance with article 22 of the DSU. Retaliation means that a complaining state, affected by the unlawful act of another state, is allowed to revenge on the respondent state by for example raising tariffs for the respondent state’s export goods.

The retaliation system has received much criticism, especially from developing countries. It has been found that the system with retaliation is an ineffective means of pressure for developing countries. In cases where a developing country with limited resources is facing a major developed country, the economic cost of retaliation can sometimes be greater than the gain of the same. In the disputes initiated in the WTO, and that are presented in this paper, it is rare that a developing country has retaliated.

As the retaliation system is considered to provide different prerequisite for developing countries and developed countries to exert pressure against a responding state, several proposals have been made to change the retaliation system. The main proposals are highlighted and discussed in this paper, namely cross-retaliation, collective retaliation, retaliation beyond actual damage and compulsory compensation. While developing countries want to reform the retaliation system in order to boost the trust in the WTO dispute settlement system, the ongoing Doha Round is threatening to increase states’ skepticism in multilateral systems.

I believe that despite the shortcomings of the retaliation system, it is a system to build on. Some of the proposals presented in the paper are, in my opinion, worth further development. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Berglund, Anna LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
A bittersweet revenge - The possibility of retaliation in the WTO dispute settlement system from the developing countries' perspective
course
JURM02 20171
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
Folkrätt, utrikeshandelsrätt, WTO, tvistlösningssystem, vedergällning
language
Swedish
id
8908582
date added to LUP
2017-06-07 17:28:46
date last changed
2017-06-07 17:28:46
@misc{8908582,
  abstract     = {The World Trade Organization was formed in 1995 and has since been working to increase trade between states by reducing trade barriers. In order to enforce the WTO law, the WTO has its own dispute settlement system. The dispute settlement system is in theory providing developing countries and developed countries the same opportunity to challenge national regulations. However, there are in practice major differences between developing and developed countries in the use of the dispute settlement system. This paper aims to investigate how the retaliation system works and how it affects developing countries’ use of the dispute settlement system.

WTO’s dispute settlement system lacks real sanctions when a state is found to violate WTO agreements. The only and final sanction is the implementation of the panels’ and AB’s recommendations. However, for a state injured by the unauthorized regulation there is the possibility of exerting pressure by retaliating in accordance with article 22 of the DSU. Retaliation means that a complaining state, affected by the unlawful act of another state, is allowed to revenge on the respondent state by for example raising tariffs for the respondent state’s export goods.

The retaliation system has received much criticism, especially from developing countries. It has been found that the system with retaliation is an ineffective means of pressure for developing countries. In cases where a developing country with limited resources is facing a major developed country, the economic cost of retaliation can sometimes be greater than the gain of the same. In the disputes initiated in the WTO, and that are presented in this paper, it is rare that a developing country has retaliated.

As the retaliation system is considered to provide different prerequisite for developing countries and developed countries to exert pressure against a responding state, several proposals have been made to change the retaliation system. The main proposals are highlighted and discussed in this paper, namely cross-retaliation, collective retaliation, retaliation beyond actual damage and compulsory compensation. While developing countries want to reform the retaliation system in order to boost the trust in the WTO dispute settlement system, the ongoing Doha Round is threatening to increase states’ skepticism in multilateral systems.

I believe that despite the shortcomings of the retaliation system, it is a system to build on. Some of the proposals presented in the paper are, in my opinion, worth further development.},
  author       = {Berglund, Anna},
  keyword      = {Folkrätt,utrikeshandelsrätt,WTO,tvistlösningssystem,vedergällning},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Hämnden är bitterljuv - Möjligheten att vidta vedergällning i WTO:s tvistlösningssystem sett ur utvecklingsländernas perspektiv},
  year         = {2017},
}