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I en rättslig limbo - Om uteslutandeklausulerna i flyktingrätten och förhållandet till principer inom mänskliga rättigheter samt det straffrättsliga förfarandet

Svensson, Sanne LU (2017) JURM02 20171
Department of Law
Abstract
Article 1F in the Refugee Convention constitutes one of the so called exclusions clauses from the possibility to be recognized as a refugee and hence obtain international protection. The Article excludes asylum seekers who are suspected for serious crimes, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity, if there are serious reasons for considering that the person has committed the alleged crime. This regulation corresponds to chapter 4, articles 2 b-c §§ in the Swedish Aliens Act.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the connection between the refugee law, principles of human rights, the international criminal law and the Swedish criminal law when it comes to the exclusion clauses. As mentioned, the Refugee Convention excludes... (More)
Article 1F in the Refugee Convention constitutes one of the so called exclusions clauses from the possibility to be recognized as a refugee and hence obtain international protection. The Article excludes asylum seekers who are suspected for serious crimes, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity, if there are serious reasons for considering that the person has committed the alleged crime. This regulation corresponds to chapter 4, articles 2 b-c §§ in the Swedish Aliens Act.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the connection between the refugee law, principles of human rights, the international criminal law and the Swedish criminal law when it comes to the exclusion clauses. As mentioned, the Refugee Convention excludes persons when there is a serious reason for considering that the person has committed any of the crimes in Article 1F. However, in a criminal procedure it has to be established beyond reasonable doubt that the same person has committed the same crime otherwise the person cannot be held liable in a trial. Consequently, a person can be excluded from international protection because there is a serious reason for considering that the person has committed a crime that is covered in Article 1F. However in court the evidence may not be sufficiently comprehensive to establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt. This despite the suspicion being the reason the person got excluded from the very beginning and in addition being the source for the expulsion order. The international refugee law is further constructed in a way that, with respect to principles in human rights, there can be circumstances that prevents an expulsion order to be executed. This means that the individual ends up in a form of legal limbo.

In the light of the problem described above, this thesis aims to investigate the reasons for the possible perceived paradox between the various evidence-requirements in the refugee law and the criminal law. The thesis also aims to make an assessment of whether this perceived paradox can be justified on the basis of the underlying reasons for the regulations as well as of two explanatory models: natural law and legal positivism.

In the last chapter I conclude that the different standard of proof in the two regulations does not necessarily have opposing purposes but rather, albeit from different standpoints, both regulations protect fundamental human rights. Their differences can be explained by the fact that the legal areas have developed at different rates and largely independently from each other, which has led to that the consequences have not got the attention required. In order for the interaction between the regulations to achieve the underlying purpose, it is important that the exclusion clauses are applied in a thoroughly manner under the rule of law. If the refugee law and the criminal law are applied as it is presumed to be, in combination with the principles for fundamental human rights, there is a well-established protection for individuals as well as for states. (Less)
Abstract (Swedish)
I artikel 1F flyktingkonventionen stadgas ett antal av de så kallade uteslutandeklausulerna från flyktingstatus, vilka utgör undantag från möjligheten att åtnjuta internationellt skydd för personer som uppfyller rekvisiten i flyktingdefinitionen. Artikeln utesluter asylsökande som misstänks för vissa grova brott, såsom krigsförbrytelser och brott mot mänskligheten, om det finns synnerligen anledning att anta att personen i fråga har gjort sig skyldig till den påstådda brottsligheten. I den svenska rätten motsvaras denna reglering av 4 kap. 2 b-c §§ utlänningslagen.

Denna uppsats syftar till att behandla samverkan mellan flyktingrätten, principerna för de mänskliga rättigheterna och den internationella samt nationella straffrätten när... (More)
I artikel 1F flyktingkonventionen stadgas ett antal av de så kallade uteslutandeklausulerna från flyktingstatus, vilka utgör undantag från möjligheten att åtnjuta internationellt skydd för personer som uppfyller rekvisiten i flyktingdefinitionen. Artikeln utesluter asylsökande som misstänks för vissa grova brott, såsom krigsförbrytelser och brott mot mänskligheten, om det finns synnerligen anledning att anta att personen i fråga har gjort sig skyldig till den påstådda brottsligheten. I den svenska rätten motsvaras denna reglering av 4 kap. 2 b-c §§ utlänningslagen.

Denna uppsats syftar till att behandla samverkan mellan flyktingrätten, principerna för de mänskliga rättigheterna och den internationella samt nationella straffrätten när det gäller regleringen kring uteslutandeklausulerna. Uppsatsen tar avstamp i det faktum att beviskravet för att utesluta en person enligt den flyktingrättsliga regleringen, synnerligen anledning att anta, och det straffrättsliga beviskravet för att döma samma person till ansvar för samma brott, ställt utom rimligt tvivel, skiljer sig åt. Detta får till konsekvens att en person kan uteslutas från flyktingstatus på grund av att det anses finnas synnerligen anledning att anta att personen begått något av de brott som kan föranleda uteslutning. Vid en straffrättslig process kan dock bevisningen anses vara otillräcklig för att kunna styrka brott utom rimligt tvivel. Detta trots att det är dessa misstankar som har föranlett uteslutningen från flyktingstatus och ligger till grund för att personen skall utvisas. Den internationella flyktingrätten är vidare konstruerad på ett sätt som gör att det med beaktan av principer inom mänskliga rättigheter finns omständigheter som gör att ett utvisningsbeslut inte kan verkställas. Det innebär att den enskilde hamnar i en form av rättslig limbo.

Mot bakgrund av den nyss beskrivna problematiken syftar uppsatsen vidare till att undersöka skälen för den eventuellt upplevda paradoxen mellan de olika beviskraven i den flyktingrättsliga- och den straffrättsliga regleringen samt försöka göra en bedömning av huruvida denna paradox kan motiveras med utgångspunkt i de bakomliggande skälen för regleringarna samt två förklaringsmodeller till rätten som sådan: naturrätten och rättspositivismen.

I uppsatsens avslutande kommentar presenteras slutsatsen att min uppfattning är att beviskraven i de olika regleringarna ytterst egentligen inte har motstående syften utan att de, om än från olika utgångspunkter, båda värnar om grundläggande mänskliga rättigheter. Med anledning av att rättsområdena har utvecklats i olika takt och till stor del fristående från varandra har konsekvenserna av tillämpningen inte uppmärksammats i tillräcklig omfattning. För att samverkan mellan de olika regleringarna skall resultera i att det bakomliggande syftet uppfylls är det av största vikt att uteslutanderegleringen tillämpas på ett rättssäkert och noggrant sätt. Om de flyktingrättsliga- och straffrättsliga reglementena tillämpas så som det är tänkt, i kombination med principerna kring de mänskliga rättigheterna, finns det ett väletablerat skydd för den enskilda individen såväl som staterna. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Svensson, Sanne LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
Caught in a legal limbo - The exclusion clauses in the refugee law and the relation to principles in human rights and criminal law
course
JURM02 20171
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
Flyktingrätt, Refugee law, Folkrätt, Public international law, Mänskliga rättigheter, Straffrätt, Uteslutandeklausuler, Exclusion clauses
language
Swedish
id
8908733
date added to LUP
2017-06-09 09:59:49
date last changed
2017-06-09 09:59:49
@misc{8908733,
  abstract     = {Article 1F in the Refugee Convention constitutes one of the so called exclusions clauses from the possibility to be recognized as a refugee and hence obtain international protection. The Article excludes asylum seekers who are suspected for serious crimes, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity, if there are serious reasons for considering that the person has committed the alleged crime. This regulation corresponds to chapter 4, articles 2 b-c §§ in the Swedish Aliens Act.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the connection between the refugee law, principles of human rights, the international criminal law and the Swedish criminal law when it comes to the exclusion clauses. As mentioned, the Refugee Convention excludes persons when there is a serious reason for considering that the person has committed any of the crimes in Article 1F. However, in a criminal procedure it has to be established beyond reasonable doubt that the same person has committed the same crime otherwise the person cannot be held liable in a trial. Consequently, a person can be excluded from international protection because there is a serious reason for considering that the person has committed a crime that is covered in Article 1F. However in court the evidence may not be sufficiently comprehensive to establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt. This despite the suspicion being the reason the person got excluded from the very beginning and in addition being the source for the expulsion order. The international refugee law is further constructed in a way that, with respect to principles in human rights, there can be circumstances that prevents an expulsion order to be executed. This means that the individual ends up in a form of legal limbo.

In the light of the problem described above, this thesis aims to investigate the reasons for the possible perceived paradox between the various evidence-requirements in the refugee law and the criminal law. The thesis also aims to make an assessment of whether this perceived paradox can be justified on the basis of the underlying reasons for the regulations as well as of two explanatory models: natural law and legal positivism.

In the last chapter I conclude that the different standard of proof in the two regulations does not necessarily have opposing purposes but rather, albeit from different standpoints, both regulations protect fundamental human rights. Their differences can be explained by the fact that the legal areas have developed at different rates and largely independently from each other, which has led to that the consequences have not got the attention required. In order for the interaction between the regulations to achieve the underlying purpose, it is important that the exclusion clauses are applied in a thoroughly manner under the rule of law. If the refugee law and the criminal law are applied as it is presumed to be, in combination with the principles for fundamental human rights, there is a well-established protection for individuals as well as for states.},
  author       = {Svensson, Sanne},
  keyword      = {Flyktingrätt,Refugee law,Folkrätt,Public international law,Mänskliga rättigheter,Straffrätt,Uteslutandeklausuler,Exclusion clauses},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {I en rättslig limbo - Om uteslutandeklausulerna i flyktingrätten och förhållandet till principer inom mänskliga rättigheter samt det straffrättsliga förfarandet},
  year         = {2017},
}