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En överträdelse - dubbla påföljder - Om artikel 17 marknadsmissbruksförordningen och konsekvenserna vid överträdelse

Gunnarsson, Anna LU (2017) JURM02 20171
Department of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Regleringen på aktiemarknaden grundar sig på tanken att samtliga marknadsaktörer ska behandlas lika och få tillgång till samma information samtidigt. Art. 17 MAR utgör exempel på reglering som syftar till att säkerställa denna likabehandling. Artikeln stadgar skyldighet för noterade bolag att offentliggöra insiderinformation och medger endast undantag under särskilda omständigheter. Övervakningen av noterade bolags informationsgivning sköttes fram till den 3 juli 2016 av börsen tillsammans med börsens disciplinnämnd. I och med ikraftträdandet av MAR det nämnda datumet har FI givits befogenhet att utdöma sanktioner när noterade bolag begår överträdelse av art. 17 MAR. Nyheten har dock inte inneburit att börsens disciplinnämnd numera är... (More)
Regleringen på aktiemarknaden grundar sig på tanken att samtliga marknadsaktörer ska behandlas lika och få tillgång till samma information samtidigt. Art. 17 MAR utgör exempel på reglering som syftar till att säkerställa denna likabehandling. Artikeln stadgar skyldighet för noterade bolag att offentliggöra insiderinformation och medger endast undantag under särskilda omständigheter. Övervakningen av noterade bolags informationsgivning sköttes fram till den 3 juli 2016 av börsen tillsammans med börsens disciplinnämnd. I och med ikraftträdandet av MAR det nämnda datumet har FI givits befogenhet att utdöma sanktioner när noterade bolag begår överträdelse av art. 17 MAR. Nyheten har dock inte inneburit att börsens disciplinnämnd numera är förhindrad att besluta om påföljd. Istället råder två parallellt tillämpliga sanktionssystem. Den svenska lagstiftaren har i förarbetena framhållit att detta inte utgör något problem då börsens sanktioner är civilrättsliga och inte kan jämföras med FI:s offentligrättsliga sanktioner. I uppsatsen utreds detta resonemang och en genomgång görs över vilka civilrättsliga respektive offentligrättsliga aspekter som börsens självreglering avseende informationsgivning kan tillmätas. Det visar sig att det finns flera aspekter i den nuvarande ordningen som talar för att börsens självreglering är av offentligrättslig karaktär, särskilt på grund av att det från lagstiftarens sida ställs upp krav på börsen att inneha reglering med tillhörande sanktioner vad gäller art. 17 MAR. Det nuvarande systemet undersöks även i ljuset av dubbelprövningsförbudet, så som det stadgas i EKMR och EU-stadgan. Vid beaktande av de offentligrättsliga drag som självreglering bär och på grundval av att de administrativa sanktioner som FI utdömer med stor sannolikhet utgör straff enligt förbudets mening, kan den nuvarande ordningen inte avfärdas som oproblematisk. Slutligen finns det en praktisk och reell risk för att bolag på grund av ett och samma agerande drabbas av parallella sanktioner. Systemet med parallella sanktionssystem kan därför få märkbara och ibland anmärkningsvärda praktiska konsekvenser, särskilt i situationer när de två organen är av olika uppfattningar. (Less)
Abstract
The regulations in the stock market are based on the idea that all market participants shall be treated equally and get access to the same information simultaneously. Article 17 in MAR constitutes an example of regulation that aims at ensuring equality between the market participants. According to the article, listed companies are obligated to disclose inside information and exceptions are only allowed under certain circumstances. Until the 3rd of July 2016, the Exchange together with the Exchange’s Disciplinary Committee managed the surveillance of listed companies’ disclosure of information. Since MAR came into force the mentioned date, the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority has been given the authority to impose sanctions on listed... (More)
The regulations in the stock market are based on the idea that all market participants shall be treated equally and get access to the same information simultaneously. Article 17 in MAR constitutes an example of regulation that aims at ensuring equality between the market participants. According to the article, listed companies are obligated to disclose inside information and exceptions are only allowed under certain circumstances. Until the 3rd of July 2016, the Exchange together with the Exchange’s Disciplinary Committee managed the surveillance of listed companies’ disclosure of information. Since MAR came into force the mentioned date, the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority has been given the authority to impose sanctions on listed companies when committing violation of article 17 in MAR. The novelty has however not implied that the Exchange’s Disciplinary Committee is unable to issue a ruling. Instead, two parallel systems of sanctions are applicable. The Swedish legislator has emphasized in the preparatory work that this is not a problem since the Exchange’s sanctions are categorised as civil law and cannot be compared to the public law sanctions issued by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority. In the essay this reasoning is studied and both the civil and public law aspects of the Exchange’s self-regulation concerning disclosure of information are examined. It appears that there are several aspects in the current order that indicate that the Exchange’s self-regulation is of public law character. Especially due to the fact that the legislator requires that the Exchange has self-regulation regarding article 17 in MAR and combines the regulation with sanctions. The current system is also examined in the light of the ne bis in idem principle as it is established in the ECHR and the EU Charter. After taking the public law character of the self regulation into consideration and after observing that the administrative sanctions imposed by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority with great probability are penalties within the meaning of the ne bis in idem principle, the current order cannot be dismissed as unproblematic. Finally, there is a practical and real risk that listed companies due to one action are subjected to parallel sanctions. Therefore, the system with parallel sanctions can result in noticeable and sometimes remarkable practical consequences, especially in situations where the two organs are of different opinions. (Less)
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author
Gunnarsson, Anna LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
One infringement - double sanctions - About article 17 in the market abuse regulation and the consequences of infringements
course
JURM02 20171
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
Associationsrätt, EU-rätt, Aktiemarknadsrätt
language
Swedish
id
8908826
date added to LUP
2017-06-21 11:23:16
date last changed
2017-06-21 11:23:16
@misc{8908826,
  abstract     = {The regulations in the stock market are based on the idea that all market participants shall be treated equally and get access to the same information simultaneously. Article 17 in MAR constitutes an example of regulation that aims at ensuring equality between the market participants. According to the article, listed companies are obligated to disclose inside information and exceptions are only allowed under certain circumstances. Until the 3rd of July 2016, the Exchange together with the Exchange’s Disciplinary Committee managed the surveillance of listed companies’ disclosure of information. Since MAR came into force the mentioned date, the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority has been given the authority to impose sanctions on listed companies when committing violation of article 17 in MAR. The novelty has however not implied that the Exchange’s Disciplinary Committee is unable to issue a ruling. Instead, two parallel systems of sanctions are applicable. The Swedish legislator has emphasized in the preparatory work that this is not a problem since the Exchange’s sanctions are categorised as civil law and cannot be compared to the public law sanctions issued by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority. In the essay this reasoning is studied and both the civil and public law aspects of the Exchange’s self-regulation concerning disclosure of information are examined. It appears that there are several aspects in the current order that indicate that the Exchange’s self-regulation is of public law character. Especially due to the fact that the legislator requires that the Exchange has self-regulation regarding article 17 in MAR and combines the regulation with sanctions. The current system is also examined in the light of the ne bis in idem principle as it is established in the ECHR and the EU Charter. After taking the public law character of the self regulation into consideration and after observing that the administrative sanctions imposed by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority with great probability are penalties within the meaning of the ne bis in idem principle, the current order cannot be dismissed as unproblematic. Finally, there is a practical and real risk that listed companies due to one action are subjected to parallel sanctions. Therefore, the system with parallel sanctions can result in noticeable and sometimes remarkable practical consequences, especially in situations where the two organs are of different opinions.},
  author       = {Gunnarsson, Anna},
  keyword      = {Associationsrätt,EU-rätt,Aktiemarknadsrätt},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {En överträdelse - dubbla påföljder - Om artikel 17 marknadsmissbruksförordningen och konsekvenserna vid överträdelse},
  year         = {2017},
}