The phenomenology of eye movement intentions and their disruption in goal-directed actions
(2017) KOGM20 20171Cognitive Science
- Abstract
- Many modern psychological theories still assume that humans know about themselves to a wide and accurate extent, in line with the early classical cognitive frameworks. Other competing frameworks, such as dynamic cognition, propose that intelligent behavior can arise from an interaction between the brain, body, and environment, without the need of manipulating explicitly represented knowledge-states. Intentions, i.e. the dispositions to do a specific action, are one such type of mental events that is assumed to be internally monitored to an accurate extent, and is heavily involved in theories modeling goal-directed action. The dynamic framework suggests that there is no reason to assume that humans would naturally have high introspective... (More)
- Many modern psychological theories still assume that humans know about themselves to a wide and accurate extent, in line with the early classical cognitive frameworks. Other competing frameworks, such as dynamic cognition, propose that intelligent behavior can arise from an interaction between the brain, body, and environment, without the need of manipulating explicitly represented knowledge-states. Intentions, i.e. the dispositions to do a specific action, are one such type of mental events that is assumed to be internally monitored to an accurate extent, and is heavily involved in theories modeling goal-directed action. The dynamic framework suggests that there is no reason to assume that humans would naturally have high introspective access to intentions, or are in need of them when making goal-directed actions in the first place. In this study, the extent to which we monitor eye movement intentions, i.e. the intentions to shift one’s gaze towards a specific location, and whether they can be expressed in conscious experience, is investigated. A forced-choice decision task was developed where a pair of faces moved systematically across
the screen. In some trials, the pair of faces moved additionally as soon as the participants attempted to gaze at the face which was in the front of the movement direction, such that the
participants would never see the ’front’ face within the center of their gaze. The results of the experiment suggest that humans in general do not monitor their eye movement intentions
in a way that allows for mismatches to be consciously experienced and expressed. It was also possible to bias participants into not choosing the alternative that escaped the center of
their gaze, if both faces were highly attractive, and doing so without the participants being aware of the manipulation. The results suggest that oculomotor control is another cognitive
domain that humans have low access to, and that theoretical models that assume intentions to be central in goal-directed action need to be revised. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/8936166
- author
- Roszko, Maximilian LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- KOGM20 20171
- year
- 2017
- type
- H2 - Master's Degree (Two Years)
- subject
- keywords
- cognitive science, eye movements, intentions, goal-directed actions, awareness, decision-making
- language
- English
- id
- 8936166
- date added to LUP
- 2018-05-18 10:02:23
- date last changed
- 2018-05-18 10:02:23
@misc{8936166,
abstract = {{Many modern psychological theories still assume that humans know about themselves to a wide and accurate extent, in line with the early classical cognitive frameworks. Other competing frameworks, such as dynamic cognition, propose that intelligent behavior can arise from an interaction between the brain, body, and environment, without the need of manipulating explicitly represented knowledge-states. Intentions, i.e. the dispositions to do a specific action, are one such type of mental events that is assumed to be internally monitored to an accurate extent, and is heavily involved in theories modeling goal-directed action. The dynamic framework suggests that there is no reason to assume that humans would naturally have high introspective access to intentions, or are in need of them when making goal-directed actions in the first place. In this study, the extent to which we monitor eye movement intentions, i.e. the intentions to shift one’s gaze towards a specific location, and whether they can be expressed in conscious experience, is investigated. A forced-choice decision task was developed where a pair of faces moved systematically across
the screen. In some trials, the pair of faces moved additionally as soon as the participants attempted to gaze at the face which was in the front of the movement direction, such that the
participants would never see the ’front’ face within the center of their gaze. The results of the experiment suggest that humans in general do not monitor their eye movement intentions
in a way that allows for mismatches to be consciously experienced and expressed. It was also possible to bias participants into not choosing the alternative that escaped the center of
their gaze, if both faces were highly attractive, and doing so without the participants being aware of the manipulation. The results suggest that oculomotor control is another cognitive
domain that humans have low access to, and that theoretical models that assume intentions to be central in goal-directed action need to be revised.}},
author = {{Roszko, Maximilian}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{The phenomenology of eye movement intentions and their disruption in goal-directed actions}},
year = {{2017}},
}