Rawls – naturrättsfilosof? - En studie av teorier om de grundläggande fri- och rättigheternas legitimitet
(2018) LAGF03 20182Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract
- In Sweden, the elected Riksdag is the legislator. However, the Riksdag may not pass just any law – its competence is limited by rules protecting human rights. The concept of universal human rights originates from the philosophical tradition of natural law. Natural law philosophers have argued, since Antiquity, that all humans have certain fundamental rights and liberties as a consequence of human nature, regardless of whether these rights are actually stipulated by law.
For many centuries, the natural law doctrine dominated Western legal thinking, but it was eventually questioned and criticized. Despite this, few people today seem to question the fact that the human rights doctrine limits the power of the popularly elected legislator.... (More) - In Sweden, the elected Riksdag is the legislator. However, the Riksdag may not pass just any law – its competence is limited by rules protecting human rights. The concept of universal human rights originates from the philosophical tradition of natural law. Natural law philosophers have argued, since Antiquity, that all humans have certain fundamental rights and liberties as a consequence of human nature, regardless of whether these rights are actually stipulated by law.
For many centuries, the natural law doctrine dominated Western legal thinking, but it was eventually questioned and criticized. Despite this, few people today seem to question the fact that the human rights doctrine limits the power of the popularly elected legislator. Against this background, I wish to examine if the derogation of democracy in the name of human rights can be justified without natural law argumentation. I will do this by examining whether one of the most influential modern theories of justice, proposed by the American philosopher John Rawls, is an example of such a doctrine.
Rawls argues that fundamental rights and liberties for all are a prerequisite of a fair and just society. However, his justification of this differs from that of traditional natural law thinkers. Rawls claims that basic liberties are a principle which people would have chosen in a hypothetical social contract scenario, where they lacked knowledge of their own position in society and therefore could not simply opt for a social contract benefitting themselves. Rawls argues that any rational person would have made this choice, because it would benefit us all in capacity of free, rational individuals and would enable us to achieve our respective goals and aspirations in life. I argue that this line of thought is in fact an example of natural law philosophy as its claims to rights presupposes a certain conception of human nature. Rawls himself denies this – a paradox that I discuss elaborately in this paper. (Less) - Abstract (Swedish)
- I Sverige stiftar den folkvalda riksdagen lag. Riksdagen får dock inte stifta vilka lagar den vill – dess kompetens inskränks av regler till skydd för mänskliga rättigheter. Idén om universella mänskliga rättigheter kommer från den så kallade naturrättsläran. Naturrättstänkare har sedan antiken argumenterat för att alla människor har vissa grundläggande fri- och rättigheter, oavsett om dessa stiftats i lag, eftersom detta följer av människans natur.
Naturrättsläran var under många århundraden helt förhärskande bland jurister och rättsfilosofer, men kom sedermera att ifrågasättas och kritiseras. Trots det är det i dag få som ifrågasätter att mänskliga rättigheter inskränker den folkvalda lagstiftarens handlingsutrymme. Mot denna bakgrund... (More) - I Sverige stiftar den folkvalda riksdagen lag. Riksdagen får dock inte stifta vilka lagar den vill – dess kompetens inskränks av regler till skydd för mänskliga rättigheter. Idén om universella mänskliga rättigheter kommer från den så kallade naturrättsläran. Naturrättstänkare har sedan antiken argumenterat för att alla människor har vissa grundläggande fri- och rättigheter, oavsett om dessa stiftats i lag, eftersom detta följer av människans natur.
Naturrättsläran var under många århundraden helt förhärskande bland jurister och rättsfilosofer, men kom sedermera att ifrågasättas och kritiseras. Trots det är det i dag få som ifrågasätter att mänskliga rättigheter inskränker den folkvalda lagstiftarens handlingsutrymme. Mot denna bakgrund vill jag i den här uppsatsen undersöka om de mänskliga rättigheternas inskränkning av demokratin kan legitimeras utan naturrättslig argumentation. Det gör jag genom att pröva om en av efterkrigstidens mest uppmärksammade normativa rättviseteorier, som formulerades av den amerikanske filosofen John Rawls, är ett möjligt exempel på en sådan lära.
Rawls menar att grundläggande fri- och rättigheter för alla människor är en förutsättning för ett rättvist samhälle. Han motiverar detta lite annorlunda än traditionella naturrättstänkare. Rawls hänvisar till att detta är en princip som människor hade valt i en fiktiv kontraktssituation om de saknat kunskap om sin egen position i samhället och därför inte kunnat styras av egenintresse. Att alla människor hade valt på det viset beror enligt Rawls på att detta är vad alla människor i egenskap av fria och rationella individer skulle tjäna på och som skulle möjliggöra för dem att förverkliga sina olika livsmål. Jag argumenterar i uppsatsen för att detta resonemang i praktiken är naturrättsligt, eftersom rättighetsanspråken bygger på en viss filosofisk övertygelse om människans natur. Rawls själv förnekar att han utgår från en sådan övertygelse – en paradox jag diskuterar närmare i uppsatsen. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/8965526
- author
- Madunic Olsson, Oskar LU
- supervisor
-
- Karol Nowak LU
- organization
- course
- LAGF03 20182
- year
- 2018
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- allmän rättslära, mänskliga rättigheter, Rawls
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 8965526
- date added to LUP
- 2019-03-11 11:20:40
- date last changed
- 2019-03-11 11:20:40
@misc{8965526,
abstract = {{In Sweden, the elected Riksdag is the legislator. However, the Riksdag may not pass just any law – its competence is limited by rules protecting human rights. The concept of universal human rights originates from the philosophical tradition of natural law. Natural law philosophers have argued, since Antiquity, that all humans have certain fundamental rights and liberties as a consequence of human nature, regardless of whether these rights are actually stipulated by law.
For many centuries, the natural law doctrine dominated Western legal thinking, but it was eventually questioned and criticized. Despite this, few people today seem to question the fact that the human rights doctrine limits the power of the popularly elected legislator. Against this background, I wish to examine if the derogation of democracy in the name of human rights can be justified without natural law argumentation. I will do this by examining whether one of the most influential modern theories of justice, proposed by the American philosopher John Rawls, is an example of such a doctrine.
Rawls argues that fundamental rights and liberties for all are a prerequisite of a fair and just society. However, his justification of this differs from that of traditional natural law thinkers. Rawls claims that basic liberties are a principle which people would have chosen in a hypothetical social contract scenario, where they lacked knowledge of their own position in society and therefore could not simply opt for a social contract benefitting themselves. Rawls argues that any rational person would have made this choice, because it would benefit us all in capacity of free, rational individuals and would enable us to achieve our respective goals and aspirations in life. I argue that this line of thought is in fact an example of natural law philosophy as its claims to rights presupposes a certain conception of human nature. Rawls himself denies this – a paradox that I discuss elaborately in this paper.}},
author = {{Madunic Olsson, Oskar}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Rawls – naturrättsfilosof? - En studie av teorier om de grundläggande fri- och rättigheternas legitimitet}},
year = {{2018}},
}