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Den provocerades straffrättsliga ansvar vid provokativa åtgärder - En studie i ljuset av Europadomstolens praxis

Nilsson, Gustav LU (2019) JURM02 20191
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract
The use of entrapment within the law enforcement in Sweden is not a new phenomenon. Despite this, the legal position was not established concerning the use of entrapment and the criminal consequences for a long time. There are two types of entrapment, inducing someone to commit a crime and inducing someone to expose evidence of an earlier or ongoing crime. These two types have no legal definitions in statutory law, why it is often hard to separate them only by their definitions. In general, it is often considered prohibited to induce someone committing a crime, while it is permitted inducing someone to expose evidence. However, to distinguish the types in this way is not sufficient. Instead, the decisive factor whether the entrapment is... (More)
The use of entrapment within the law enforcement in Sweden is not a new phenomenon. Despite this, the legal position was not established concerning the use of entrapment and the criminal consequences for a long time. There are two types of entrapment, inducing someone to commit a crime and inducing someone to expose evidence of an earlier or ongoing crime. These two types have no legal definitions in statutory law, why it is often hard to separate them only by their definitions. In general, it is often considered prohibited to induce someone committing a crime, while it is permitted inducing someone to expose evidence. However, to distinguish the types in this way is not sufficient. Instead, the decisive factor whether the entrapment is permitted or not is how it has been carried out in the particular case.

For a long time, Swedish courts have been reluctant to remark the entrapment during the meting out of punishment. Though, because of the precedents from the European Court of Human Rights the view of the matter has changed, and Swedish courts are obliged to remark if the entrapment has led to a violation of article 6 ECHR and the right to a fair trial. The thesis therefore examines how Swedish law deal with the criminal liability of a person who is subject to the different types of entrapment in the light of the lack of a clear distinction between the two. Furthermore, it examines how this distinction corresponds to article 6 ECHR. In this matter it has been shown that judgments from Swedish courts regarding the criminal liability is entirely based on the precedents of the European Court of Human Rights.

Regarding the entrapment of inducing someone to commit a crime the most important judgment is Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal. Later judgments have repeatedly referred to this. A great matter for the assessment of the criminal liability is whether the provocateur has actively induced or otherwise incited the person to commit a crime, or if the provocateur only acted in a passive matter without influence. Therefore, the question to be answered is if the crime would have been committed if the entrapment never took place. Beside the entrapped evidence the court has stated that there need to be other evidence in the trial and the entrapment procedure must be strictly documented. If the court in the light of all considerations concludes that the crime would not have occurred without the entrapment the result is that the suspect right from the outset has definitely been deprived of a fair trial, meaning there is a breach of article 6. With the judgment NJA 2007 s. 1037 the Swedish legal position was changed as the Supreme Court interpreted the precedents of the European Court of Human Rights as domestic courts must be able to disrupt a trial and leave the prosecution without approval if the right to a fair trial has been effectively undermined. That means that the presence of entrapment is treated as the requisites to hold the prosecuted responsible is not attained. In case the entrapment is less severe and therefore not effectively undermines the right to a fair trial, there may still be grounds for considering the entrapment as a mitigating circumstance which could lead to a remission of sanction.

Swedish precedents are at large consistent with the ones of the European Court of Human Rights when it comes to the other type of entrapment, concerning inducement to expose evidence. The decisive factor for the legal consequences of such entrapment is how it has been carried out and whether the evidence was obtained in an extremely undue manner. If so, it has been shown that also this type of entrapment can lead to a breach of article 6 ECHR. The fundamental circumstance to the assessment of whether the evidence was obtained in an extremely undue manner is the voluntary nature of the information provided. Thus, the suspect must not have been in a particularly stressful situation where he has suffered serious pressure from the provocateur.

Lastly it is concluded that entrapment in many cases includes elements of both types, why the boundary of what constitutes one or the other is often hard to draw. Therefore, to determine the permissibility, it is not the designation of the method that is essential. The decisive factor is how the entrapment was actually carried out in the individual case. (Less)
Abstract (Swedish)
Förekomsten av provokativa åtgärder inom ramen för polisens brottsbekämpande verksamhet är ingen ny företeelse. Trots detta har rättsläget gällande användandet och dess straffrättsliga konsekvenser länge varit osäkert. Provokativa åtgärder innefattar det som brukar benämnas brotts- respektive bevisprovokation. Dessa begrepp saknar lagreglerade definitioner, varför det ofta är svårt att rent begreppsmässigt göra en gränsdragning mellan dem båda. I allmänhet brukar det sägas att brottsprovokation är otillåtet medan bevisprovokation är tillåtet. En sådan generell gränsdragning är dock inte tillräcklig, utan det avgörande för huruvida provokationen är tillåten eller inte är snarare hur den rent faktiskt har genomförts i det enskilda fallet.

... (More)
Förekomsten av provokativa åtgärder inom ramen för polisens brottsbekämpande verksamhet är ingen ny företeelse. Trots detta har rättsläget gällande användandet och dess straffrättsliga konsekvenser länge varit osäkert. Provokativa åtgärder innefattar det som brukar benämnas brotts- respektive bevisprovokation. Dessa begrepp saknar lagreglerade definitioner, varför det ofta är svårt att rent begreppsmässigt göra en gränsdragning mellan dem båda. I allmänhet brukar det sägas att brottsprovokation är otillåtet medan bevisprovokation är tillåtet. En sådan generell gränsdragning är dock inte tillräcklig, utan det avgörande för huruvida provokationen är tillåten eller inte är snarare hur den rent faktiskt har genomförts i det enskilda fallet.

Länge har svenska domstolar haft en restriktiv hållning mot att beakta förekomsten av provokativa åtgärder vid straffmätningen. Mot bakgrund av Europadomstolens praxis har synen däremot ändrats och svenska domstolar är numera skyldiga att bedöma huruvida provokationen strider mot artikel 6 EKMR om rätten till en rättvis rättegång. I framställningen utreds därför hur svenskt rätt behandlar den provocerades ansvar vid förekomsten av brotts- respektive bevisprovokation i avsaknaden av en klar gränsdragning mellan dem båda, samt hur denna gränsdragning förhåller sig till artikel 6 EKMR om rätten till en rättvis rättegång. Det har här visat sig att svenska domstolars bedömning av den provocerades ansvar är helt baserad på Europadomstolens praxis.

I fråga om brottsprovokation konstateras tidigt att avgörandet Teixeira de Castro mot Portugal är det vägledande avgörandet som det senare återkommande hänvisats till. En fråga som spelar stor roll för bedömningen är huruvida provokatören aktivt provocerat och därigenom verkat för att brott ska begås eller ifall denne endast agerat passivt och utan påtryckningar. Det avgörande är alltså om brottet skulle ha begåtts även om provokationen aldrig hade ägt rum. Förutom bevisningen som provoceras fram ställs även upp ett krav på annan stödbevisning samt tillräcklig dokumentation. Om domstolen efter en helhetsbedömning av förfarandet konstaterar att provokatören faktiskt provocerat fram ett brott som annars inte hade begåtts, innebär det att den provocerade redan från början definitivt berövats rätten till en rättvis rättegång, varför brott mot artikel 6 EKMR föreligger. Med avgörandet NJA 2007 s. 1037 ändrades det svenska rättsläget då HD tolkade Europa- domstolens praxis som att nationella domstolar, ifall rätten till en rättvis rättegång blivit oåterkalleligen undergrävd, måste ha möjlighet att avbryta förfarandet och lämna åtalet utan bifall. Det sagda innebär att förekomsten av provokationen då behandlas som en bristande materiell straffbarhetsbetingelse. Om provokationen däremot inte anses ha oåterkalleligen undergrävt rätten till rättvis rättegång kan det ändå finnas skäl att beakta provokationen som en förmildrande omständighet vid påföljdsbestämningen med den yttersta konsekvensen att påföljdseftergift meddelas.

Även vad gäller bevisprovokationer stämmer svensk praxis i hög grad överens med Europadomstolen. Det avgörande för den rättsliga följden vid en bevisprovokation är hur provokationen rent faktiskt har utförts och om bevisningen därigenom inhämtats på ett ytterst otillbörligt sätt. Om så är fallet har det visat sig att även bevisprovokationer kan anses strida mot rätten till rättvis rättegång i artikel 6 EKMR. Det som framstår som det mest centrala för bedömningen av om bevisningen inhämtats på ett ytterst otillbörligt sätt är frivilligheten i lämnandet av informationen. Den provocerade får alltså inte ha befunnit sig i en särskilt pressande situation där denne utstått allvarliga påtryckningar från provokatören.

Avslutningsvis konstateras att den provokativa åtgärden i många fall kan innefatta inslag av såväl bevis- som brottsprovokation, varför gräns- dragningen av vad som utgör det ena eller andra ofta är svår att dra. För att avgöra tillåtligheten är det därför inte benämningen på metoden som är väsentlig. Det avgörande är alltså hur den provokativa åtgärden rent faktiskt utförts i det enskilda fallet. (Less)
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author
Nilsson, Gustav LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
The criminal liability of entrapment - A study in the lights of the precedents of the European Court of Human Rights
course
JURM02 20191
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
Straffrätt, Criminal law, Provokativa åtgärder, Brottsprovokation, Bevisprovokation, Provokation, Teixeira de Castro, Europadomstolen, EKMR, Rätten till en rättvis rättegång, Artikel 6
language
Swedish
id
8976825
date added to LUP
2019-06-17 14:25:14
date last changed
2019-06-17 14:25:14
@misc{8976825,
  abstract     = {The use of entrapment within the law enforcement in Sweden is not a new phenomenon. Despite this, the legal position was not established concerning the use of entrapment and the criminal consequences for a long time. There are two types of entrapment, inducing someone to commit a crime and inducing someone to expose evidence of an earlier or ongoing crime. These two types have no legal definitions in statutory law, why it is often hard to separate them only by their definitions. In general, it is often considered prohibited to induce someone committing a crime, while it is permitted inducing someone to expose evidence. However, to distinguish the types in this way is not sufficient. Instead, the decisive factor whether the entrapment is permitted or not is how it has been carried out in the particular case.

For a long time, Swedish courts have been reluctant to remark the entrapment during the meting out of punishment. Though, because of the precedents from the European Court of Human Rights the view of the matter has changed, and Swedish courts are obliged to remark if the entrapment has led to a violation of article 6 ECHR and the right to a fair trial. The thesis therefore examines how Swedish law deal with the criminal liability of a person who is subject to the different types of entrapment in the light of the lack of a clear distinction between the two. Furthermore, it examines how this distinction corresponds to article 6 ECHR. In this matter it has been shown that judgments from Swedish courts regarding the criminal liability is entirely based on the precedents of the European Court of Human Rights.

Regarding the entrapment of inducing someone to commit a crime the most important judgment is Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal. Later judgments have repeatedly referred to this. A great matter for the assessment of the criminal liability is whether the provocateur has actively induced or otherwise incited the person to commit a crime, or if the provocateur only acted in a passive matter without influence. Therefore, the question to be answered is if the crime would have been committed if the entrapment never took place. Beside the entrapped evidence the court has stated that there need to be other evidence in the trial and the entrapment procedure must be strictly documented. If the court in the light of all considerations concludes that the crime would not have occurred without the entrapment the result is that the suspect right from the outset has definitely been deprived of a fair trial, meaning there is a breach of article 6. With the judgment NJA 2007 s. 1037 the Swedish legal position was changed as the Supreme Court interpreted the precedents of the European Court of Human Rights as domestic courts must be able to disrupt a trial and leave the prosecution without approval if the right to a fair trial has been effectively undermined. That means that the presence of entrapment is treated as the requisites to hold the prosecuted responsible is not attained. In case the entrapment is less severe and therefore not effectively undermines the right to a fair trial, there may still be grounds for considering the entrapment as a mitigating circumstance which could lead to a remission of sanction.

Swedish precedents are at large consistent with the ones of the European Court of Human Rights when it comes to the other type of entrapment, concerning inducement to expose evidence. The decisive factor for the legal consequences of such entrapment is how it has been carried out and whether the evidence was obtained in an extremely undue manner. If so, it has been shown that also this type of entrapment can lead to a breach of article 6 ECHR. The fundamental circumstance to the assessment of whether the evidence was obtained in an extremely undue manner is the voluntary nature of the information provided. Thus, the suspect must not have been in a particularly stressful situation where he has suffered serious pressure from the provocateur.

Lastly it is concluded that entrapment in many cases includes elements of both types, why the boundary of what constitutes one or the other is often hard to draw. Therefore, to determine the permissibility, it is not the designation of the method that is essential. The decisive factor is how the entrapment was actually carried out in the individual case.},
  author       = {Nilsson, Gustav},
  keyword      = {Straffrätt,Criminal law,Provokativa åtgärder,Brottsprovokation,Bevisprovokation,Provokation,Teixeira de Castro,Europadomstolen,EKMR,Rätten till en rättvis rättegång,Artikel 6},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Den provocerades straffrättsliga ansvar vid provokativa åtgärder - En studie i ljuset av Europadomstolens praxis},
  year         = {2019},
}