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Grundlagsstadgade rättigheter som hinder för erkännande och verkställighet av utländska avgöranden i Sverige

Westermann, Anneli LU (2019) JURM02 20191
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
De svenska grundlagarna innehåller rättigheter som anger ramen för det offentliga maktutövandet. Över tid har rättigheterna gått från att rikta sig främst till lagstiftaren, till att i större och större grad genomsyra rättstillämpningen. Inom den internationella privat- och processrätten kan en domstol ibland inte acceptera ett utländskt avgörande om det strider mot grundläggande värderingar. Detta kan grunda sig dels i att en rättighetsstadga direkt föreskriver att ett erkännande eller en verkställighet av en dom som strider emot rättighetsstadgan även utgör ett brott mot stadgan, dels i att rättighetsstadgans rättigheter gör sig gällande inom ramen för ordre public. Ordre public-förbehållet innebär ofta att erkännande eller... (More)
De svenska grundlagarna innehåller rättigheter som anger ramen för det offentliga maktutövandet. Över tid har rättigheterna gått från att rikta sig främst till lagstiftaren, till att i större och större grad genomsyra rättstillämpningen. Inom den internationella privat- och processrätten kan en domstol ibland inte acceptera ett utländskt avgörande om det strider mot grundläggande värderingar. Detta kan grunda sig dels i att en rättighetsstadga direkt föreskriver att ett erkännande eller en verkställighet av en dom som strider emot rättighetsstadgan även utgör ett brott mot stadgan, dels i att rättighetsstadgans rättigheter gör sig gällande inom ramen för ordre public. Ordre public-förbehållet innebär ofta att erkännande eller verkställighet inte får ske om det skulle strida emot grunderna för den inhemska rättsordningen.

Syftet med detta arbete är att förstå hur den svenska grundlagen inverkar på den svenska internationella privat- och processrätten, genom att ligga till grund för en domstols vägran att erkänna eller verkställa ett utländskt förmögenhetsrättsligt avgörande. Inom ramen för detta utreder jag hur regeringsformen (RF) kan tillämpas som självständig vägransgrund, och hur den kan göras gällande inom ramen för ordre public. För att möjliggöra detta undersöker jag hur RF:s rättigheter tillämpas inom civilrätten och drar paralleller till hur andra rättighetsstadgor har tillämpats som självständig vägransgrund och inom ramen för ordre public.

Rättighetskatalogen i RF innehåller absoluta rättigheter som bara kan inskränkas genom en grundlagsändring och relativa rättigheter som kan inskränkas genom lag. Rättigheterna gäller emellan staten och enskilda och aktualiseras i rättstillämpningen genom normprövningen i 11 kap. 14 § RF. Normprövningen ålägger domstolarna att i enskilda fall åsidosätta lagar som strider emot överordnade normer, såsom grundlagar och Europakonventionen (EKMR). Vidare har Högsta domstolen (HD) i flera fall utdömt skadestånd baserat endast på rättighetskatalogens rättigheter, då rättigheterna gav uttryck för en allmän rättsgrundsats att överträdelser från statens sida skulle vara skadeståndsgrundande. Det har även förts diskussioner om RF kan tillämpas enskilda emellan. Enligt ett sådant resonemang skulle RF ha inverkan på enskildas rättsförhållanden genom att domstolar vore bundna av rättigheterna, till exempel vid genomdrivandet av enskildas förpliktelser. En sådan tillämpning av regeringsformen har emellertid undantagits genom förarbetena. Trots detta har i doktrinen diskuterats att rättigheterna i viss mån ändå har inverkan på privaträtten genom pactum turpe som förhindrar domstolen från att genomdriva osedliga avtal.

Europadomstolen har i bland annat Pellegrini konstaterat att en konventionsslutande stat begår ett brott mot konventionen om statens domstol erkänner eller verkställer ett avgörande som strider mot EKMR. Detta uttrycks genom att den inhemska domstolen har en undersökningsplikt och måste säkerställa att domen uppfyller konventionens krav. Det har förts en diskussion om EU-stadgan ställer upp en liknande skyldighet som EKMR. EU-domstolen har dock inom privaträtten ännu inte tillämpat EU-stadgan på så sätt. Däremot har EU-stadgan direkt aktualiserats vid överlämnande av enskilda baserat på europeiska arresteringsorder, och samma möjlighet torde finnas gällande privaträttsliga avgöranden.

Svenskt ordre public ska prövas ex officio av domstolar och aktualiseras inom ordre public-förbehåll dels i skriven rätt i till exempel lagar som införlivar konventioner, dels som oskriven rättsgrundsats. På grund av sin restriktiva natur tillämpas det dock mycket sällan i svenska domstolar. Mest noterbart utreder HD i NJA 1998 s. 817 huruvida yttrandefriheten och meddelarfriheten kunde hindra verkställighet av en norsk skadeståndsdom. Trots att domen i fallet verkställdes konstaterade HD att rättigheterna kan utgöra del av grunderna för rättsordningen.

EU-domstolen har i flera rättsfall fyllt ut ordre public-bestämmelsen i Bryssel Ia-förordningen med EKMR:s och EU-stadgans rättigheter, särskilt de processuella rättigheterna i artikel 6 EKMR och artikel 47 EU-stadgan. Emellertid förskriver den i Krombach uppställda principen att rättigheterna måste härstamma ur gemensamma konstitutionella traditioner och internationella rättighetsstadgor.

Gällande grundlagarna som självständig vägransgrund menar jag att diskussionen kring EKMR och EU-stadgan som självständig vägransgrund kan överföras till RF. Min slutsats är därför att de svenska grundlagarna kan utgöra en självständig vägransgrund, även mot bakgrund av den generella utvecklingen som RF har haft inom rättstillämpningen. Normprövningen i 11 kap. 14 § RF skulle kunna innebära en skyldighet för domstolar att pröva erkännandet eller verkställigheten av ett avgörande emot direkt tillämpliga rättigheter. Om domstolen finner att lagen föreskriver ett erkännande eller en verkställighet i strid med rättigheterna får lagen inte tillämpas i det fallet, vilket innebär att erkännande eller verkställighet inte får ske.

Min slutsats gällande ordre public är att grundläggande rättigheter ur RF fyller ut svensk ordre public. Rättigheterna ger uttryck för vilka värden som ses som så viktiga att de utgör konstitutionella principer och därför innefattas i grunderna för rättsordningen. Denna tillämpning av rättigheterna stöds också av hur rättigheterna ger uttryck för en allmän rättsgrundsats att staten ska ersätta enskilda vid en rättighetskränkning och att avtal som anses osedliga inte får genomdrivas i domstol på grund av pactum turpe. Rättigheter som är särskilda för RF kan dock inte ligga till grund för en vägran att erkänna eller verkställa ett avgörande inom ramen för den EU-rättsliga internationella privat- och processrätten, då EU-domstolen har begränsat det EU-rättsliga ordre public-förbehållet genom Krombach och efterföljande fall. (Less)
Abstract
The Swedish constitution contains rights that set the frames within which the public power acts. Over time, the rights have gone from mainly addressing the legislator to affecting the adjudication in individual cases more and more. In the area of private international law, a court cannot recognise or enforce a foreign judgment if it infringes fundamental values. This might be the case if a charter of rights directly prescribes that the act of recognising or enforcing a foreign judgment that is in breach with the charter, also constitutes a breach in itself. Furthermore, the rights of a charter can be applied in the context of public policy. The public policy preclusion usually prevents recognition or enforcement of foreign judgments if it... (More)
The Swedish constitution contains rights that set the frames within which the public power acts. Over time, the rights have gone from mainly addressing the legislator to affecting the adjudication in individual cases more and more. In the area of private international law, a court cannot recognise or enforce a foreign judgment if it infringes fundamental values. This might be the case if a charter of rights directly prescribes that the act of recognising or enforcing a foreign judgment that is in breach with the charter, also constitutes a breach in itself. Furthermore, the rights of a charter can be applied in the context of public policy. The public policy preclusion usually prevents recognition or enforcement of foreign judgments if it would be contrary to the foundations of the Swedish legal order.

The purpose of this work is to understand how the Swedish constitution affects Swedish private international law by forming the basis for a court’s refusal to recognise or enforce a foreign judgment in the area of commercial law. More closely, I will examine how the Swedish Instrument of Government (RF) can be used as an independent ground for refusal, and how it can be applied in the framework of public policy.

The catalogue of rights in RF consists of absolute rights that can only be restricted through a change in the constitution, and relative rights that can be restricted through ordinary statutes. The rights apply to the relationship between the state and the individual and occur in the adjudication through the judicial review found in Ch. 11 Art. 14 RF. The judicial review requires the courts in individual cases to set aside statutes that go against norms of a higher rank, such as the constitution or the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Furthermore, the Supreme Court (HD) has in numerous cases allowed an individual damages based solely on the rights in the catalogue, since the rights contain a general principle that infringements by the state should allow for reparation.

Furthermore, there have been discussions concerning if the rights in RF can be applied between individuals. If such a usage were allowed, the rights would affect the relationships of individuals through that the courts are bound by the constitution while enforcing contracts, for example. However, such an application has been excluded through the travaux préparatoires of the constitution. Despite this, some legal scholars are of the opinion that the rights still affect commercial law, for example through the institute of pactum turpe, which prevents the court from enforcing immoral contracts.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has in Pellegrini, among others, concluded that if a court of a party state recognises or enforces a judgment that infringes the convention, this also constitutes an infringement by the party state itself. This is expressed through that the state has a duty to assess the judgment and must make sure that it fulfils the requirements of the convention. It has been discussed if the EU Charter of fundamental rights (EU Charter) puts up a similar requirement as the ECHR. However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has not yet interpreted the EU Charter this way in the area of commercial law. Nevertheless, the EU Charter has been found directly applicable in the area of European arrest warrants, and the same possibility should exist regarding commercial judgments.

The Swedish public policy exception is applied in written law in statutes that incorporate conventions, as well as existing as an unwritten principle. Swedish public policy shall be assessed ex officio by courts. Because of its restrictive nature, the public policy exception is seldom used in Swedish courts. Most notably, in NJA 1998 s. 817, HD examined if the freedom of speech and the right of individuals to communicate information and intelligence for the purpose of publication in mass media could prevent the enforcement of a Norwegian judgment concerning damages. Even if the judgment was enforced in this particular case, the Supreme court admitted that the foundations of the legal order can contain constitutional rights.

The CJEU has in numerous judgments interpreted the public policy rule in the Brussels I bis Regulation to contain the rights of the ECHR and the EU Charter, especially the procedural rights in article 6 ECHR and article 47 EU Charter. However, according to the principle laid down in the ECtHR case Krombach, the applied rights can only originate from the mutual constitutional traditions of the member states and international charters.

Concerning the Swedish constitution as an individual ground for refusal, I am of the opinion that the discussion about the ECHR and the EU Charter can be applied also to RF. My conclusion is therefore that the Swedish constitution can indeed be used as an individual ground for refusal. This view is also backed by the general development of the Swedish constitution in adjudication. The judicial review in Ch. 11 Art. 14 RF could encompass an obligation for courts to examine if a statute that prescribes recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment goes against directly applicable fundamental rights. If the court finds that a statute requires recognition or enforcement contrary to the rights, the state cannot be applied in the case and recognition or enforcement cannot take place.

My conclusion regarding public policy is that fundamental rights from RF are present in the Swedish public policy. The rights express which values are so important that they are constitutional principles and therefore are part of the foundations of the legal order. This interpretation is also supported by how the Supreme court has interpreted some rights to include a principle that damages are awarded if the state infringes an individual’s rights, and by the principles that prevent the court from enforcing immoral contracts. However, rights that are unique for RF cannot prevent recognition or enforcement of a judgment in the context of the European private international law. This is because the CJEU has restricted the public policy exception through Krombach and following cases. (Less)
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author
Westermann, Anneli LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
Constitutional rights as an obstacle for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Sweden
course
JURM02 20191
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
EU-rätt, statsrätt, internationell privaträtt, grundlag, regeringsformen, EKMR
language
Swedish
id
8976863
date added to LUP
2019-06-11 17:31:25
date last changed
2019-06-11 17:31:25
@misc{8976863,
  abstract     = {The Swedish constitution contains rights that set the frames within which the public power acts. Over time, the rights have gone from mainly addressing the legislator to affecting the adjudication in individual cases more and more. In the area of private international law, a court cannot recognise or enforce a foreign judgment if it infringes fundamental values. This might be the case if a charter of rights directly prescribes that the act of recognising or enforcing a foreign judgment that is in breach with the charter, also constitutes a breach in itself. Furthermore, the rights of a charter can be applied in the context of public policy. The public policy preclusion usually prevents recognition or enforcement of foreign judgments if it would be contrary to the foundations of the Swedish legal order. 

The purpose of this work is to understand how the Swedish constitution affects Swedish private international law by forming the basis for a court’s refusal to recognise or enforce a foreign judgment in the area of commercial law. More closely, I will examine how the Swedish Instrument of Government (RF) can be used as an independent ground for refusal, and how it can be applied in the framework of public policy. 

The catalogue of rights in RF consists of absolute rights that can only be restricted through a change in the constitution, and relative rights that can be restricted through ordinary statutes. The rights apply to the relationship between the state and the individual and occur in the adjudication through the judicial review found in Ch. 11 Art. 14 RF. The judicial review requires the courts in individual cases to set aside statutes that go against norms of a higher rank, such as the constitution or the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Furthermore, the Supreme Court (HD) has in numerous cases allowed an individual damages based solely on the rights in the catalogue, since the rights contain a general principle that infringements by the state should allow for reparation. 

Furthermore, there have been discussions concerning if the rights in RF can be applied between individuals. If such a usage were allowed, the rights would affect the relationships of individuals through that the courts are bound by the constitution while enforcing contracts, for example. However, such an application has been excluded through the travaux préparatoires of the constitution. Despite this, some legal scholars are of the opinion that the rights still affect commercial law, for example through the institute of pactum turpe, which prevents the court from enforcing immoral contracts. 

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has in Pellegrini, among others, concluded that if a court of a party state recognises or enforces a judgment that infringes the convention, this also constitutes an infringement by the party state itself. This is expressed through that the state has a duty to assess the judgment and must make sure that it fulfils the requirements of the convention. It has been discussed if the EU Charter of fundamental rights (EU Charter) puts up a similar requirement as the ECHR. However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has not yet interpreted the EU Charter this way in the area of commercial law. Nevertheless, the EU Charter has been found directly applicable in the area of European arrest warrants, and the same possibility should exist regarding commercial judgments. 

The Swedish public policy exception is applied in written law in statutes that incorporate conventions, as well as existing as an unwritten principle. Swedish public policy shall be assessed ex officio by courts. Because of its restrictive nature, the public policy exception is seldom used in Swedish courts. Most notably, in NJA 1998 s. 817, HD examined if the freedom of speech and the right of individuals to communicate information and intelligence for the purpose of publication in mass media could prevent the enforcement of a Norwegian judgment concerning damages. Even if the judgment was enforced in this particular case, the Supreme court admitted that the foundations of the legal order can contain constitutional rights. 

The CJEU has in numerous judgments interpreted the public policy rule in the Brussels I bis Regulation to contain the rights of the ECHR and the EU Charter, especially the procedural rights in article 6 ECHR and article 47 EU Charter. However, according to the principle laid down in the ECtHR case Krombach, the applied rights can only originate from the mutual constitutional traditions of the member states and international charters.

Concerning the Swedish constitution as an individual ground for refusal, I am of the opinion that the discussion about the ECHR and the EU Charter can be applied also to RF. My conclusion is therefore that the Swedish constitution can indeed be used as an individual ground for refusal. This view is also backed by the general development of the Swedish constitution in adjudication. The judicial review in Ch. 11 Art. 14 RF could encompass an obligation for courts to examine if a statute that prescribes recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment goes against directly applicable fundamental rights. If the court finds that a statute requires recognition or enforcement contrary to the rights, the state cannot be applied in the case and recognition or enforcement cannot take place. 

My conclusion regarding public policy is that fundamental rights from RF are present in the Swedish public policy. The rights express which values are so important that they are constitutional principles and therefore are part of the foundations of the legal order. This interpretation is also supported by how the Supreme court has interpreted some rights to include a principle that damages are awarded if the state infringes an individual’s rights, and by the principles that prevent the court from enforcing immoral contracts. However, rights that are unique for RF cannot prevent recognition or enforcement of a judgment in the context of the European private international law. This is because the CJEU has restricted the public policy exception through Krombach and following cases.},
  author       = {Westermann, Anneli},
  keyword      = {EU-rätt,statsrätt,internationell privaträtt,grundlag,regeringsformen,EKMR},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Grundlagsstadgade rättigheter som hinder för erkännande och verkställighet av utländska avgöranden i Sverige},
  year         = {2019},
}