Skip to main content

LUP Student Papers

LUND UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES

The Repugnant Conclusion and intuitions about large number cases

Jacobsson, Johan LU (2019) FPPA31 20191
Practical Philosophy
Abstract
In this essay I consider whether it is possible to defend Utilitarianism against The Repugnant Conclusion by questioning the reliability of our intuitions about large number cases. The first part deals with a proposal by John Broome. Broome claims that our “homely intuitions” should be set aside in large number cases, just as our intuitions for building bridges should be set aside when spanning broad rivers. Instead of intuitions, we should rely on theory in these cases. I discuss Broome’s claims and consider some objections. In the end of the first part, I suggest that Broome might have a difficult time defending Total Utilitarianism against Repugnant Conclusions involving smaller numbers. The second part considers a recent proposal by... (More)
In this essay I consider whether it is possible to defend Utilitarianism against The Repugnant Conclusion by questioning the reliability of our intuitions about large number cases. The first part deals with a proposal by John Broome. Broome claims that our “homely intuitions” should be set aside in large number cases, just as our intuitions for building bridges should be set aside when spanning broad rivers. Instead of intuitions, we should rely on theory in these cases. I discuss Broome’s claims and consider some objections. In the end of the first part, I suggest that Broome might have a difficult time defending Total Utilitarianism against Repugnant Conclusions involving smaller numbers. The second part considers a recent proposal by Johan E. Gustafsson. Gustafsson claims that it is not large numbers per se, but rather extreme trade-offs which causes problems for our intuitions’ reliability. This enables him to avoid small number-Repugnant Conclusions. However, as I argue, Gustafsson faces other challenges. Most notably, he seems required to explain the observed systematicity of our intuitive judgements. But on at least one version of The Repugnant Conclusion this seems difficult. I conclude that Large Number Sceptics have not yet proposed an explanation that successfully defends Utilitarianism against The Repugnant Conclusion. (Less)
Popular Abstract (Swedish)
I diskussionen om den motbjudande slutsatsen har vissa filosofer försökt försvara utilitarismen genom att ifrågasätta tillförlitligheten hos våra intuitioner. Två typer av dessa försvar går att urskilja. Enligt det första är vår intuition inte tillförlitlig därför att vi har fel uppfattning om vad det innebär att leva ett liv knappt värt att leva. Enligt det andra är vår intuition inte tillförlitlig därför att den motbjudande slutsatsen involverar stora tal. I den här uppsatsen försöker jag visa varför det andra försvaret inte fungerar.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Jacobsson, Johan LU
supervisor
organization
course
FPPA31 20191
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
Population ethics, The Repugnant Conclusion, Utilitarianism, large number cases, John Broome, reliability, intuitions, margin of error.
language
English
id
8990100
date added to LUP
2020-11-26 13:57:24
date last changed
2020-11-30 06:32:31
@misc{8990100,
  abstract     = {{In this essay I consider whether it is possible to defend Utilitarianism against The Repugnant Conclusion by questioning the reliability of our intuitions about large number cases. The first part deals with a proposal by John Broome. Broome claims that our “homely intuitions” should be set aside in large number cases, just as our intuitions for building bridges should be set aside when spanning broad rivers. Instead of intuitions, we should rely on theory in these cases. I discuss Broome’s claims and consider some objections. In the end of the first part, I suggest that Broome might have a difficult time defending Total Utilitarianism against Repugnant Conclusions involving smaller numbers. The second part considers a recent proposal by Johan E. Gustafsson. Gustafsson claims that it is not large numbers per se, but rather extreme trade-offs which causes problems for our intuitions’ reliability. This enables him to avoid small number-Repugnant Conclusions. However, as I argue, Gustafsson faces other challenges. Most notably, he seems required to explain the observed systematicity of our intuitive judgements. But on at least one version of The Repugnant Conclusion this seems difficult. I conclude that Large Number Sceptics have not yet proposed an explanation that successfully defends Utilitarianism against The Repugnant Conclusion.}},
  author       = {{Jacobsson, Johan}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{The Repugnant Conclusion and intuitions about large number cases}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}