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Mellanhänders ansvar på nätet - En undersökning av förutsättningarna för vitesförbud mot internetleverantörer vid tredje mans upphovsrättsintrång

Alander, Julia LU (2019) LAGF03 20192
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Syftet med denna uppsats har varit att klargöra och analysera mellanhänders ansvar vid tredje mans upphovsrättsintrång. För att uppfylla syftet har frågeställningen som besvarats i uppsatsen varit vilka förutsättningar som gäller för att ett vitesförbud ska kunna meddelas mot en mellanhand, vid tredje mans upphovsrättsintrång. För att sätta syftet i ett bredare perspektiv har en annan frågeställning varit om regleringen kring mellanhänders ansvar vid tredje mans upphovsrättsintrång uppfyller kravet på rättssäkerhet. Resultatredovisningens ena del utgår alltså från en rättsdogmatisk metod, medan den andra delen utgår från ett rättssäkerhetsperspektiv, närmare bestämt utifrån Aleksander Peczeniks rättssäkerhetsbegrepp.

Upphovsrättsintrång... (More)
Syftet med denna uppsats har varit att klargöra och analysera mellanhänders ansvar vid tredje mans upphovsrättsintrång. För att uppfylla syftet har frågeställningen som besvarats i uppsatsen varit vilka förutsättningar som gäller för att ett vitesförbud ska kunna meddelas mot en mellanhand, vid tredje mans upphovsrättsintrång. För att sätta syftet i ett bredare perspektiv har en annan frågeställning varit om regleringen kring mellanhänders ansvar vid tredje mans upphovsrättsintrång uppfyller kravet på rättssäkerhet. Resultatredovisningens ena del utgår alltså från en rättsdogmatisk metod, medan den andra delen utgår från ett rättssäkerhetsperspektiv, närmare bestämt utifrån Aleksander Peczeniks rättssäkerhetsbegrepp.

Upphovsrättsintrång sker idag i mycket stor omfattning på internet. Under de senaste åren har EU-rättslig lagstiftning tillkommit i syfte att stärka skyddet av upphovsrätten. I denna uppsats har fokuserats på att redogöra för svensk rätt. Svensk immaterialrätt bygger till stor del på EU-rättslig lagstiftning och praxis.

För att ett vitesförbud enligt 53 b § URL ska kunna meddelas mot en mellanhand, vid tredje mans upphovsrättsintrång, krävs att mellanhanden medverkar till upphovsrättsintrånget. Vidare krävs att vitesförbudet är proportionerligt samt ändamålsenligt och effektivt. Bestämmelsen om vitesförbud i 53 b § URL är ett resultat av implementeringen av InfoSoc-direktivet. Enligt förarbetsuttalanden innebär medverkansbegreppet i 53 b § URL att en part har medverkat i objektiv straffrättslig mening. Det finns inte mycket praxis beträffande medverkansbegreppets innebörd. 2017
kom ett rättsfall från PMÖD som ändrade det tidigare rättsläget som gällde enligt förarbetsuttalandena. Medverkansbegreppet har dock fortfarande ingen tydlig definition. PMÖDs uttalanden från detta rättsfall kan tolkas på olika sätt. Antingen har medverkansbegreppet givits en negativ definition genom PMÖDs konstaterande att definitionen enligt förarbetena inte längre gäller, eller så innebär det att medverkansansvaret numera är strikt. En annan tolkning är att begreppet medverkan både definieras negativt och som ett strikt ansvar. PMÖDs tolkning av medverkansbegreppet från 2017 års rättsfall har bekräftats i senare rättsfall från 2019. Medverkansbegreppet har en otydlig innebörd i dagens rättsläge och det gör att kravet på förutsebar rättstillämpning (formell rättssäkerhet) inte är uppfyllt.

Blockeringsföreläggande och filtrering är exempel på hur ett vitesförbud kan utformas. I svensk praxis, som hänvisar till EUDs praxis, har konstaterats att rättigheter som berörs vid ett blockeringsföreläggande är upphovsrätt, näringsfrihet och informationsfrihet. Ett blockeringsföreläggande har bedömts vara proportionerligt när materialet som tillgängliggjorts via tredje man till störst del utgjorts av upphovsrättsligt skyddat material som otillåtet tillgängliggjorts. När risk för kränkning av informationsfriheten genom överblockering förelegat har ett blockeringsföreläggande inte ansetts vara
proportionerligt. En sådan proportionalitetsbedömning balanserar alla intressenters grundläggande fri- och rättigheter på bäst sätt. Kravet på materiell rättssäkerhet kan ändå inte anses vara uppfyllt eftersom det i första hand bygger på att kravet på förutsebar rättstillämpning (formell rättssäkerhet) är uppfyllt, vilket det ej är.
Ändamålsenlighet- och effektivitetsbedömningen utgör också en del av
proportionalitetsbedömningen. Vitesförbud mot en mellanhand har bedömts vara ändamålsenligt när den egentlige intrångsgörarens verksamhet har syftat till att sprida upphovsrättsligt skyddad material, eftersom en sådan aktör ofta vill vara otillgänglig.
Man har i bland annat ovannämnda rättsfall från 2017 konstaterat att ett
blockeringsföreläggande visserligen är förhållandevis enkelt att kringgå. Den omständigheten att ett blockeringsföreläggande försvårar tillgången av det upphovsrättsligt skyddade materialet gör dock att kravet på effektivitet uppfylls. Jag anser inte att ett blockeringsföreläggande utgör en effektiv sanktion, med tanke på att
det är såpass enkelt att kringgå. Detta anser jag inte vara ett problem ur ett rättssäkerhetsperspektiv, utan det handlar mer om att det inte finns tekniska lösningar idag som är effektiva och samtidigt förenliga med grundläggande fri- och rättigheter, och som inte heller kräver en förändring av internets grundläggande struktur. (Less)
Abstract
The purpose with this essay has been to clarify and analyze the responsibility of intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copywright. The essay has investigated the conditions for an injuction to be issued against a intermediary, whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copywright. To put
the purpose in a wider context the essay has also investigated whether the regulation of intermediaries responsibilty is compatible with the rule of law. One part of the essay therefore is based on a legal dogmatic method, while the other part is based on a rule of law perspective, more specifically, Aleksander Peczenik’s rule of law-theory.

Copywright infringements are in today’s society committed in a... (More)
The purpose with this essay has been to clarify and analyze the responsibility of intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copywright. The essay has investigated the conditions for an injuction to be issued against a intermediary, whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copywright. To put
the purpose in a wider context the essay has also investigated whether the regulation of intermediaries responsibilty is compatible with the rule of law. One part of the essay therefore is based on a legal dogmatic method, while the other part is based on a rule of law perspective, more specifically, Aleksander Peczenik’s rule of law-theory.

Copywright infringements are in today’s society committed in a large extent. During the last couple of years EU regulations has aimed to enhance the protection of copywrite.
This essay has focused on investigating Swedish law. A majority of Swedish copywrite
law is based on EU regulations and precedent.

The issuing of an injunction in accordance with 53 b § URL is dependent of certain conditions being met. An intermediary has to be co-responsible to the infringement. Furthermore it is required that the injunction is proportionate, appropriate and effective. 53 b § URL is a result of the implementation of the InfoSoc-directive. According to Swedish preparytory work co-responsibilty means that a party has co-operated in an objective criminal sense. There are not a lot of precedent regarding the meaning of coresponsibilty in 53 § b URL. In 2017 a precedent was published that changed the earlier legal position that applied in accordance with the preparatory work.

The co-responsibilty term still has no clear definition. In the precedent from 2017 the term has either been given a negative definition through PMÖD’s finding that the term’s definition according to the preparytory work no longer applies, or the term has been given the meaning of strict liability. Antoher interpretion of PMÖD’s statement is that the co-responsibilty term both is defined negative and has been given the meaning of strict liability. The interpretation of the co-responsibility term from the 2017 precedent has been confirmed in later precedent from 2019. The co-responsibility term is ambigous and it leads to the requirement of forseeable law not beeing met.

Blocking injunctions and filtering constitutes examples of how an injunction according to 53 b § URL can be designed. In Swedish precedent, which refers to ECJ precedent, it has been established that an issuing of a blocking injunction concerns copywright, freedom of trade and freedom of information. A blocking injunction has been assessed
to be proportionate when the material that has been made available by a third party, to a larger extent consists of copywrighted material that has been unlawfully made available.
When there has been a risk of violating freedom of information by overblocking, a blocking injunction has not considered to be proportionate. Such a proportionateassessment balances all parties fundamental rights in the best way. The requirement of substantive rule of law can still not be considered to be met, since this requirement is
based on the law beeing forseeable, which has been established it is not.

The appropriateness and efficiancy of an injunction is measured within the proportionate-assessment. Injunctions issued against an intermediary has considered to be appropriate when the infringer’s business has aimed to spread copywrighted material, since that type of infringer also aims to be unavailable.

In the above mentioned precedent from 2017 it has been established that a blocking injunction is relatively easy to circumvent, but because of the fact that a blocking injunction raises the threshold of committing copywright infringement the requirement of efficiancy is considered to be met. My opinion is that a blocking injunction is not an effective remedy, given that it is that simple to circumvent a measure like that. I Believe that this is not a problem from a rule of law perspective, but that it is because we do not have any technical solutions that are efficient and at the same time compatible with fundamental rights, and that will not demand a change of the fundamental structure of the internet. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Alander, Julia LU
supervisor
organization
course
LAGF03 20192
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
Immaterialrätt, rättssäkerhet, upphovsrättsintrång, mellanhänder, 53 b § URL
language
Swedish
id
8999713
date added to LUP
2020-04-04 17:00:08
date last changed
2020-04-04 17:00:08
@misc{8999713,
  abstract     = {The purpose with this essay has been to clarify and analyze the responsibility of intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copywright. The essay has investigated the conditions for an injuction to be issued against a intermediary, whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copywright. To put
the purpose in a wider context the essay has also investigated whether the regulation of intermediaries responsibilty is compatible with the rule of law. One part of the essay therefore is based on a legal dogmatic method, while the other part is based on a rule of law perspective, more specifically, Aleksander Peczenik’s rule of law-theory.

Copywright infringements are in today’s society committed in a large extent. During the last couple of years EU regulations has aimed to enhance the protection of copywrite.
This essay has focused on investigating Swedish law. A majority of Swedish copywrite
law is based on EU regulations and precedent.

The issuing of an injunction in accordance with 53 b § URL is dependent of certain conditions being met. An intermediary has to be co-responsible to the infringement. Furthermore it is required that the injunction is proportionate, appropriate and effective. 53 b § URL is a result of the implementation of the InfoSoc-directive. According to Swedish preparytory work co-responsibilty means that a party has co-operated in an objective criminal sense. There are not a lot of precedent regarding the meaning of coresponsibilty in 53 § b URL. In 2017 a precedent was published that changed the earlier legal position that applied in accordance with the preparatory work.

The co-responsibilty term still has no clear definition. In the precedent from 2017 the term has either been given a negative definition through PMÖD’s finding that the term’s definition according to the preparytory work no longer applies, or the term has been given the meaning of strict liability. Antoher interpretion of PMÖD’s statement is that the co-responsibilty term both is defined negative and has been given the meaning of strict liability. The interpretation of the co-responsibility term from the 2017 precedent has been confirmed in later precedent from 2019. The co-responsibility term is ambigous and it leads to the requirement of forseeable law not beeing met.

Blocking injunctions and filtering constitutes examples of how an injunction according to 53 b § URL can be designed. In Swedish precedent, which refers to ECJ precedent, it has been established that an issuing of a blocking injunction concerns copywright, freedom of trade and freedom of information. A blocking injunction has been assessed
to be proportionate when the material that has been made available by a third party, to a larger extent consists of copywrighted material that has been unlawfully made available.
When there has been a risk of violating freedom of information by overblocking, a blocking injunction has not considered to be proportionate. Such a proportionateassessment balances all parties fundamental rights in the best way. The requirement of substantive rule of law can still not be considered to be met, since this requirement is
based on the law beeing forseeable, which has been established it is not.

The appropriateness and efficiancy of an injunction is measured within the proportionate-assessment. Injunctions issued against an intermediary has considered to be appropriate when the infringer’s business has aimed to spread copywrighted material, since that type of infringer also aims to be unavailable.

In the above mentioned precedent from 2017 it has been established that a blocking injunction is relatively easy to circumvent, but because of the fact that a blocking injunction raises the threshold of committing copywright infringement the requirement of efficiancy is considered to be met. My opinion is that a blocking injunction is not an effective remedy, given that it is that simple to circumvent a measure like that. I Believe that this is not a problem from a rule of law perspective, but that it is because we do not have any technical solutions that are efficient and at the same time compatible with fundamental rights, and that will not demand a change of the fundamental structure of the internet.},
  author       = {Alander, Julia},
  keyword      = {Immaterialrätt,rättssäkerhet,upphovsrättsintrång,mellanhänder,53 b § URL},
  language     = {swe},
  note         = {Student Paper},
  title        = {Mellanhänders ansvar på nätet - En undersökning av förutsättningarna för vitesförbud mot internetleverantörer vid tredje mans upphovsrättsintrång},
  year         = {2019},
}