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Iraks avskräckning 1991-2003, Lärdomar från ett misslyckat fall

Netterström, Oscar LU (2020) STVU15 20201
Department of Political Science
Abstract
In March 2003 the Iraqi deterrence strategy came to an end. The US led coalition invaded the country, on contrary of the Security Council ́s recommendations, due to one of the deterrents most important means, weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
This qualitative case-study has the scope of Iraq ́s failed interwar deterrence- strategy between 1991-2003. What is deterrence, who was the actual target of the Iraqi strategy and in the end, why did it fail?
The probabilistic results show, based on the general factors for a successful deterrent strategy; communication, capability and will, that the Iraqi strategy mainly failed due to deficiencies within these factors in combination with regime credibility problems. While the Iraqi regime used a... (More)
In March 2003 the Iraqi deterrence strategy came to an end. The US led coalition invaded the country, on contrary of the Security Council ́s recommendations, due to one of the deterrents most important means, weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
This qualitative case-study has the scope of Iraq ́s failed interwar deterrence- strategy between 1991-2003. What is deterrence, who was the actual target of the Iraqi strategy and in the end, why did it fail?
The probabilistic results show, based on the general factors for a successful deterrent strategy; communication, capability and will, that the Iraqi strategy mainly failed due to deficiencies within these factors in combination with regime credibility problems. While the Iraqi regime used a vast array of communicative means, the general credibility was already too low for the desired deterrent effect to take place. The Iraqi capabilities was reduced during the early 90 ́s, mainly due to the defeat during Operation Desert Storm, UN sanctions and the inspector ́s successful deconstruction of Iraqi WMD-programs. The Iraqi will was contra- dictory and fluctuating over time, and both the military and civilian will was pre- dominately based on fear of the own leadership, with the result of both random deflection and retreats during the 2003 invasion. (Less)
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author
Netterström, Oscar LU
supervisor
organization
course
STVU15 20201
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
Misslyckad avskräckning, Tröskeleffekt, Irak, Massförstörelsevapen, Saddam Hussein
language
Swedish
additional info
Jag vill tacka både Tony Ingesson och Jakob Gustavsson vid statsvetenskapliga institutionen för en föredömlig kurs. Tony som lärare i vetenskaplig metod, och Jakob för engagemanget som uppsatshandledare. Stort tack!
id
9008688
date added to LUP
2020-05-25 14:28:42
date last changed
2020-05-25 14:28:42
@misc{9008688,
  abstract     = {{In March 2003 the Iraqi deterrence strategy came to an end. The US led coalition invaded the country, on contrary of the Security Council ́s recommendations, due to one of the deterrents most important means, weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
This qualitative case-study has the scope of Iraq ́s failed interwar deterrence- strategy between 1991-2003. What is deterrence, who was the actual target of the Iraqi strategy and in the end, why did it fail?
The probabilistic results show, based on the general factors for a successful deterrent strategy; communication, capability and will, that the Iraqi strategy mainly failed due to deficiencies within these factors in combination with regime credibility problems. While the Iraqi regime used a vast array of communicative means, the general credibility was already too low for the desired deterrent effect to take place. The Iraqi capabilities was reduced during the early 90 ́s, mainly due to the defeat during Operation Desert Storm, UN sanctions and the inspector ́s successful deconstruction of Iraqi WMD-programs. The Iraqi will was contra- dictory and fluctuating over time, and both the military and civilian will was pre- dominately based on fear of the own leadership, with the result of both random deflection and retreats during the 2003 invasion.}},
  author       = {{Netterström, Oscar}},
  language     = {{swe}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Iraks avskräckning 1991-2003, Lärdomar från ett misslyckat fall}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}