Digitala integritetskränkningar - En straffrättslig frizon? - Om olaga integritetsintrång och förtal i dess tillämpning på spridandet av deepfakes
(2020) JURM02 20201Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract
- The protection of personal integrity has faced new challenges since the rise of social media. Particularly in the dissemination of privacy infringement, which is largely facilitated by today’s technology. A new problem has arisen in connection with the development of technology, so-called deepfakes. The online phenomenon of deepfakes is relatively new and implies a still or moving image that has been manipulated with the help of artificial intelligence, for example by changing a person’s face and body. As early as 1992, the Supreme Court pointed out that there is a lack of protection for the personal integrity within Swedish legislation. After a comprehensive investigation, a new criminal provision was implemented in 2018, the regulation... (More)
- The protection of personal integrity has faced new challenges since the rise of social media. Particularly in the dissemination of privacy infringement, which is largely facilitated by today’s technology. A new problem has arisen in connection with the development of technology, so-called deepfakes. The online phenomenon of deepfakes is relatively new and implies a still or moving image that has been manipulated with the help of artificial intelligence, for example by changing a person’s face and body. As early as 1992, the Supreme Court pointed out that there is a lack of protection for the personal integrity within Swedish legislation. After a comprehensive investigation, a new criminal provision was implemented in 2018, the regulation on unlawful violation of integrity whose purpose would be to cover all cases of dissemination of images with a sexual nature.
This essay aims to examine if the regulation on unlawful violation of integrity and defamation can be applied on dissemination of deepfakes. Furthermore, the purpose of this essay is to examine if the personal integrity as a conception, is constructed in an adequate way, seen in the light of the fact that the dissemination of privacy-infringing data is greatly facilitated by today’s technology.
Based on case law, operative regulation and legislative history, this essay focuses on whether the criminal justice protection is sufficiently adjusted to today’s technology and communication platforms. Through an interpretation of case law in the field, it appears that there are acts which are of an infringing nature – but which are not covered by the wording of the criminal regulation in practise. As a solution to the grey area that appears to exist within the field, it is suggested that any requirement that the portrayed person can be identifiable should not reasonably be considered when it comes to criminal regulations that intends to protect the personal integrity. The identification problem should be considered with the question of whether the damage that has occurred is perceived as, depending on how grave it is instead.
Even though some of today’s indicative cases from the Supreme Court are over 20 years old, it is not entirely clear how they might be applied to attacks on the personal integrity in this age of modern technology.
The principle of legality sets a limit on how widely-conducted the courts can interpret the criminal regulations. Furthermore, the legislator has not chosen to give a generally valid definition of what is covered by the personal integrity. On the grounds that new interests which, due to development in the society, are considered worthy of protection, should be joined to the concept as a result of new regulation. Given that today’s technology enables new attacks on the personal integrity, it would be desirable for a new investigation to highlight the interests that have a particular protective value and should be covered by protection against unjustified interference. (Less) - Abstract (Swedish)
- Skyddet för den personliga integriteten har ställts inför nya utmaningar sedan internets och sociala mediers framväxt. I samband med teknikutvecklingens framväxt har en ny problematik uppmärksammats, nämligen så kallade deepfakes. Nätfenomenet deepfakes är relativt nytt och innebär att still- eller rörlig bild manipulerats med hjälp av artificiell intelligens, bland annat genom att en persons ansikte och kropp byts ut. Redan år 1992 påtalade Högsta domstolen att det fanns ett bristande skydd för den personliga integriteten inom svensk rätt. Efter en omfattande rättsutredning infördes en ny brottsbestämmelse år 2018, nämligen olaga integritetsintrång, vars syfte skulle bli att täcka in samtliga fall av spridning av bilder och filmer av... (More)
- Skyddet för den personliga integriteten har ställts inför nya utmaningar sedan internets och sociala mediers framväxt. I samband med teknikutvecklingens framväxt har en ny problematik uppmärksammats, nämligen så kallade deepfakes. Nätfenomenet deepfakes är relativt nytt och innebär att still- eller rörlig bild manipulerats med hjälp av artificiell intelligens, bland annat genom att en persons ansikte och kropp byts ut. Redan år 1992 påtalade Högsta domstolen att det fanns ett bristande skydd för den personliga integriteten inom svensk rätt. Efter en omfattande rättsutredning infördes en ny brottsbestämmelse år 2018, nämligen olaga integritetsintrång, vars syfte skulle bli att täcka in samtliga fall av spridning av bilder och filmer av sexuell natur.
Framställningen syftar till att utreda om brottsbestämmelserna om olaga integritetsintrång och förtal kan tillämpas vid spridning av deepfakes. Vidare utreds om begreppet personlig integritet är konstruerat på ett tillfredsställande sätt mot bakgrund av att spridning av integritetskränkande uppgifter till stor del underlättas av dagens teknologi.
Utifrån underrättspraxis, gällande rätt och förarbeten utreds hur det svenska straffrättsliga skyddet för den personliga integriteten är tillräckligt anpassad efter dagens teknik och kommunikationsplattformar. Genom en tolkning av underrättspraxis på området tycks det vid tillämpningen av
straffbestämmelserna – finnas handlingar som är av integritetskränkande karaktär – men som inte omfattas av straffbestämmelsernas ordalydelser. Som en lösning på den gråzon som tycks existera på området, föreslås att något krav på att den porträtterade ska kunna identifieras inte rimligtvis bör ställas när det rör straffbestämmelser som avser att skydda den personliga integriteten. Identifikationsproblematiken borde istället vägas in i frågan om den skada som uppstått är att uppfatta som allvarlig eller inte.
Trots att vissa av dagens vägledande avgöranden från Högsta domstolen är över 20 år gamla, är det otydligt hur de kan komma att tillämpas på moderna tidens angrepp mot den personliga integriteten. Den straffrättsliga legalitetsprincipen sätter en gräns för hur brett domstolarna kan tolka straffbestämmelserna. Vidare har lagstiftaren valt att inte ge en allmängiltig definition av vad som omfattas av den personliga integriteten, med motiveringen att nya intressen – som på grund av utvecklingen i samhället anses skyddsvärda – istället ska sammanfogas med begreppet till följd av ny lagstiftning. Med tanke på att dagens teknik möjliggör nya angrepp mot den personliga integriteten vore det önskvärt med en ny utredning som lyfter vilka intressen som har ett särskilt skyddsvärde och bör omfattas av ett skydd mot obefogade ingrepp. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9010546
- author
- Masri, Dalia LU
- supervisor
- organization
- alternative title
- Digital violations of the personal integrity - a penal free zone? - The regulation on unlawful violation of integrity and defamation in its adjudication process on deepfakes
- course
- JURM02 20201
- year
- 2020
- type
- H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
- subject
- keywords
- Straffrätt, Criminal Law, Deepfakes, AI, Personlig integritet, Förtal, Olaga integritetsintrång
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 9010546
- date added to LUP
- 2020-06-15 11:53:53
- date last changed
- 2020-06-15 11:53:53
@misc{9010546,
abstract = {{The protection of personal integrity has faced new challenges since the rise of social media. Particularly in the dissemination of privacy infringement, which is largely facilitated by today’s technology. A new problem has arisen in connection with the development of technology, so-called deepfakes. The online phenomenon of deepfakes is relatively new and implies a still or moving image that has been manipulated with the help of artificial intelligence, for example by changing a person’s face and body. As early as 1992, the Supreme Court pointed out that there is a lack of protection for the personal integrity within Swedish legislation. After a comprehensive investigation, a new criminal provision was implemented in 2018, the regulation on unlawful violation of integrity whose purpose would be to cover all cases of dissemination of images with a sexual nature.
This essay aims to examine if the regulation on unlawful violation of integrity and defamation can be applied on dissemination of deepfakes. Furthermore, the purpose of this essay is to examine if the personal integrity as a conception, is constructed in an adequate way, seen in the light of the fact that the dissemination of privacy-infringing data is greatly facilitated by today’s technology.
Based on case law, operative regulation and legislative history, this essay focuses on whether the criminal justice protection is sufficiently adjusted to today’s technology and communication platforms. Through an interpretation of case law in the field, it appears that there are acts which are of an infringing nature – but which are not covered by the wording of the criminal regulation in practise. As a solution to the grey area that appears to exist within the field, it is suggested that any requirement that the portrayed person can be identifiable should not reasonably be considered when it comes to criminal regulations that intends to protect the personal integrity. The identification problem should be considered with the question of whether the damage that has occurred is perceived as, depending on how grave it is instead.
Even though some of today’s indicative cases from the Supreme Court are over 20 years old, it is not entirely clear how they might be applied to attacks on the personal integrity in this age of modern technology.
The principle of legality sets a limit on how widely-conducted the courts can interpret the criminal regulations. Furthermore, the legislator has not chosen to give a generally valid definition of what is covered by the personal integrity. On the grounds that new interests which, due to development in the society, are considered worthy of protection, should be joined to the concept as a result of new regulation. Given that today’s technology enables new attacks on the personal integrity, it would be desirable for a new investigation to highlight the interests that have a particular protective value and should be covered by protection against unjustified interference.}},
author = {{Masri, Dalia}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Digitala integritetskränkningar - En straffrättslig frizon? - Om olaga integritetsintrång och förtal i dess tillämpning på spridandet av deepfakes}},
year = {{2020}},
}