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Onlineplattformar och prisparitetsvillkor - Konkurrensbegränsande avtal genom syfte eller resultat?

Blixt, Sofia LU (2020) JURM02 20201
Faculty of Law
Department of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Onlineplattformar är en väl integrerad del av den digitala handeln, några exempel är Amazon Marketplace, Booking.com och Expedia. I onlineplattformarnas avtal med leverantörer återfinns ofta en prisparitetsklausul. Det innebär att leverantören inte får erbjuda mer fördelaktiga priser på andra försäljningskanaler än vad leverantören erbjuder på onlineplattformen. Onlineplattformarnas prisparitetsvillkor har behandlats på olika sätt inom EU och de har varit mycket omdiskuterade i litteraturen. Studiens syfte är att utreda om onlineplattformarnas prisparitetsvillkor är förenliga med förbudet mot konkurrensbegränsande avtal i 2 kapitlet 1§ KL och artikel 101.1 FEUF. Förbudet mot konkurrensbegränsande samarbete har två kriterier. Studien kommer... (More)
Onlineplattformar är en väl integrerad del av den digitala handeln, några exempel är Amazon Marketplace, Booking.com och Expedia. I onlineplattformarnas avtal med leverantörer återfinns ofta en prisparitetsklausul. Det innebär att leverantören inte får erbjuda mer fördelaktiga priser på andra försäljningskanaler än vad leverantören erbjuder på onlineplattformen. Onlineplattformarnas prisparitetsvillkor har behandlats på olika sätt inom EU och de har varit mycket omdiskuterade i litteraturen. Studiens syfte är att utreda om onlineplattformarnas prisparitetsvillkor är förenliga med förbudet mot konkurrensbegränsande avtal i 2 kapitlet 1§ KL och artikel 101.1 FEUF. Förbudet mot konkurrensbegränsande samarbete har två kriterier. Studien kommer dock enbart behandla konkurrensbegränsningskriteriet. För att 2 kapitlet 1§ KL och
artikel 101.1 FEUF ska anses vara uppfyllda behöver ett avtal antingen begränsa konkurrensen genom syfte eller resultat. Studien kommer därför att utreda om prisparitetsvillkor utgör syftes- respektive resultatöverträdelser. Avsikten med studien är att vara en riktlinje för bedömningen av prisparitetsvillkor i förhållande till förbudet mot konkurrensbegränsande avtal. PMÖD meddelade en dom 2019 om Booking.coms prisparitetsvillkor. PMÖD:s dom skiljde sig markant från PMD:s dom. Studien kommer därför även att utreda vad utgången borde ha blivit i Booking-domen.

Det finns två typer av prisparitetsvillkor, breda och snäva. Breda paritetsvillkor anses generellt vara mer konkurrensbegränsande än snäva eftersom de innebär att leverantörerna inte får erbjuda bättre pris i någon annan försäljningskanal jämfört med onlineplattformen. Snäva paritetsklausuler innebär enbart att leverantören inte får erbjuda bättre pris på sin hemsida än på onlineplattformen.

Studien visar att prisparitetsvillkor kan begränsa konkurrensen eftersom följden av dem kan bli att ett fast pris tillämpas på marknaden för en vara eller tjänst, att konkurrensen avseende kommissionsavgifter minskar och att det blir svårare för nya aktörer att tillträda marknaden. Studien visar att breda prisparitetsvillkor kan anses utgöra syftesöverträdelser samt att både breda och snäva prisparitetsvillkor kan utgöra resultatöverträdelser. Domslutet i Booking-domen borde ha varit att Booking.coms snäva prisparitetsklausuler utgjorde en konkurrensbegränsning genom resultat på marknaden för onlineresebyråtjänster, men inte på marknaden för hotellövernattningar. (Less)
Abstract
Online platforms are an integrated part of the digital economy, examples of online platforms are Amazon Marketplace, Booking.com and Expedia. The agreements between online platforms and suppliers usually contain a price parity clause. Because of the price parity clause, the suppliers are not allowed to offer better prices in other sales channels compared to the online platform. The price parity clauses have been treated differently within the EU and they have been well discussed in literature. The purpose with this study is to examine if the online platform’s price parity clauses comply with the prohibition against anti-competitive cooperation in chapter 2, 1§ of the Competition Act as well as article 101.1 TFEU. There are two criteria... (More)
Online platforms are an integrated part of the digital economy, examples of online platforms are Amazon Marketplace, Booking.com and Expedia. The agreements between online platforms and suppliers usually contain a price parity clause. Because of the price parity clause, the suppliers are not allowed to offer better prices in other sales channels compared to the online platform. The price parity clauses have been treated differently within the EU and they have been well discussed in literature. The purpose with this study is to examine if the online platform’s price parity clauses comply with the prohibition against anti-competitive cooperation in chapter 2, 1§ of the Competition Act as well as article 101.1 TFEU. There are two criteria that need to be fulfilled in the prohibition against anti-competitive cooperation. The study, however, only examines the criteria about restriction of competition. Chapter 2, 1§ of the Competition Act and article 101.1 TFEU applies to agreements which restrict competition either by its object or effect. Therefore, the study will examine if price parity clauses restrict competition by object or effect. The study aims at being a guideline for how price parity clauses should be treated in accordance with the prohibition against anti-competitive cooperation. The Patent and Market Court of Appeal addressed Booking.com’s price parity clauses in a judgment from 2019. The Court of Appeal’s judgment differentiated from the Patent and Market Court. Therefore, the study also examines what the verdict should have been in the Booking-case.

There are two types of price parity clauses, wide and narrow. The competition is generally more restricted by wide price parity clauses as the supplier cannot offer a better price in any other sales channels compared to the online platform. If it is a narrow price parity clause, the parity only applies to the supplier’s own website.

The study shows that price parity clauses can restrict competition as they may lead to price uniformity, reduction of competition regarding commission and may prevent new businesses from entering the market. The study shows that wide price parity clauses fulfil the criteria for restriction of competition by object. Both wide and narrow price parity clauses may restrict competition by effect. Furthermore, the verdict of the Booking-judgment should have been that the narrow price parity clauses were an anti-competitive agreement by effect on the market for online travel agencies, but not on the market for hotel stays. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Blixt, Sofia LU
supervisor
organization
alternative title
Online platforms and price parity clauses - anti-competitive agreements by object or effect?
course
JURM02 20201
year
type
H3 - Professional qualifications (4 Years - )
subject
keywords
Konkurrensrätt, Förmögenhetsrätt, Competition law
language
Swedish
id
9010709
date added to LUP
2020-06-22 13:09:09
date last changed
2020-06-22 13:09:09
@misc{9010709,
  abstract     = {{Online platforms are an integrated part of the digital economy, examples of online platforms are Amazon Marketplace, Booking.com and Expedia. The agreements between online platforms and suppliers usually contain a price parity clause. Because of the price parity clause, the suppliers are not allowed to offer better prices in other sales channels compared to the online platform. The price parity clauses have been treated differently within the EU and they have been well discussed in literature. The purpose with this study is to examine if the online platform’s price parity clauses comply with the prohibition against anti-competitive cooperation in chapter 2, 1§ of the Competition Act as well as article 101.1 TFEU. There are two criteria that need to be fulfilled in the prohibition against anti-competitive cooperation. The study, however, only examines the criteria about restriction of competition. Chapter 2, 1§ of the Competition Act and article 101.1 TFEU applies to agreements which restrict competition either by its object or effect. Therefore, the study will examine if price parity clauses restrict competition by object or effect. The study aims at being a guideline for how price parity clauses should be treated in accordance with the prohibition against anti-competitive cooperation. The Patent and Market Court of Appeal addressed Booking.com’s price parity clauses in a judgment from 2019. The Court of Appeal’s judgment differentiated from the Patent and Market Court. Therefore, the study also examines what the verdict should have been in the Booking-case. 

There are two types of price parity clauses, wide and narrow. The competition is generally more restricted by wide price parity clauses as the supplier cannot offer a better price in any other sales channels compared to the online platform. If it is a narrow price parity clause, the parity only applies to the supplier’s own website. 

The study shows that price parity clauses can restrict competition as they may lead to price uniformity, reduction of competition regarding commission and may prevent new businesses from entering the market. The study shows that wide price parity clauses fulfil the criteria for restriction of competition by object. Both wide and narrow price parity clauses may restrict competition by effect. Furthermore, the verdict of the Booking-judgment should have been that the narrow price parity clauses were an anti-competitive agreement by effect on the market for online travel agencies, but not on the market for hotel stays.}},
  author       = {{Blixt, Sofia}},
  language     = {{swe}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Onlineplattformar och prisparitetsvillkor - Konkurrensbegränsande avtal genom syfte eller resultat?}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}