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Avskaffa likgiltighetsuppsåtet? - En kritisk granskning av uppsåtets nedre gräns

Kouthoofd Muldin, Cesar LU (2020) LAGF03 20202
Faculty of Law
Department of Law
Abstract
For a person to be considered criminally liable for a crime, it is required that the person has incurred guilt. The concept of guilt is understood as an act committed intentionally or through negligence. Negligence and intent give expression to different degrees of guilt, where the quilt form intent is always more reprehensible and has a higher penalty value. Thus, it is of great importance that crimes committed with intent and crimes committed with negligence be kept apart. The major assessment difficulties in an intent-assasement occur when an act has been committed in the borderland between intent and negligence. This essay intends to investigate and critically examine the intent's lower limit against negligence, the so-called... (More)
For a person to be considered criminally liable for a crime, it is required that the person has incurred guilt. The concept of guilt is understood as an act committed intentionally or through negligence. Negligence and intent give expression to different degrees of guilt, where the quilt form intent is always more reprehensible and has a higher penalty value. Thus, it is of great importance that crimes committed with intent and crimes committed with negligence be kept apart. The major assessment difficulties in an intent-assasement occur when an act has been committed in the borderland between intent and negligence. This essay intends to investigate and critically examine the intent's lower limit against negligence, the so-called “likgiltighetsuppsåt”. This form of intent can be described as an intent of indifference.

The intent of indifference was introduced into Swedish law by the Supreme Court´s ruling in “HIV-Fallet” back in 2004. It then replaced the previously applied lower limit of intent, possible intent with a hypothetical test. However, the new intent of indifference proved to be difficult to apply in the lower courts of Sweden. The Supreme Court therefore clarified this concept of intent in the case NJA 2016 s. 173.

In recent years, there has been a debate among scholars of criminal law in Sweden regarding the intent of indifference. The concept of this intent has been questioned by lawyers and researchers. The focus of the text is on the Supreme Court's clarification of the intent of indifference and the debate that followed that decision.

The ruling in NJA 2016 s. 173 has to some extent clarified what is to be given decisive importance in the assessment of the intent. However, the ruling has also given rise to uncertainty. The uncertainty is expressed as to whether it is still correct to speak of an intent of indifference in Swedish criminal law or whether the lower limit of intent in fact consists of a probability-intent (sannolikhetsuppsåt). This uncertainty can be questioned from a legal certainty perspective. (Less)
Abstract (Swedish)
För att en person ska kunna anses straffrättsligt ansvarig för ett brott krävs det att personen åsamkat skuld. Skuldbegreppet förstås som en gärning begången uppsåtligen eller av oaktsamhet. Oaktsamhet och uppsåt ger uttryck för olika grad av skuld, där skuldformen uppsåt alltid är mer klandervärd och har ett högre straffvärde. Således är det av stor vikt att brott begångna med uppsåt och brott begångna av oaktsamhet hålls isär. De stora bedömningssvårigheterna vid en uppsåtsbedömning inträffar då en gärning begåtts i gränslandet mellan uppsåt och oaktsamhet. Denna uppsats ämnar utreda och kritiskt granska uppsåtets nedre gräns mot oaktsamhet, det s.k. likgiltighetsuppsåtet.

Likgiltighetsuppsåtet introducerades i svensk rätt i och med... (More)
För att en person ska kunna anses straffrättsligt ansvarig för ett brott krävs det att personen åsamkat skuld. Skuldbegreppet förstås som en gärning begången uppsåtligen eller av oaktsamhet. Oaktsamhet och uppsåt ger uttryck för olika grad av skuld, där skuldformen uppsåt alltid är mer klandervärd och har ett högre straffvärde. Således är det av stor vikt att brott begångna med uppsåt och brott begångna av oaktsamhet hålls isär. De stora bedömningssvårigheterna vid en uppsåtsbedömning inträffar då en gärning begåtts i gränslandet mellan uppsåt och oaktsamhet. Denna uppsats ämnar utreda och kritiskt granska uppsåtets nedre gräns mot oaktsamhet, det s.k. likgiltighetsuppsåtet.

Likgiltighetsuppsåtet introducerades i svensk rätt i och med ”HIV-fallet” 2004. Det ersatta då den tidigare tillämpade nedre gränsen av uppsåt, eventuellt uppsåt med hypotetiskt prov. Det nya likgiltighetsuppsåtet visade sig dock vara svårtillämpat i underrätterna. Högsta domstolen kom därför i fallet ”mopedmannen” att förtydliga och precisera likgiltighetsuppsåtet.

Under senare år har det förts en debatt inom svensk straffrätt rörande likgiltighetsuppsåtets vara eller icke vara. Uppsåtsbegreppet har ifrågasatts av advokater och forskare. Textens huvudsakliga fokus ligger på Högsta domstolens precisering av likgiltighetsuppsåtet och den debatten som följt efter det avgörandet.

”Mopedmannen-domen” har i viss mån klarlagt vad som ska ges avgörande betydelse vid uppsåtsbedömningen. Domen har emellertid också givit upphov till en ovisshet. Ovissheten tar sig uttryck i huruvida det fortfarande är korrekt att tala om ett likgiltighetsuppsåt eller om uppsåtets nedre gräns i själva verket består av sannolikhetsuppsåt. Denna osäkerhet beträffande bevisbedömningen för uppsåtsformen kan ifrågasättas ur ett rättssäkerhetsperspektiv. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Kouthoofd Muldin, Cesar LU
supervisor
organization
course
LAGF03 20202
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
straffrätt, likgiltighetsuppsåt
language
Swedish
id
9034729
date added to LUP
2021-02-09 11:26:06
date last changed
2021-02-09 11:55:51
@misc{9034729,
  abstract     = {{For a person to be considered criminally liable for a crime, it is required that the person has incurred guilt. The concept of guilt is understood as an act committed intentionally or through negligence. Negligence and intent give expression to different degrees of guilt, where the quilt form intent is always more reprehensible and has a higher penalty value. Thus, it is of great importance that crimes committed with intent and crimes committed with negligence be kept apart. The major assessment difficulties in an intent-assasement occur when an act has been committed in the borderland between intent and negligence. This essay intends to investigate and critically examine the intent's lower limit against negligence, the so-called “likgiltighetsuppsåt”. This form of intent can be described as an intent of indifference. 

The intent of indifference was introduced into Swedish law by the Supreme Court´s ruling in “HIV-Fallet” back in 2004. It then replaced the previously applied lower limit of intent, possible intent with a hypothetical test. However, the new intent of indifference proved to be difficult to apply in the lower courts of Sweden. The Supreme Court therefore clarified this concept of intent in the case NJA 2016 s. 173.

In recent years, there has been a debate among scholars of criminal law in Sweden regarding the intent of indifference. The concept of this intent has been questioned by lawyers and researchers. The focus of the text is on the Supreme Court's clarification of the intent of indifference and the debate that followed that decision.

The ruling in NJA 2016 s. 173 has to some extent clarified what is to be given decisive importance in the assessment of the intent. However, the ruling has also given rise to uncertainty. The uncertainty is expressed as to whether it is still correct to speak of an intent of indifference in Swedish criminal law or whether the lower limit of intent in fact consists of a probability-intent (sannolikhetsuppsåt). This uncertainty can be questioned from a legal certainty perspective.}},
  author       = {{Kouthoofd Muldin, Cesar}},
  language     = {{swe}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Avskaffa likgiltighetsuppsåtet? - En kritisk granskning av uppsåtets nedre gräns}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}