The road to a minimum winning coalition?: A study of coalition building during the negotiations of the Mobility Package
(2021) STVM23 20211Department of Political Science
- Abstract
- The European road transport sector is an integral part of the European Single Market. Since the Central- and Eastern enlargements the sector has grown and today more than 45% of all haulage in the EU is performed by truck. With that backdrop, the Commission in 2017 proposed the Mobility Package to regulate the social and safety aspects of the sector. This thesis assesses the becoming of the Mobility Package by using qualitative methodology in the form of semi-structured interviews with Parliamentary Assistants. Applying minimum winning coalition theory to analyse the behaviour and coalitions within the European Parliament and in the Trilogue meetings. This analysis showcases the use of side payments, the rational and irrational behaviour... (More)
- The European road transport sector is an integral part of the European Single Market. Since the Central- and Eastern enlargements the sector has grown and today more than 45% of all haulage in the EU is performed by truck. With that backdrop, the Commission in 2017 proposed the Mobility Package to regulate the social and safety aspects of the sector. This thesis assesses the becoming of the Mobility Package by using qualitative methodology in the form of semi-structured interviews with Parliamentary Assistants. Applying minimum winning coalition theory to analyse the behaviour and coalitions within the European Parliament and in the Trilogue meetings. This analysis showcases the use of side payments, the rational and irrational behaviour by leading negotiators while they assess the possibilities in forming coalitions. It also demonstrates the East/West division on the question of the Mobility Package, and how this turned into tough bargaining between Parliament and Council. Moreover, the thesis details the shortcomings of several central assumptions of minimum winning coalition theory and critically discusses alternative answers. It further concludes that the behaviour of negotiators meets explanatory limits due to a narrow definition of rational players. Lastly, it is concluded that negotiators do in fact not strive for minimum winning coalitions within their own institution when they engage in interinstitutional bargaining. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9045113
- author
- Poulsen, Andreas LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- STVM23 20211
- year
- 2021
- type
- H2 - Master's Degree (Two Years)
- subject
- keywords
- Minimum winning theory, European Parliament, decision-making, game theory
- language
- English
- id
- 9045113
- date added to LUP
- 2021-07-06 11:11:13
- date last changed
- 2021-07-06 11:11:13
@misc{9045113, abstract = {{The European road transport sector is an integral part of the European Single Market. Since the Central- and Eastern enlargements the sector has grown and today more than 45% of all haulage in the EU is performed by truck. With that backdrop, the Commission in 2017 proposed the Mobility Package to regulate the social and safety aspects of the sector. This thesis assesses the becoming of the Mobility Package by using qualitative methodology in the form of semi-structured interviews with Parliamentary Assistants. Applying minimum winning coalition theory to analyse the behaviour and coalitions within the European Parliament and in the Trilogue meetings. This analysis showcases the use of side payments, the rational and irrational behaviour by leading negotiators while they assess the possibilities in forming coalitions. It also demonstrates the East/West division on the question of the Mobility Package, and how this turned into tough bargaining between Parliament and Council. Moreover, the thesis details the shortcomings of several central assumptions of minimum winning coalition theory and critically discusses alternative answers. It further concludes that the behaviour of negotiators meets explanatory limits due to a narrow definition of rational players. Lastly, it is concluded that negotiators do in fact not strive for minimum winning coalitions within their own institution when they engage in interinstitutional bargaining.}}, author = {{Poulsen, Andreas}}, language = {{eng}}, note = {{Student Paper}}, title = {{The road to a minimum winning coalition?: A study of coalition building during the negotiations of the Mobility Package}}, year = {{2021}}, }