Sa du något eller? – Om provokationers straffmildrande verkan
(2021) LAGF03 20211Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract (Swedish)
- Provokationers strafflindrande effekt har länge setts som självklar i såväl det svenska som andra länders rättssystem. 1989 infördes en bestämmelse i Brottsbalken som uttryckligen bekräftade att provokationer, eller ordagrant enligt bestämmelsen ”uppenbart kränkande beteende”, skulle ses som en förmildrande omständighet vid bedömningen av ett brotts straffvärde. I förarbetet till bestämmelsen utvecklas dock inte skälen för principen i någon större utsträckning, utan den togs snarast för given när påföljdssystemet skulle reformeras. Även i praxis tycks principen i stort sett ha betraktats som underförstådd, utan att domskälen närmare gått in på hur bedömningen skett. Syftet med denna uppsats är att svara på frågan varför provokation ska ses... (More)
- Provokationers strafflindrande effekt har länge setts som självklar i såväl det svenska som andra länders rättssystem. 1989 infördes en bestämmelse i Brottsbalken som uttryckligen bekräftade att provokationer, eller ordagrant enligt bestämmelsen ”uppenbart kränkande beteende”, skulle ses som en förmildrande omständighet vid bedömningen av ett brotts straffvärde. I förarbetet till bestämmelsen utvecklas dock inte skälen för principen i någon större utsträckning, utan den togs snarast för given när påföljdssystemet skulle reformeras. Även i praxis tycks principen i stort sett ha betraktats som underförstådd, utan att domskälen närmare gått in på hur bedömningen skett. Syftet med denna uppsats är att svara på frågan varför provokation ska ses som en förmildrande faktor vid bedömningen av straffvärdet för ett brott. I den doktrin som jag studerat har jag funnit att mycket bygger på vilken syn rättssystemet har på mänskliga känslor, om de är inneboende hos vår art eller inlärda. Jag har hittat en ganska stark konsensus om att svensk rätt lägger tonvikten vid en normativ, moralisk bedömning.
Jag ägnar också ett kapitel av uppsatsen åt att reflektera över min slutsats i relation till förändringen i straffideologi, från prevention till förtjänst, proportionalitet och ekvivalens, som successivt ägt rum sedan Brottsbalkens införande. Eftersom provokationens förmildrande verkan går att spåra långt längre tillbaka än till 1989, har frågeställningen varit om denna straffideologiska ändring har någon inverkan på mina antaganden om provokationsbestämmelsens grundvalar. Min slutsats i denna del är att provokationers förmildrande verkan svårligen moraliskt kan underbyggas på samma sätt med en preventionistisk ideologi som med en proportionalistisk. Detta eftersom rättskipningen enligt den första ideologin måste lägga fokus på gärningspersonens faktiska sinnelag och dennes risk för att försättas i en liknande situation igen, medan det enligt den senare inte är tillåtet att överväga framåtblickande skäl, varför fokus flyttas från gärningspersonen till provokatören och dennes skuld. (Less) - Abstract
- The mitigating effect of provocation has for a long time been considered a given part of the Swedish as well as other judicial systems. In 1989, a new regulation was introduced in the Swedish Penal Code, explicitly confirming the mitigating power of provocation, or, as directly translated from the regulation, “obviously abusive behaviour”, in the assessment of the penal value of a crime. The clues in the legislative history, as to why the principle was introduced as law, are, however, not greatly elaborated on; when the sanction system was due for reform, its introduction was practically taken for granted. The principle was already part of an established practice, although the courts have never clearly established on which grounds the... (More)
- The mitigating effect of provocation has for a long time been considered a given part of the Swedish as well as other judicial systems. In 1989, a new regulation was introduced in the Swedish Penal Code, explicitly confirming the mitigating power of provocation, or, as directly translated from the regulation, “obviously abusive behaviour”, in the assessment of the penal value of a crime. The clues in the legislative history, as to why the principle was introduced as law, are, however, not greatly elaborated on; when the sanction system was due for reform, its introduction was practically taken for granted. The principle was already part of an established practice, although the courts have never clearly established on which grounds the evaluation was done. The purpose of this essay is to answer the question of why provocation ought to be seen as a mitigating factor in the assessment of penal value of a crime. In the doctrine that I have studied, I have found a lot of the reasoning to be based upon the criminal system’s view on human emotions; whether they are inherent to humankind or, rather, instrumental to values learned. I have found that Swedish law puts emphasis on a normative, moral judgment.
I also dedicate a chapter of the essay to reflection on my conclusion as related to the change of direction in penal ideology, from prevention to proportion and equivalence, which has taken successfully taken place since the first introduction of the Penal Code. Since the mitigating power of provocation can be tracked further back than to 1989, my question has been whether the change in penal ideology affects my conclusions about the basic premises of the regulation of provocation. My conclusion in this part is that the mitigating power of provocation cannot be based upon the same arguments with a preventionist ideology, as it would be with a proportionalist one. To match the first ideology, justice would need to focus mainly on the spirit of the perpetrator’s actual state of mind and their risk of being put in a similar situation again, whereas the latter does not allow the assessment to consider the risk of future crime as a factor. Because of this, focus is shifted from the perpetrator to the provocateur and their guilt in the case. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9045767
- author
- Olsson, Måns LU
- supervisor
- organization
- course
- LAGF03 20211
- year
- 2021
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- straffrätt, criminal law, provokation, kränkande beteende, kränkning, straffvärde, förmildrande omständighet
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 9045767
- date added to LUP
- 2021-06-29 16:38:29
- date last changed
- 2021-06-29 16:38:29
@misc{9045767,
abstract = {{The mitigating effect of provocation has for a long time been considered a given part of the Swedish as well as other judicial systems. In 1989, a new regulation was introduced in the Swedish Penal Code, explicitly confirming the mitigating power of provocation, or, as directly translated from the regulation, “obviously abusive behaviour”, in the assessment of the penal value of a crime. The clues in the legislative history, as to why the principle was introduced as law, are, however, not greatly elaborated on; when the sanction system was due for reform, its introduction was practically taken for granted. The principle was already part of an established practice, although the courts have never clearly established on which grounds the evaluation was done. The purpose of this essay is to answer the question of why provocation ought to be seen as a mitigating factor in the assessment of penal value of a crime. In the doctrine that I have studied, I have found a lot of the reasoning to be based upon the criminal system’s view on human emotions; whether they are inherent to humankind or, rather, instrumental to values learned. I have found that Swedish law puts emphasis on a normative, moral judgment.
I also dedicate a chapter of the essay to reflection on my conclusion as related to the change of direction in penal ideology, from prevention to proportion and equivalence, which has taken successfully taken place since the first introduction of the Penal Code. Since the mitigating power of provocation can be tracked further back than to 1989, my question has been whether the change in penal ideology affects my conclusions about the basic premises of the regulation of provocation. My conclusion in this part is that the mitigating power of provocation cannot be based upon the same arguments with a preventionist ideology, as it would be with a proportionalist one. To match the first ideology, justice would need to focus mainly on the spirit of the perpetrator’s actual state of mind and their risk of being put in a similar situation again, whereas the latter does not allow the assessment to consider the risk of future crime as a factor. Because of this, focus is shifted from the perpetrator to the provocateur and their guilt in the case.}},
author = {{Olsson, Måns}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Sa du något eller? – Om provokationers straffmildrande verkan}},
year = {{2021}},
}