Uteslutet medverkansansvar för de som straffbud avser skydda - Principiella och systematiska aspekter
(2021) LAGF03 20211Department of Law
Faculty of Law
- Abstract (Swedish)
- Medverkan till brott enligt brottsbalken (1962:700), BrB, 23:4 är en vidsträckt brottsform inte enbart utifrån kriminaliseringens utsträckning över olika delikt, men även eftersom tröskeln för det otillåtna är tämligen låg. Att även de som avses skyddas av olika straffbud ibland medverkar till gärningsmannens gärning är därför inte särskilt konstigt. Samtidigt kan ofta antas att lagstiftaren inte har avsett att straffansvar skall utdömas i dessa situationer. De svenska medverkansreglerna inhyser dock inget generellt stadgande om att den som avses skyddas av en straffbestämmelse inte skall kunna ådömas medverkansansvar. Om en medverkande som avses skyddas skall undantas från ansvar, måste det därför förklaras på andra sätt som passar in i... (More)
- Medverkan till brott enligt brottsbalken (1962:700), BrB, 23:4 är en vidsträckt brottsform inte enbart utifrån kriminaliseringens utsträckning över olika delikt, men även eftersom tröskeln för det otillåtna är tämligen låg. Att även de som avses skyddas av olika straffbud ibland medverkar till gärningsmannens gärning är därför inte särskilt konstigt. Samtidigt kan ofta antas att lagstiftaren inte har avsett att straffansvar skall utdömas i dessa situationer. De svenska medverkansreglerna inhyser dock inget generellt stadgande om att den som avses skyddas av en straffbestämmelse inte skall kunna ådömas medverkansansvar. Om en medverkande som avses skyddas skall undantas från ansvar, måste det därför förklaras på andra sätt som passar in i det komplexa system som medverkansläran utgör.
Med avstamp i den rättsdogmatiska metoden diskuterar och systematiserar uppsatsen de principer och regler som kan användas för att utesluta medverkansansvar för de som avses skyddas enligt olika straffbud. Studien visar att det när uttryckliga undantagsstadganden eller tydliga förarbetsuttalanden saknas, primärt finns två läror att tillgå i situationer som dessa; handlande mot egen rättssfär respektive concursus necessarius. Enligt förstnämnda lära är det inte brottsligt att begå ett brott enbart mot sig själv, vilket inte endast kan tillämpas på gärningsmän, utan även på medverkande. Concursus necessarius tar i stället sikte på nödvändig medverkan, dvs. sådan medverkan som medverkansobjektet inte kan tillskapas utan. För sådana fall råder i princip total enighet kring att en nödvändigt medverkande som avses skyddas av det straffbud som utgör medverkansobjekt inte torde hållas ansvarig för sin medverkan. Beträffande den tekniska placeringen av straffriheten inom medverkansläran bör uteslutet ansvar med hänvisning till handlande mot egen rättssfär placeras som bristande brottsbeskrivningsenlighet enligt 23:4 st. 1, medan concursus necessarius istället bör betraktas som undantag från medverkansreglernas tillämpningsområde. (Less) - Abstract
- Complicity in crime according to Chapter 23 Section 4 of The Penal Code (1962:700), BrB, is an extensive type of crime, not only due to complicity being criminalized for a substantive number of crimes, but also because the threshold for the unallowed is rather low. That those who are supposed to be protected by different penalty provisions sometimes formally participate in the perpetrator’s act, is therefore not that strange. At the same time, it can often be assumed that the legislator has not intended to punish the accomplice in these situations. However, the Swedish rules on complicity do not contain a general provision that those who are to be protected by a penal provision are to be exempt from responsibility for complicity. If a... (More)
- Complicity in crime according to Chapter 23 Section 4 of The Penal Code (1962:700), BrB, is an extensive type of crime, not only due to complicity being criminalized for a substantive number of crimes, but also because the threshold for the unallowed is rather low. That those who are supposed to be protected by different penalty provisions sometimes formally participate in the perpetrator’s act, is therefore not that strange. At the same time, it can often be assumed that the legislator has not intended to punish the accomplice in these situations. However, the Swedish rules on complicity do not contain a general provision that those who are to be protected by a penal provision are to be exempt from responsibility for complicity. If a protected person is to be exempt from said responsibility, it must therefore be explained in some other way that fits into the complex system that the rules on complicity constitute.
Based on the legal dogmatic method, the essay discusses and systemizes the principles and rules that can be used to exempt responsibility for complicity for those who are to be protected by different penal provisions. The study shows that when there are no explicit exemption rules or clear statements in legislative work, primarily two principles are to be used in situations such as these: acting against one's own legal sphere and concursus necessarius. According to the first, an act cannot constitute a crime if committed only against oneself, which can not only be applied to perpetrators, but also accomplices. Concursus necessarius is instead aimed at necessary participation, which is such participation that the complicity object cannot be created without. For these cases, the legal doctrine is basically unanimous in that a necessary participant who is supposed to be protected by the provision that constitutes the complicity object, ought to not be held responsible for his/her complicity. Regarding the technical placement of the exemptions within the rules on complicity, it is to be described as lacking fulfillment of the first paragraph of Chapter 23 Section 4 when the accomplice acts against his own legal sphere, while cases of concursus necessarius should be considered as exceptions from the scope of application of the rules on complicity. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9045893
- author
- Österberg, John LU
- supervisor
-
- Tova Bennet LU
- organization
- course
- LAGF03 20211
- year
- 2021
- type
- M2 - Bachelor Degree
- subject
- keywords
- straffrätt, medverkansansvar, skyddsintressen, handlande mot egen rättssfär, nödvändig medverkan
- language
- Swedish
- id
- 9045893
- date added to LUP
- 2021-06-29 16:32:12
- date last changed
- 2021-06-29 16:32:12
@misc{9045893,
abstract = {{Complicity in crime according to Chapter 23 Section 4 of The Penal Code (1962:700), BrB, is an extensive type of crime, not only due to complicity being criminalized for a substantive number of crimes, but also because the threshold for the unallowed is rather low. That those who are supposed to be protected by different penalty provisions sometimes formally participate in the perpetrator’s act, is therefore not that strange. At the same time, it can often be assumed that the legislator has not intended to punish the accomplice in these situations. However, the Swedish rules on complicity do not contain a general provision that those who are to be protected by a penal provision are to be exempt from responsibility for complicity. If a protected person is to be exempt from said responsibility, it must therefore be explained in some other way that fits into the complex system that the rules on complicity constitute.
Based on the legal dogmatic method, the essay discusses and systemizes the principles and rules that can be used to exempt responsibility for complicity for those who are to be protected by different penal provisions. The study shows that when there are no explicit exemption rules or clear statements in legislative work, primarily two principles are to be used in situations such as these: acting against one's own legal sphere and concursus necessarius. According to the first, an act cannot constitute a crime if committed only against oneself, which can not only be applied to perpetrators, but also accomplices. Concursus necessarius is instead aimed at necessary participation, which is such participation that the complicity object cannot be created without. For these cases, the legal doctrine is basically unanimous in that a necessary participant who is supposed to be protected by the provision that constitutes the complicity object, ought to not be held responsible for his/her complicity. Regarding the technical placement of the exemptions within the rules on complicity, it is to be described as lacking fulfillment of the first paragraph of Chapter 23 Section 4 when the accomplice acts against his own legal sphere, while cases of concursus necessarius should be considered as exceptions from the scope of application of the rules on complicity.}},
author = {{Österberg, John}},
language = {{swe}},
note = {{Student Paper}},
title = {{Uteslutet medverkansansvar för de som straffbud avser skydda - Principiella och systematiska aspekter}},
year = {{2021}},
}