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Utrotningshotade landområden - Folkrättsliga konsekvenser vid ö-staters förlust av territorium

Larsson, Linus LU (2021) LAGF03 20211
Department of Law
Faculty of Law
Abstract (Swedish)
Den internationella arenan domineras av stater. Staters existens är befäst i sedvanerätten genom Montevideokonventionen. Det har dock i ivern att hålla sig fast vid denna uppstått en uppfattning om att de kriterierna som krävs för att något kan anses vara en stat, också blir gällande e contrario i hänsyn till när stater ska anses upphöra att existera. En av de fyra kriterierna är kriteriet om territorium, men vad händer när territoriet inte längre finns? Det är en reell risk, när ett öga riktas mot ö-staterna och de klimatförändringar som för med sin en förhöjd havsnivå. Och vad händer med staternas resurser, i hänsyn till de maritima zonerna de nyttjar?

Denna uppsats undersöker kraven som Montevideokonventionen har satt ut för att en... (More)
Den internationella arenan domineras av stater. Staters existens är befäst i sedvanerätten genom Montevideokonventionen. Det har dock i ivern att hålla sig fast vid denna uppstått en uppfattning om att de kriterierna som krävs för att något kan anses vara en stat, också blir gällande e contrario i hänsyn till när stater ska anses upphöra att existera. En av de fyra kriterierna är kriteriet om territorium, men vad händer när territoriet inte längre finns? Det är en reell risk, när ett öga riktas mot ö-staterna och de klimatförändringar som för med sin en förhöjd havsnivå. Och vad händer med staternas resurser, i hänsyn till de maritima zonerna de nyttjar?

Denna uppsats undersöker kraven som Montevideokonventionen har satt ut för att en stat ska anses existera, och lyfter kort varför det är åtråvärt att vara en stat på den internationella arenan. Det förs fram att den största anledningen är att den internationella arenan är skapt för stater, det är enbart stater som får rösta och konventionerna är skapta med stater i åtanke.

Vidare undersöks sätt som stater har upphört att existera historiskt sett, i ett tidsspann från vår dag till FN:s grundande. Det visar sig att alla exempel antingen är frivilliga, såsom sammanslagningar, eller består av att restsstater fyller det vakuum som lämnas efter den ursprungliga staten, såsom sker i splittringen av Jugoslavien, eller att en stat handgripligen annekterar en annan stats territorium medelst våld. Vidare konstateras att inga stater upphört att existera utan att minst en annan stat varit inblandad i skeendet. Detta betyder att Montevideokonventionen e contrario fortfarande är en teoretisk tolkning av situationen, trots att den är den gällande. Det konstateras också att konsekvensen av förhöjda havsnivåer kan få följden att Montevideokonventionen e contrario kommer att nyttjas för att beröva ö-stater som kan komma att mista sitt territorium eller befolkning, deras statsskap.

Det befästs också att det finns ett gediget skydd för stater i form av ett antagande att de aldrig går under – men det konstateras även att de trots detta inte kan räknas som stater, och inte kommer kunna rösta, om de inte igen får territorium. Förslag på alternativa former av statsskap som återfinns i doktrinen lyftes även upp, bland annat ett förslag på en exilstat.

Slutligen problematiseras även artikel 121 i UNCLOS och dess definition av vad som är öar och inte, och diskussionen om var gränsen går för dessa belyses kort. Det framgår att doktrinen är tvetydig, och att det finns fog i att tolka ett utträde ur UNCLOS som ett eventuell fördelaktigt beslut i syfte att fortsatt kunna göra hävd på EEZ som kan berövas ö-staterna till följd av havsnivåhöjningen och den efterföljande nedgraderingen av deras öar till rocks.

Slutsatsen är att ö-staternas situation är hotad, och att deras statsskap kan komma att tas ifrån dem vid förlusten av deras territorium, om inte det internationella samfundet på något sätt utformar en lösning på problemet, då det inte finns några luckor för ö-stater att nyttja i dagsläget. (Less)
Abstract
The global arena is dominated by states. The existence of a state is regulated in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights of States. There does however seem, that in the desire to follow this convention, a definitive opinion that states losing one of the criteria set up by the convention, also means losing their stateship, as a Montevideo Convention e contrario, if you will. One of these four criteria is the criteria for territory – but what if the territory no longer exists? There is a fear that the sea level rise may bring this criterion into play for island-states. And what is to happen with the maritime resources of these states, in regard to the maritime zones which they are entitled to?

This thesis examines the criteria the... (More)
The global arena is dominated by states. The existence of a state is regulated in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights of States. There does however seem, that in the desire to follow this convention, a definitive opinion that states losing one of the criteria set up by the convention, also means losing their stateship, as a Montevideo Convention e contrario, if you will. One of these four criteria is the criteria for territory – but what if the territory no longer exists? There is a fear that the sea level rise may bring this criterion into play for island-states. And what is to happen with the maritime resources of these states, in regard to the maritime zones which they are entitled to?

This thesis examines the criteria the Montevideo Convention has erected for the existence of a state, and briefly highlights why it is desirable to be a state in the global arena. The case brought forward is one made based on the fact that the global arena has been made for states, it is only states that may vote in the general assembly and the conventions are made with states in mind.

Moreover, the thesis examines historical ways that states have ceased to exist, in a timespan spanning from the foundation of the UN to our day. These examples are shown to be made of free will, such as mergers, or consist of rump-states filling up the void left on the territory of the mother-state, such as the partition of Yugoslavia, or in one case, a hostile seizure of territory. Furthermore, it is established that no states have ceased to be without at least one other state being complicit in it one way or another. This goes to show that the Montevideo Convention e contrario still is a theoretical interpretation of the Convention, even though it seems to have won acceptance. It is furthermore established that the consequence of heightened sea-levels could be that the Montevideo Convention e contrario will be used to invalidate the island-nations stateship, if they lose their territory or their population.

It is also confirmed that there is a solid support for states in the fact that they in the customary law are presumed to never perish. It is however also confirmed that they despite this presumption still will not be seen as “enough” states in the international context to retain their right to vote and participate in the general assembly, if they are not territorial. Suggestions of alternative stateship-solutions found in the legal doctrine is also presented, such as a suggestion of a state retaining their stateship although involuntarily exiled from their homeland.
Lastly, the article 121 of UNCLOS is problematized in its definition of what is an island and what is not, and the debate on where this line should be drawn is briefly discussed. It is obvious that the legal doctrine is ambiguous, and that there is reason to discuss the withdrawal from UNCLOS as an favorable course of action, to be able to continue to claim the EEZ that may be deprived off of them due to the rising sea-levels and the following degradation of their islands into rocks.

The conclusion is that the island-nations situation is threatened, and that their stateship may be in danger of being seized from them when their territory is lost, if the international community doesn’t find a solution to the problem, as the chance for a loophole seems to be quite slim. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
Larsson, Linus LU
supervisor
organization
course
LAGF03 20211
year
type
M2 - Bachelor Degree
subject
keywords
folkrätt, public international law, havsrätt, law of the sea, UNCLOS
language
Swedish
id
9045953
date added to LUP
2021-06-29 16:41:56
date last changed
2021-06-29 16:41:56
@misc{9045953,
  abstract     = {{The global arena is dominated by states. The existence of a state is regulated in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights of States. There does however seem, that in the desire to follow this convention, a definitive opinion that states losing one of the criteria set up by the convention, also means losing their stateship, as a Montevideo Convention e contrario, if you will. One of these four criteria is the criteria for territory – but what if the territory no longer exists? There is a fear that the sea level rise may bring this criterion into play for island-states. And what is to happen with the maritime resources of these states, in regard to the maritime zones which they are entitled to?

This thesis examines the criteria the Montevideo Convention has erected for the existence of a state, and briefly highlights why it is desirable to be a state in the global arena. The case brought forward is one made based on the fact that the global arena has been made for states, it is only states that may vote in the general assembly and the conventions are made with states in mind.

Moreover, the thesis examines historical ways that states have ceased to exist, in a timespan spanning from the foundation of the UN to our day. These examples are shown to be made of free will, such as mergers, or consist of rump-states filling up the void left on the territory of the mother-state, such as the partition of Yugoslavia, or in one case, a hostile seizure of territory. Furthermore, it is established that no states have ceased to be without at least one other state being complicit in it one way or another. This goes to show that the Montevideo Convention e contrario still is a theoretical interpretation of the Convention, even though it seems to have won acceptance. It is furthermore established that the consequence of heightened sea-levels could be that the Montevideo Convention e contrario will be used to invalidate the island-nations stateship, if they lose their territory or their population.

It is also confirmed that there is a solid support for states in the fact that they in the customary law are presumed to never perish. It is however also confirmed that they despite this presumption still will not be seen as “enough” states in the international context to retain their right to vote and participate in the general assembly, if they are not territorial. Suggestions of alternative stateship-solutions found in the legal doctrine is also presented, such as a suggestion of a state retaining their stateship although involuntarily exiled from their homeland.
Lastly, the article 121 of UNCLOS is problematized in its definition of what is an island and what is not, and the debate on where this line should be drawn is briefly discussed. It is obvious that the legal doctrine is ambiguous, and that there is reason to discuss the withdrawal from UNCLOS as an favorable course of action, to be able to continue to claim the EEZ that may be deprived off of them due to the rising sea-levels and the following degradation of their islands into rocks.

The conclusion is that the island-nations situation is threatened, and that their stateship may be in danger of being seized from them when their territory is lost, if the international community doesn’t find a solution to the problem, as the chance for a loophole seems to be quite slim.}},
  author       = {{Larsson, Linus}},
  language     = {{swe}},
  note         = {{Student Paper}},
  title        = {{Utrotningshotade landområden - Folkrättsliga konsekvenser vid ö-staters förlust av territorium}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}